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This dissertation presents an account of the basic schema of Hegel’s ontological 
theory based on a close reading of the key part of his Logic: the Doctrine of the 
Concept. The careful examination of the internal architectonic of the Hegelian 
Concept, which includes its three moments: the activity of generation of empirical 
concepts that is guided by the determinations of reflection, the systematically 
related constellation of empirical concepts, and the objects that are individuated 
through them as well as the specific type of relation between these moments, 
demonstrates that the key characteristics of the basic ontological structure stem 
from Kant. Hence, I conclude that Hegel is presenting a new type of ontology that 
becomes possible after Kant’s Copernican revolution, which rendered the formal 
structure of the empirical objects of experience grounded on the faculty of 
understanding. The dissertation suggests that Hegel’s Logic can be read as an 
extended commentary on (or spelling out of the ontological implications from) the 
famous Kantian claim from the transcendental deduction: the object is in the 
concept of which manifold is united. 
 
 
Advisors: Dean Moyar.  Readers: Yitzhak Melamed, Hent de Vries  







First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dean 
Moyar for the continuous guidance and support of my research, for his patience, 
encouragement, and immense knowledge. It was his constant insistence on clarity 
and intellectual rigor that made it possible for me to navigate through the complex 
twists and turns of Hegel’s logic. I could not have imagined having a better advisor.   
 
I thank Yitzhak Melamed for his invaluable insights and continuous support 
throughout the writing process. Similarly I am grateful to Hent de Vries both for his 
helpful comments on this work and the inspiring seminars on contemporary 
European Philosophy that nurtured and reinforced my interest in Hegel. I also 
would like to thank Katrin Pahl and Jennifer Culbert for their insightful feedback and 
suggestions on future prospects of my research.  
 
My sincere thanks also goes to Michael Williams, Richard Bett, Eckart Förster, Paola 
Marrati, Meredith Williams, Peter Achinstein, Steven Gross, and Hilary Bok for the 
many wonderful classes that shaped my outlook. I’m grateful to Hopkins’ Philosophy 
Department for its intellectual rigor and open spirit that offered an ideal 
environment for development as a scholar. I thank my fellow graduate students for 
iv 
 
their friendship and many inspiring discussions that inform my research through 
and through.  
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family, my wife Hulya, my mother 
Nelly, and my sister Khatya for their love and constant supporting throughout the 
whole process of writing this thesis. Finally, the unique place in my life belongs to 











Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Chapter 2: Hegel’s Critique of Alternative Positions ………………………………………………………......33 
Chapter 3: Determinations of Reflection and Generation of Conceptual Content  …..…………....82 
Chapter 4: The Logical Structure of the Concept …………………………………………………………….…122 





CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
 
The recent debate over Hegel’s philosophy is carried out along the lines of 
the Kantian-epistemological vs. metaphysical interpretations of his position. Those 
belonging to the first camp understand Hegel as the figure who brought the Kantian 
epistemological turn in philosophy to its completion, leaving behind the questions of 
traditional metaphysics regarding the ultimate structure of reality that underlies the 
mere appearance and true nature of God, soul, and the world. The general line taken 
by these commentators is that although Hegel does not stop short of using the 
terminology of traditional metaphysics (such as God, infinite, absolute etc.), the 
philosophically significant core of his position is independent of these archaic 
elements, which therefore can be lifted out of his overall corpus without sustaining 
any philosophically significant loss. Though not always explicitly acknowledged, 
these Hegelian scholars stand in the long tradition of rescuing what is alive in Hegel 
from what is dead and ought to be left behind. The essential kernel of Hegel’s system 
worth rescuing, according to these commentators, is the Kantian transcendental 







The central figure among the commentators who consider the completion of 
Kantian transcendental epistemology central to Hegel's legacy is Robert Pippin, 
whose groundbreaking Hegel’s Idealism, published in 1989, set a new stage in Hegel 
scholarship. In the book, Pippin aims to demonstrate that the issues most important 
to Hegel’s project can be traced back to Kantian critical epistemology. Uncovering 
the Kantian origins of Hegel’s philosophy, according to Pippin and his followers, 
allows us to read Hegel as a post-Kantian epistemologist whose doctrine can be set 
free of any substantial ontological commitments. This approach allows us to read 
Hegel's two central works, Logic and Phenomenology, as investigations within the 
normative authority of the pure concepts of understanding as the means by which 
reality can be cognized, and to do so without ascribing to Hegel any substantial 
commitments regarding the nature of this reality. The image of Hegel that emerges 
as a result of this account is that of a transcendental epistemologist who replaces 
the Kantian formal account of the pure concepts of the understanding with a more 
robust exposition of the conceptual schemata as the medium of making sense of the 
world while putting aside questions of metaphysical nature. 
 Pippin’s work brought about two invaluable contributions to Hegel 
scholarship. First, he left behind the hitherto dominant onto-theological readings of 
Hegel that saw him as a philosopher of the world-soul who had reconstructed the 
problems and issues of traditional metaphysical systems on historicist grounds, but 
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essentially addressed the very same questions as his rationalist predecessors and 
offered answers to them from the point of view of God. Second, Pippin made it 
possible for Hegel to speak to contemporary philosophers by translating his 
complicated technical vocabulary—such as “in itself vs. for itself,” “infinite being 
immanent to the finite,” “freedom as being with itself in its other,” etcetera—into a 
language much more accessible to those schooled in the analytic tradition. From an 
obscure thinker of only historical value, Hegel was transformed into a figure who 




2) New traditionalist alternative 
 
The alternative approach that emerged in the years following the publication 
of Pippin’s work has reinstated the image of Hegel as a metaphysical thinker. But 
this is not simply an attempt to go back to any version of the traditional reading that 
dominated Hegel scholarship prior to the publication of Pippin’s work. What sets 
these commentators apart from the traditional readings of Hegel, which also 
ascribed to him a metaphysical position, is that they are elaborated on the 
background and in contradistinction to Pippin’s Hegel. The most vivid evidence of 
this is that these commentators take distancing Hegel from Kant as the touchstone 
for ascribing to him any form of metaphysical view. It is because Pippin and his 
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followers take the Kantian dimension of Hegel’s project as the grounds for 
advancing a non-metaphysical reading that the new metaphysical interpretations 
see distancing Hegel from Kant as a necessary condition for a successful execution of 
their project.  
Hence, while Rolf-Peter Horstmann in his work that preceded and considered 
with the publication of Pippin’s book could comfortably present Hegel as upholding 
certain ontological theory, while at the same time standing within the tradition of 
the Kantian critical philosophy, the new interpreters like Robert Stern and Brady 
Bowman clearly feel the need for decoupling Hegel’s project from Kant's in order to 
ascribe to him any substantial ontological commitments. Bowman, for example, 
writes, “to be a philosopher self-consciously working in the wake of Kant’s 
‘fortunate revolution’ is [not] necessarily to be engaged in a project that is 
continuous with transcendental idealism or one that needs to recognize the peculiar 
limitations Kant sought to impose on thought. Post Kant is not necessarily propter 
Kant” (Bowman 2013, 3). For Bowman, the path to demonstrating that Hegel is 
upholding a metaphysical theory lies in showing that his project diverges radically 
from Kant’s. In the same vein, Stern writes,  
Kant may be seen as proposing a dilemma to the 
traditional ontologist: Either he can proceed by 
abstracting from the spatio-temporal appearances of 
things in an attempt to speculate about things as they 
are in themselves,… ,and get him nowhere with things 
in themselves; or he can attempt to work with less 
formal principles, that take into account the spatio-
temporal features of things—but then he must accept 
that he is no longer inquiring into being qua being. 
(Stern 2009, 15) 
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Here Stern is drawing two alternative options that were left to choose from after 
Kant, and he ends up placing Hegel closer to the traditional camp by describing him 
as having “much greater sympathy for the traditional approach than the Kantian 
one, which he often presents as a kind of modern faint-heartedness, a falling back 
from the admirable confidence in the power of thought and reason to take us to the 
heart of things that the metaphysical tradition… was able to display” (Stern 2009, 9). 
Clearly, it is due to the depth and breadth of Pippin’s impact on the recent Hegel 
scholarship that both Bowman and Stern see no other alternative but to decouple 
Hegel from Kant in order to ascribe to him an ontological theory.  
 
 
3) My Position 
 
My position is that this debate rests on a false dilemma, as it assumes that the 
Kantian and metaphysical readings mutually exclude each other. I shall argue that 
not only is it possible, but in order to do justice to the complexity of his position we 
must read Hegel as both (a) continuing the Kantian Transcendental project, and (b) 
advancing a qualitatively new kind of metaphysical (or rather, ontological) theory 
(having left the traditional pre-critical metaphysics fully behind). I shall use the 
term ontology, rather than metaphysics, for reasons that will become clear shortly. 
This work takes up the task of presenting a detailed account of what I will be 
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referring to as Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology, and it consists of three essential 
facets.  
First, I shall show that the ontological theory Hegel is advancing is 
fundamentally different from traditional metaphysics, and therefore the recent 
metaphysical readings advance views that are more misguiding than helpful in 
understanding Hegel’s position.  
Second, I shall also show that this qualitatively new ontological outlook 
became possible only after Kant’s critical philosophy. In other words, without the 
Kantian background and the Kantian basic framework integrated within the 
Hegelian system, the central theses advanced by Hegel’s ontological theory would 
simply not be possible. One way to think of this relation is along the lines of the 
Kuhnian theory of the establishment of new scientific paradigms that brings along 
with it new background commitments and assumptions. According to Kuhn, certain 
scientific theories become possible only after one system of fundamental beliefs and 
normative assumptions are replaced by another. In the same way, Kantian insights 
inaugurate something like a paradigm shift that makes the elaboration of Hegelian 
ontology possible. The Kuhnian analogy can also be helpful in further explicating the 
difference between traditional metaphysics and Hegelian ontology. Although both 
are views about the ultimate nature of reality and, upon first glance, the Hegelian 
model might appear as one more theory amongst the many that had been 
formulated before him, once more carefully examined, it becomes apparent that we 
are dealing with a radical transformation of the most fundamental aspects of the 
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traditional view. For example, the central concept of ontology, being, has been 
described in the Hegelian doctrine and traditional metaphysic as identical to 
thought, but the claim of identity between the two sides is radically different 
according to the traditional and the Hegelian ontology. To use the Kuhnian 
terminology, as a result of the paradigm shift, we are responding to a different world 
and the shift was initiated by the Kant’s Copernican turn. Hence, spelling out the 
Kantian origins of this transformation and taking a close look at its details will be 
one of the central tasks of my undertaking here.  
Finally, the ultimate goal of the project is to present a detailed account of the 
ontological model upheld by Hegel. It is in the Doctrine of the Concept, and 
specifically in the Syllogism section, where Hegel presents the most fundamental 
account of his conception of actuality. Therefore, a close analysis of these parts of 
the Logic will be the central task undertaken in what follows. As is, we shall see that 
the detailed presentation of the basic underpinnings of Hegelian ontology will serve 
as the most conclusive confirmation of the above two points as well. It is only after a 
comprehensive account of Hegel’s vision of actuality is brought to light can we fully 
appreciate both its indebtedness to Kant and the extent to which it departs from 






4) Pippin’s & My Readings 
 
The interpretation that I’ll be offering here is inspired by Pippin’s Kantian 
reading of Hegel. I agree with the overall thrust of Pippin's approach regarding the 
Kantian origins of Hegel’s system, as well as the rejection of the traditional 
metaphysical model that follows from this. To do the contrary and position Hegel 
close to the pre-Kantian metaphysic means, as my discussion shall make clear, to fail 
to appreciate the revolutionary nature of his position and to relegate him to history 
as a “premodern anachronism.” Hence, I agree with Pippin’s claim that “Hegel’s 
speculative position…his theory of the Absolute Idea, his claim that such an Idea 
alone is ‘what truly is’ could be interpreted and defended in a way that is not 
committed to a philosophically problematic theological metaphysics”(Pippin 1989, 
5). Indeed, as laying out the detailed picture of Hegel’s position shall make evident, 
one has to fundamentally misunderstand the Hegelian basic conceptual framework 
to see him as pursuing a project similar to traditional metaphysics. But at the same 
time, to claim that Hegel is not committed to “a philosophically problematic 
theological metaphysics” is not the same as to claim that he is not upholding any 
ontological stance at all. To claim that it is the absolute idea that “what truly is," as 
Hegel does according to Pippin, means to take up certain ontological commitments. 
If this claim has any meaning at all, it belongs to the sphere of ontology.  
I also agree with Pippin’s broad-brush outline of the formula for “getting 
Hegel from Kant”:  
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Keep the doctrine of pure concepts and the account of 
apperception that helps justify the necessary 
presupposition of pure concepts, keep the critical 
problem of a proof for the objectivity of these concepts, 
the question that began critical philosophy, but 
abandon the doctrine of ‘pure sensible intuition,’ and 
the very possibility of a clear distinction between 
concepts and intuitions, and what is left is much of 
Hegel’s enterprise. (Pippin 1989, 9) 
And Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism indeed presents a comprehensive application of this 
formula through the detailed analysis of Hegel’s two central texts, The 
Phenomenology and the Logic.  
The approach I’m taking in this work is more modest. Instead of presenting a 
comprehensive account of Hegel's corpus, I shall almost exclusively focus on those 
few sections of his Logic that I consider to be essential for understanding the basic 
principle of his position. It is through the identification of the Kantian footprints on 
this fundamental level of his system that the claim of continuity between the 





Another important figure amongst the non-metaphysical interpreters of 
Hegel is Robert Brandom, who alongside Pippin reads Hegel as pursuing the Kantian 
project, but sees him as best understood when projected onto the plane of problems 
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and issues of semantics. In his paper “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of 
Hegel,” Brandom suggests to read Hegel as advancing a two-tiered semantic theory 
that discriminates between the logical vs. empirical (ordinary or non-logical) 
concepts. Clearly, the move is directly emanating from the Kantian distinction 
between the logical forms of judgment and the categories on the one hand, and the 
empirical concepts on the other.  
According to Brandom, while the ordinary determinate concepts “make 
explicit how the world is,” the logical ones “make explicit the process by which 
determinate content is conferred on or incorporated in the ground-level empirical 
and practical concepts” (2004). He wants to replace the monistic metaphysics that 
used to be traditionally ascribed to Hegel with a semantic holism, according to 
which empirical concepts taken together with the inferential relation between them 
and the doxastic commitments in which they are employed form an interrelated 
holistic system. Hence, judgment, wherein a single element of a given constellation 
is employed, is mediately related to the systematic whole; and an endorsement of a 
new judgment is mirrored in a modification of the conceptual content of the totality 
of the system. Besides, a modification of a conceptual content of any given element 
of the system will have its impact on the potential or actual judgment made by 
means of the other elements of the given schema.  
I agree with Brandom in his delineation between the logical and the 
empirical concepts, as well as his view regarding their relation to one another. The 
former, instead of serving as the medium through which the world is made manifest 
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to the mind, constitutes the schemata that determines the relation between 
empirical concepts and guides the process of their formation. Logical concepts, 
according to Brandom, comprise a set of meta-concepts that, instead of telling us 
about how the world is, tell us about the processes of formation of the concepts, 
which tell us how the world is. Much of the analysis of Hegel’s ontological theory 
that follows will be carried out with this Brandomian distinction in mind. As we 
shall see, through the analysis of some key passages from the Doctrine of Essence 
and the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel presents an account of this onto-logical 
structure grasped on different levels: first, as an elaboration of the elements of this 
set of concepts in the doctrine of essence; and later, in the doctrine of the concept, 
on the structural relation that guides the process of their application and also 
expresses the architectonics of the system of empirical concepts formed through 
this process. The empirical, or ordinary, concepts are different from the system 
presented in Hegel’s onto-logical account in that they are necessarily unstable and 
incomplete; they undergo a continuous process of revision and reformulation of 
their meaning. According to Brandom, any set of empirical concepts, through the 
process of their application in empirical judgments and the clarification of the 
inferential relations between them, will be necessarily driven to contradiction—this 
is what he calls the semantic pessimism of Hegel as he reads him. Hence, if in the case 
of the logical concepts their exhaustive account is presented by Hegel in his Logic, 
the analogous set of the empirical concepts is in principle impossible.  
Brandom, like Pippin before him, opens up a new dimension in which Hegel’s 
philosophy can be approached, by pointing to a complex framework present within 
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the Hegelian corpus that needs to be further fleshed out and elaborated in greater 
detail. The discussion that follows will be dedicated to the analysis of the key 
passages from Logic, in which Hegel presents elements of this framework. One 
important aspect of the project I’m undertaking here is to present a detailed account 
of several key elements of what Brandom calls the system of Hegel’s logical concepts. 
Besides having a great exegetic value in rendering accessible some of the murkiest 
parts of Hegel’s corpus, this Brandomian approach will also serve as a 
demonstration of the futility of attempts to tie Hegel’s stance with the traditional 
pre-Kantian metaphysics, as the system of logical concepts uncovered through this 
analysis are obviously related to the logical forms of judgment on which Kant 
grounded his pure concepts of the understanding. This is one more clear evidence 
that the Hegelian system is elaborated within the post-Kantian paradigm, and any 
attempts to reduce its problematic to those dealt by the pre-critical tradition is 
destined to fail in doing justice to it. At the same time, it will also become evident 
that the position put forth is not free of certain specific kind of ontological claims—
ontology not in the traditional sense but in the post-Kantian sense of the word. In 
fact, I hope to show that the Brandomian approach best realizes its potential when 






6) Pippin and Brandom: Pros and Cons  
 
Pippin’s and Brandom’s non-metaphysical readings have two decisive 
advantages over the traditional approach that places Hegel closer to the pre-critical 
metaphysicians than to Kant. First, only against the Kantian backdrop is it possible 
to make sense of the large part of Hegel’s logic that deals with the essential core of 
his philosophical system—his doctrine of the essence and the doctrine of the 
concept.  Only with the Kantian theory of the logical functions of judgment 
comprising the transcendental structure that guides the activity of the mind on 
which the object is grounded does it become possible to make sense of what Hegel is 
doing in the Doctrine of the Essence—what kind of meaning could the numerous 
claims like these have, “Determinate being is merely posited being or positedness” 
and “positidness is a determination of reflection” (WL 406), that Hegel makes 
without the Kantian backdrop and within any traditional metaphysical system? Or, 
again, without the Kantian thesis that object is in the concept of which the manifold 
is united, what could be meant by the Hegelian claim that everything actual is the 
concept? It is the Kantian transcendental turn that posits the ground based on which 
the theory that grants to the determinations of reflection the constitutive role for 
the actuality as is done in the doctrine of the essence. Any serious interpretation of 
Hegel's Logic has to acknowledge that what Hegel is doing there is clearly geared to 
the completion of the project that Kant characterized as the Copernican revolution 
in philosophy.  
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Secondly, Pippin and Brandom demonstrated how much potential the 
Kantian readings have when it comes to re-enlivening Hegel’s philosophy and 
making it relevant to contemporary problems and debates in epistemology, 
semantics, ethics, etcetera. Once these strengths of the Kantian interpretations are 
brought to the fore, the backward-looking traditional readings that discard the 
liveliest aspects of Hegel’s thought lose all the appeal.  
At the same time, Pippin’s and Brandom’s attempts to maintain neutrality 
with respect to ontology contribute very little to the strength of their positions. This 
resistance to embrace what clearly has plenty of textual evidence is a remnant of 
once-dominant dogma in the Anglophone academic philosophy regarding the 
complete rejection of metaphysics. One significant current in this overall approach, 
which probably had influenced Pippin and Brandom, originates in the Quinian 
privileging of epistemology over ontology. Quine, in his influential paper, “On What 
There Is,” argued that it is possible to isolate epistemological and semantic concerns 
from the ontological commitment and to formulate epistemological theory, i.e., 
theory about the cognition of reality, while having bracketed the question of what 
this reality is like. But a careful examination of Quine’s stance reveals that instead of 
staying neutral regarding ontological commitments, he is simply presupposing a 
basic Cartesian kind of dualistic ontology. 
 In a similar way, the shadow of the Cartesian type of dualistic ontology is 
following the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel. By neglecting the issue or 
attempting to stay neutral regarding ontological commitments and focusing instead 
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on epistemological and semantic problems, a risk emerges of inadvertently 
enforcing an ontological outlook utterly different from that of Hegel. Ontological 
backdrop seems to me to be a necessary condition for the elaboration of any 
epistemological or semantic theory. To put forth, for example, a theory of 
knowledge, as a minimum one has to answer the question of what kind of thing is 
that which is known, that which knows, and what form of being does knowledge as 
such have. By ignoring these questions, we are not obviating the need for answering 
them; instead, we are actually answering them implicitly. Brandom’s claim that 
“good reasons to endorse a strong holism concerning the senses (but not referents) 
of ordinary determinate concepts do not oblige one to adopt a corresponding thesis 
concerning the contents expressed by the logical and philosophical meta-vocabulary 
we use to discuss and explicate those ground-level concepts” (Brandom 2004, 3), 
where he describes the sense of different conceptual sets and contrasts them with 
their referents, has a clear dualistic ontological implication of a Cartesian or Fregean 
kind. Also, Pippin’s claim that Hegel’s position “is not an attack on the possibility of 
an extraconceptual reality ‘in itself’, but on the internal coherence of the notion of 
such an object as an object of thought” (Hegel’s Idealism 200) can be interpreted as 
accepting a dualistic ontological background. The bottom line is that there is no 
epistemology or semantics possible without a corresponding ontological 
commitment, and by merely pretending that we can interpret Hegel in this way we 
are undermining the force and originality of his thought and might be unwittingly 
ascribing him a kind of ontology outlook that goes in direct contradiction with the 




7) Kantian Ontology 
 
Neither does the Kantian reading of Hegel bar us from acknowledging the 
ontological view present in his system. When Kant offers supplanting the proud 
ontology by an analytic of the pure understanding, “the proud name of an ontology, 
which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a 
systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest 
one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding” (A247/B303), he is not simply 
rejecting ontology as such. Kant is not denying here that we can have some form of 
knowledge about the nature of being, as the entire transcendental analytic is 
nothing else but an exposition of the constitutive factors of the empirical reality. 
What he is rejecting is the basic ontological assumptions of the tradition preceding 
him. Kant abandons the idea of the possibility of science of the basic determinations 
of being that renders for us accessible the true nature of reality, or, to put it in his 
terms, the synthetic a priori knowledge of the noumenal world underlying the 
phenomenal realm. In other words, what Kant is saying here is not that ontology is 
not possible, but that it is not possible in the way the pre-critical tradition conceived 
it and, therefore, it ought to be replaced by a new type of enquiry into the nature of 




The new type of ontology that becomes possible as a result of the Kantian 
revolution puts aside the task of investigating the nature of transcendent being and 
turns to the investigation of the nature of phenomenal reality and the power of the 
understanding as its constitutive element. Essentially, the fundamental claim of the 
new Kantian ontology is made in the famous passage from the transcendental 
deduction—the object is in the concept of which manifold is united. The spelling out 
and justification of the structure of the unification and the forms involved with this 
unity is largely the central task of the Transcendental Analytic of The Critique of Pure 
Reason. Hence, the Kantian approach emerges as the polar opposite of the Quinian 
one—instead of privileging epistemology over ontology, it is the other way around: 
the empirical objects are cognizable, i.e., we can be epistemological optimists 
regarding the spatio-temporal objects because they are furnished by the cognitive 
structure of the transcendental apperception. It is the transcendental ontology that 
grounds Kant’s epistemology, not vice versa. This is the guiding thread that Kant 
formulates in the Introduction to The Critique of Pure Reason when claiming that 
“reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design” (B 
XIII). 
The two different ways of thinking of ontology have the corresponding two 
senses in which Kant uses the word metaphysics. The first one is related to the old 
tradition that he exposes as the dreams of reason, and the other to the contribution 
that reason makes to the constitution of experience. Hence, on the one hand 
metaphysics is a study of the unconditioned that lies behind the conditioned, or the 
apparent reality, and is the source of all meaning. This is the conception of 
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metaphysics that Heidegger traced as emerging in Plato’s philosophy; with this 
development, according to him “the change in the essence of truth, a change that 
becomes the history of metaphysics” is taking place (Heidegger 1998, 181). Truth 
becomes correspondence between assertion and being interpreted as idea, and the 
history of metaphysics as the search of this eternal unchanging truth takes its 
origins here.  
Plato himself concretely illustrates the basic outline of 
metaphysics in the story recounted in the "allegory of 
the cave." In fact, the coining of the word ‘metaphysics’ 
is already prefigured in Plato’s presentation. In the 
passage (516) that depicts the adaptation of the gaze to 
the ideas, Plato says (516 c3): Thinking goes beyond 
those things that are experiences in the form of mere 
shadows and images, and goes out towards these things, 
namely, the "ideas." (Heidegger 1998, 180)  
This is the conception of metaphysics that Kant calls “worm-eaten dogmatism” (A X) 
and he thinks of it as left behind for good by his critical philosophy.  
But Kant also uses the word metaphysics in a different sense and talks about 
“a metaphysics that has been purified through criticism" (B XXIV), the metaphysics 
that directs its gaze not “beyond those things that are experiences” but investigates 
the immanent structure of the experienced reality itself that makes this very 
experience and cognition of the things experienced possible. One way to describe 
the effects of Kant’s critical philosophy on metaphysics is a transformation of 
metaphysics into transcendental ontology. In medieval philosophy, the investigation 
of the nature and origins of the unconditioned supersensible reality—the heirs of 
the Platonic Ideas—came to be known as metaphysica specialis, to be contrasted 
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with the science of being qua being that was concerned with the basic categories of 
being (metaphysica generalis). As such, the way it was conceived before Kant, 
metaphysics had to offer a two-tiered ontological account or two kinds of ontology: 
on the one hand the science of being of the transcendent substances, which we can 
call transcendent ontology, and on the other hand an account of the nature of 
ordinary objects of experience that were deemed as “mere shadows” of the 
underlying true reality. With Kant’s Copernican revolution, the entire undertaking of 
the metaphysica specialis is rendered futile, as so is the part of metaphysica generalis 
that we have called transcendent ontology. The only viable option for metaphysical 
investigation is the enquiry into the nature of experience, which, considering Kant’s 
definition of the term “transcendental” as the “our mode of cognition of objects 
insofar as this is to be possible a priori” (A11/B25), I shall call transcendental 
ontology. Hence, with Kant, two fundamental changes take place: a) the basic 
categories of being are traced back to the cognitive constitution of subject, and b) 
the scope of these categories is confined to experience. Therefore, the domain of 
metaphysics is reduced to laying out the complete account of the elements 
immanent to experience but not originating in it, hence available to reason prior to 
experience via its self-examination. Thus, we can say that the metaphysics is 
essentially reduced to transcendental ontology. As we shall see, Hegel significantly 
modifies Kant’s original project. The central aspects of this change are overcoming 
the Kantian psychologism that confines the limits of reason to certain rules of 




8) Traditionalist readings 
 
While according to the interpretation I’ll be offering here, the Kantian 
readings of Hegel are mostly right, the opposite side—the traditional readings—is 
mostly misguided. The shared mistaken assumption of Bowman and Stern is that 
reading Hegel as engaged in some forms of traditional metaphysics is a necessary 
condition for ascribing to him any ontological views. Therefore, in spite of the many 
insightful and interesting aspects of their interpretations, they end up advancing a 
picture of Hegel that is fundamentally misconstrued. Hegel’s position cannot be 
reduced to a form of Aristotelian metaphysics as Stern does, nor can his arguments 
be illuminated by translating them into the scholastic vocabulary (of formal vs. 
objective reality) as Bowman ends up doing, and the reason for this is that Hegel’s 
ontology is post-Kantian through and through. Once more, the difference between 
them can be seen as a difference between two scientific theories divided by a 
paradigm shift. To use the Kuhnian analogy again, just like the mass before and after 
the elaboration of the theory of relativity means fundamentally different things 
(even though on a superficial level it might appear identical), so the basic elements 
of the conceptual framework—for example, being, contradiction, concept—have 




8.1) Bowman  
Bowman, in his Hegel and Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity, claims “Hegel is 
committed to a rationalist tradition in Western philosophy that stretches from 
Anaxagoras to Leibniz and Wolff and which teaches the unboundedness of scientific 
knowledge” (Bowman 2013, 28). On the other hand, Bowman sees Kant as waging 
an attack on the identity of “being and intelligibility” (Bowman 2013, 26) and 
therefore undermining the unboundedness of scientific knowledge. Hence, Hegel’s 
philosophical undertaking is framed as aiming to resuscitate the “the chief casualty 
of this [Kantian] attack on rationalism [which] was traditional metaphysics and its 
commitments to the knowability of the unconditioned, of being as it is in itself” 
(Bowman 2013, 28). Kant and Hegel are placed by Bowman on the opposite sides of 
the divide—Kant as a critic and Hegel as a defender of traditional metaphysics. My 
analysis of Hegel’s relation to both Kant and traditional metaphysics will make clear 
that this is a mistaken approach.  
In Chapter 2 I shall explicate Hegel’s criticism of the rationalist tradition, 
which makes it evident that he upheld a fundamentally different model of relation 
between “being and intelligibility” from that of the pre-Kantian metaphysicians. 
Moreover, the crucial point of the difference between theirs and Hegel’s position is 
what he inherited from Kant: the investigation of the grounds of identity of being 
and intelligibility. The thread that connects Kant’s undertaking with Hegel’s is not 
the issue of unintelligibility of transcendent being or unknowability of things-in-
themselves as Bowman would have it, but the investigation of the conditions of 
knowledge of empirical realty, identifying the ground on which the relation between 
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(empirical) being and intelligibility rests. Hegel takes the thing-in-itself and the 
problems associated with it as a peripheral husk of Kant’s philosophy, and is quite 
explicit about this. What he finds to be the most valuable in Kant is his revolutionary 
insights about the nature of the relation between the cognizing subject, the cognized 
object, and the structure of cognitive relation between them; and it is as the result of 
pursuing this Kantian project further that Hegel arrives at the conclusions about 
“the unboundedness of scientific knowledge” and the “identity of being and 
intelligible.” Therefore, Hegel should be understood not as performing a miracle and 
bringing back to life “the chief casualty” of Kant’s critical attack as Bowman sees it, 
but placing the last nails in the coffin and putting it to rest.  
As we shall see, Hegel describes the confidence of traditional metaphysics in 
the knowability of reality as naïve and this is a pivotal difference between theirs and 
Hegel’s position that Bowman ignores. It is true that Hegel is sympathetic to the 
commitment of traditional metaphysics to the identity of being and intelligibility, 
but sees this strength as resting on its naïveté and, on the other hand, the potential 
for overcoming of which he sees in the Kantian transcendental project. One way to 
read Hegel’s entire philosophical project is as an undertaking for substituting a 
rational justification for this naïve, unreflected presupposition. But Bowman ignores 
this crucial difference, instead focusing on those points of Hegel’s criticism of the 
pre-Kantian metaphysicians that are neutral in relation to Kant’s devastating attack 
on the tradition and can be maintained on the grounds independent of this attack. 
Thus Bowman writes: “For him[Hegel], pre-critical metaphysics come to signify any 
attitude towards reality which takes the categories of traditional ontology (a) as the 
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exclusive and irreducible forms of objective cognition and (b) as the basic forms of 
the substantially real itself” (58). Bowman is right. Hegel does voice criticism along 
these lines in the introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic as we shall see below. But 
we shall also see that for Hegel these mistakes arise from the more fundamental 
problem in the stance adopted by traditional metaphysics—its failure to see the 
need for the justification of identity of being and thought. The root of the problem is 
not that these commitments of the tradition are incorrect assumptions, but that they 
are mere assumptions and are problematic not only because they don’t present the 
nature of reality on the most fundamental level, but more because the tradition does 
not see any need for presenting justification for them. It is this justification of the 
accessibility of being (although of only empirical nature) by intelligibility that is 
supplied by Kant, and this is what renders Hegel’s project akin to his and miles away 
from the traditional metaphysics. 
Although the insufficient appreciation of the Kantian dimension in Hegel is a 
weaker side of Bowman’s reading, there are many aspects of his work that are 
undoubtedly important contributions to recent Hegel scholarship. One of these is 
Bowman's analysis of the dualistic aspect of the Hegelian notion of the concept. 
Drawing on the influential works of Rolf Horstamann and Dieter Henrich, Bowman 
presents an interesting account of the underpinnings of Hegel’s ontological theory. 
The static ontological structure that grounds all finite determination is taken up by 
Bowman from Horstmann’s analysis of the Hegelian relational monism in his 
Ontologie und Relationen and is integrated with the dynamic account of the very 
same structure that he adopts from Henrich’s work. These accounts, one static and 
24 
 
the other dynamic, are two sides of the same coin according to Bowman, and only 
with keeping this dual aspect of the Hegelian understanding of the concept can we 
get an adequate grasp of his ontological theory.  
Bowman discusses the relation-to-self that includes as its immanent moment 
the relation-to-other as the fundamental feature of the relational structure of the 
Hegelian Concept; and in order to demonstrate how this relational structure 
underlies the finite thought-determinations, he offers the relation between identity, 
difference, and ground. Bowman maintains that “the finite thought determinations 
identity, difference, and ground are shown to have no proper content of their own. 
They are strictly speaking only different aspects of or perspectives on a single, 
complex rational structure” (Bowman 2013, 40-41). He wants to show that the 
interrelatedness of these determinations—identity, difference, ground—exemplify 
the immanence of the relation-to-other to the relation-to-self, and ultimately all 
these determinations are elements of the single complex relational structure. But his 
account is not very convincing—although the general idea he is developing is 
correct (the self-relational structure is the basic schema that incorporates other 
determinations in it), the specific determinations he presents to exemplify this 
structure are not suited to do it properly. While claiming to present the self-
relational structure in its entirety, Bowman is actually looking at only a limited 
subset of the determinations that comprise it. In order to put forward a more 
comprehensive account, Bowman had to look at The Doctrine of the Concept and its 
relational schemata, which Hegel presents in the syllogism section, but 
unfortunately Bowman stops on the level of The Doctrine of Essence. As my 
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discussion in Chapters 3–5 shall demonstrate, Brandom’s programmatic sketch is 
pointing to a more promising direction in laying out the basic relational structure 
operating in Hegel’s ontological theory.  
Bowman’s discussion of the dynamic moment of the Hegelian ontological 
substructure, the autonomous negation, heavily relies on Dieter Henrich’s work. He 
wants to supplement the above-outlined static relational structure with an active, 
creative function: “In Henrich’s phrase, Hegel ‘authorizes’ negation and makes it to 
serve as the unique basic term from which to derive all other logical determinations 
and indeed his whole system” (Bowman 2013, 50). In order to avoid possible 
misinterpretations, Bowman explains that the dynamic account presented should 
not be taken to be anything different from the already outlined static relational 
structure: 
the Concept and absolute negativity are two sides of a 
single ‘speculative’ coin, one structural, one dynamic; 
and their unity is at the same time the unity of Hegelian 
metaphysics and methodology. For just as the concept 
cannot be adequately understood except as the 
structural expression of absolute negativity, neither can 
the methodology of Hegelian science be understood 
except as the finite intellect’s recreation of Nachvollzug 
of the same dynamic that constitutes Hegel’s monist 
metaphysics of subjectivity, the concept (Bowman 2013, 
56) 
The activity, or the autonomous negation, is supposed to be tracing the exact same 
formal structure of the Concept that was laid out in the static form earlier. Hence, 
the immanence of the relation-to-other to the relation-to-self is to be confirmed in 
terms of autonomous negativity. But Bowman’s account of the identity between the 
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two sides again falls short of being convincing, and again the reason is that 
Bowman’s account only scratches the surface of the problem without descending to 
the most fundamental level where the identity between the relational structure and 
active creative power are treated as the identity between the two moments of the 
Concept as exposed in the Syllogism section of the Subjective Logic. Hence, while I 
agree with Bowman’s overall approach regarding the two aspects reading of the 
underpinnings of the Hegelian ontology, I do not think his account of this identity 
does justice to Hegel’s position. As my discussion in Chapter 5 shall show, without a 
detailed exposition of the moments of the concept and the relations between them 
that Hegel spells out in the Syllogism section, any account of the identity of the static 
and dynamic moments of the concepts will be insufficient. 
One more interesting theme that Bowman brings up in his book but does not 
develop far enough is the relation between the categories and the fundamental 
ontological substructure. He simply identifies the uncovering of the latter by Hegel 
with the rejection of the fundamentality of the former: 
in reducing the categories of metaphysica generalis to 
determinations of the Concept, and thus reformulating 
their content  in terms of a structure that they either fail 
entirely to exhibit in their ordinary employment or at 
best succeed in exhibiting only in an inadequate way, 
Hegel is effectively transforming the ordinary meaning 
of those categories (Bowman 2013, 42) 
Bowman ultimately renders the categories as dispensable elements of secondary 
importance that can be spared once the more fundamental account which grounds 
them is attained: “in principle, we could dispense with such terms and hence with 
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any reference at all to the traditional content associated with those terms, and 
instead grasp the content of the Logic purely as a tightly ordered sequence of 
iterations of the basic structure of the Concept” (Bowman 2013, 42). In Chapter 5, I 
shall show that Hegel’s position is more complex, as well as more interesting, than a 
mere rejection of the categories for the sake of the relation between relation-to-self 
and relation-to-other as Bowman would have it. Here, just as in the above-discussed 
case, a close analysis of the Syllogism section and the Subjective Logic in general is 
the key—without paying sufficient attention to the part of the text where Hegel lays 
out the most fundamental substructure of his ontological vision, it is not possible to 
present an adequate account of this substructure.  
 
8.2) Stern 
Robert Stern, in his influential interpretation of Hegel as a metaphysician, 
tries to be more attentive to the presence of the Kantian current in Hegel’s thought. 
He acknowledges that much of what motivated Hegel’s philosophical ambitions in 
his early years emanated from Kant’s critical philosophy, but ultimately Stern also 
sees a mature Hegel giving up the transcendental approach and adopting the stance 
of traditional metaphysics.  
if we do think of Hegel as engaging in ‘proud ontology’ 
once more, we do not have to see him doing so 
forgetfully, as it were, as if deaf to all Kant’s concerns 
and ignorant of the Kantian position;  but we don’t 
therefore have to think of him as in some sense taking 
Kant’s transcendental alternative either. Rather, we can 
see him as engaging with it seriously, but finding it 
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wanting in crucial respects, which in turn led him to see 
ways in which the traditional picture remains of value. 
(Stern 2009, How is Hegelian Metaphysics Possible, 29) 
Stern thinks that Hegel came to find his way out of the Kantian problematic of the 
formal conditions of the possibility of experience and turned to investigation of the 
“being qua being” as it was done by the pre-critical metaphysicians. Stern, like 
Bowman, is right in that Hegel advances an ontological theory, but this does not 
commit him to returning to the pre-critical metaphysics.  
One of the central aims of my dissertation is to demonstrate that instead of 
rejecting the Kantian route, Hegel develops it further and arrives at a theory of 
being—but not simply as being qua being, but rather as being qua being as thought 
and ultimately being and thought as both grounded in what he calls the Concept. In 
other words, the way I read it, the path toward the Hegelian ontology lies not 
alongside the traditional problems of the pre-critical metaphysics, but through the 
Kantian transcendental philosophy. This will be made evident through the careful 
analysis of Hegel’s examination of the respective positions of traditional 
metaphysics and Kant in the Introduction to The Encyclopedia Logic, which I will 
undertake in Chapter 2. But the most conclusive evidence for the Kantian origins of 
Hegel’s ontology can be provided only with a comprehensive account of its 
fundamental underpinnings, and as my examination of this ontological substructure 
through the close reading of the Syllogism section will reveal, the Hegelian position 
to its most minute details is a development of the Kantian project and all its pivotal 
elements emanate from Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Hence, when we attempt 
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“finding [our] way out of Kantian problematics,” (as Hegel does according to Stern) 
we also end up finding our way out of the Hegelian solutions to this problematics. 
Stern’s placing of Hegel closer to traditional metaphysics than to Kant at least 
in part arises out of his misinterpretation of Kant’s position. He sees Kant as 
advancing what he calls a bundle theory of the object: “the Kantian model of the 
object therefore remains essentially pluralistic in character, as the unity of the 
object is reducible to a complex of more basic and intrinsically unrelated entities 
(the manifold of intuitions) out of which the object is constructed” (Stern 1990, 3). 
While Hegel, according to Stern, “frees the unity of the object from the synthesizing 
activity of Kant’s transcendental subject; for, on Hegel’s account (to put it simply), 
the object does not need to be organized or unified by us, because, as the 
exemplification of a substance-universal, it is no longer treated as reducible to the 
kind of atomistic manifold that requires this synthesis” (Stern 1990, 5).  
For now, I’m putting aside the problems with Stern’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s conception of the object and I shall address it in Chapter 4. Presently I would 
like to briefly point to the obvious problem with Stern’s understanding of the 
Kantian notion of the object, which stands in clear contradiction to Kant’s central 
thesis from the Transcendental Deduction about the nature of the object: “an object 
is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (B137). 
Note that Kant is not asserting that the object is the manifold of intuitions that are 
united by the concept, as Stern would have it, but exactly the opposite; it is the 
concept that is the rule of the synthesis that plays the fundamental role in the 
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constitution of the object. The difficulties with Stern’s view will become even more 
apparent in Chapter 4, in which I will be taking a closer look at the Kantian 
understanding of the empirical concepts and their objects, and will spell out in 
greater detail the meaning of Kant’s claim that object is grounded on the universal 
rule of combination and is not reducible to the sensible manifold. On the other hand, 
the logical functions of judgment that serve as the most basic rules of this 
combination have their presence in the schemata that we encounter in Hegel’s 
theory of the relational structure immanent to his notion of the concept—the one he 
expounds in the Syllogism section of the Subjective Logic. Hence, Kant and Hegel 
don’t stand as far away in this respect as Stern would like to convince us.  
Stern places Hegel not only too far from Kant, but also too close to Aristotle. 
He wants to ascribe to Hegel a vision of reality like that of Aristotle, where forms are 
posited as the immanent substratum of the individuals that determines its structure 
and development and expresses what the given individual most truly is: “Hegel 
argues, along Aristotelian lines, that properly conceived, the individual is an 
irreducible substance and this irreducibility is explained by virtue of its being of 
such and such kind … the manifestation of a universal  substance-form” (Stern 1990, 
4). No doubt there is a strong Aristotelian current in Hegel’s thought, and indeed as 
we shall see, the reading of Hegel’s notion of the universal on the Aristotelian 
background makes it more easily accessible than is often taken to be. However, to 
simply describe them as upholding the same or even similar views about the nature 
of the substance-forms play in the constitution of objective reality is a gross 
simplification. In Chapter 5 I shall demonstrate that Hegel’s model of the relation 
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between the universal, particular, and individual is very different from Aristotle’s. In 
fact, in the Syllogism section Hegel presents an ontological model that is an 
Aristotelian one; but he rejects and moves on toward articulating his own vision of 
reality. Hence, the analysis that follows will demonstrate the nature of similarity, as 
well as its limits and extent of difference between the Aristotelian and Hegelian 
ontologies.  
In the following chapter I undertake a close analysis of Hegel’s criticism of 
traditional metaphysics, empiricism, and Kant as it is presented in the Vorbegriff 
Section (translated as Preliminary Conception) of Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic. The 
idea behind this strategy is to locate the central points of Hegel’s stance in relation 
to the alternative positions that are more readily accessible for contemporary 
philosophers. Since the technical vocabularies of the doctrines he considers are 
more familiar for us, the Vorbegriff section offers a helpful entry point in the 
Hegelian system. By identifying the aspects of the alternative ontological models 
Hegel finds problematic and the perspective from which he voices his criticism, we 
can learn much about his own standpoint. In Chapter 3 I look at the determinations 
of reflection presented by Hegel in The Doctrine of Essence and show that they are 
the basic functions guiding the empirical concept generating activity, the universal 
moments of the Hegelian Concept. I demonstrate that the determinations of 
reflection that include identity, difference, diversity, opposition, and contradiction 
correspond to the concepts of comparison (or concepts of reflection) from Kant’s 
Amphiboly section of The Critique of Pure Reason and in the end to the logical 
functions of judgment from which the concepts of comparison stem from. Hence I 
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show that the modus operandi of the universal moment of the Hegelian Concept is 
borrowed from Kant’s critical system. The subsequent two chapters are dedicated to 
the close reading of The Doctrine of the Concept itself. First Chapter 4 presents a 
detailed account of the three moments of this Hegelian fundamental ontological 
structure: universality, particularity, and individuality as the components of the 
inner architectonics of the Concept. Finally in Chapter 5, I look at the different 
models of mediation between the three moments of the Concept that Hegel 
considers and trace the progression toward his own conception of the nature of 
their relation. As we shall see, the moments are not merely related to one another, 
but their relation has the nature of self-relation—one more feature that ties the 
Hegelian Concept with Kantian transcendental apperception. The close examination 
of the inner architectonics of the fundamental structure of Hegel’s ontological 





CHAPTER 2: Hegel’s Critique of Alternative Positions  
 
Any serious attempt to reconstruct Hegel’s ontology faces a formidable 
challenge to translate his complex technical vocabulary into a language more easily 
accessible to contemporary philosophers and then to interpret within this idiom 
such bold and enigmatic-sounding claims as “everything actual contains opposite 
determinations,” “everything actual is rational,” “everything is concept,” “the true is 
the whole,” etc. An attempt to meet this challenge can easily result in either 
watering down Hegel’s bold and original position or inventing a new jargon that is 
even more difficult to make sense of than Hegel’s. It seems to me that the best 
strategy for avoiding both of these alternatives is to locate the key points of the 
Hegelian system in relation to the alternative positions that are more readily 
accessible for us.  
The opening pages of the Encyclopedia Logic, which Hegel calls Preliminary 
Conception (Vorbegriff), offer a unique opportunity for undertaking such a topology, 
for in no other published text does Hegel offer such a comprehensive analysis of the 
major alternatives to his own position. In the Vorbegriff, Hegel presents a systematic 
criticism of traditional metaphysics, empiricism, Kant and Jacobi, allowing us to 
identify the key points of his own position in terms of the alternatives discussed 
there. The aim of my strategy is to decipher the key elements of Hegel’s positions 
through the analysis of his perspective on the alternative outlooks. The idea is that 
by identifying these fundamental points, I can establish a helpful entry point into his 
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system, rendering the more challenging texts to be analyzed in subsequent chapters 
more accessible. I shall focus on Hegel’s critical analysis of traditional metaphysics, 
empiricism, and Kant, since these three standpoints are more familiar and readily 
accessible, hence instrumental in identifying critical points of Hegel’s own position, 
while his discussion of Jacobi would have been relatively less helpful for this 
purpose. 
The first position of thought Hegel examines, pointing out both its 
“strengths” and “weaknesses,” is rationalist metaphysics. I’m using the quotation 
marks here to highlight the fact that the alleged weaknesses and strengths are so 
evaluated from Hegel’s own perspective, rather than from a neutral ground, 
whatever that might be; and this is why the analysis of this doctrine and Hegel’s 
evaluation thereof could be used as a point of entrance to Hegel’s complex 
ontological theory. Hegel refers to the first position of thought as the traditional 
metaphysics “the way [it] was constituted among us before the Kantian philosophy” 
(EL §27), making it clear that he has in mind the tradition that stemmed from 
Leibniz’s metaphysics and dominated the German academia up until Kant. Hence, 
Leibniz shall serve for me as the primary point of reference when examining Hegel’s 
critical analysis of the first position of thought. While Hegel deploys many different 
strategies and examples to demonstrate the problematic aspects of the view under 
consideration, these various approaches can be categorized into three major groups. 
The first one focuses on the tradition’s conception of the nature of determinations of 
thought used as the medium for grasping reality; the second critical strategy 
concerns the unjustified projection of a specific structure onto reality; and the third 
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one takes up an issue with the traditional metaphysic’s appropriation of the sensible 
representation and the specific epistemic function it grants to them.  
But before examining each one of these charges closely, I shall briefly outline 
what Hegel sees as a positive aspect of traditional metaphysics. Hegel opens his 
analysis of the first position of thought with a somewhat paradoxical claim that in 
some respects traditional metaphysics was superior to Kantian critical philosophy. 
“This science regarded the thought-determinations as the fundamental 
determinations of things; and, in virtue of this presupposition … stood at a higher 
level than the later critical philosophizing” (EL §28). One should be surprised by this 
claim, considering that in spite of his occasional critical remarks, Hegel is still of 
quite a high opinion of Kant’s transcendental system. In fact, during his formative 
years in Jena, Hegel explicitly describes his own philosophical undertaking as a 
completion of the Kantian project or lifting the spirit of transcendental philosophy 
from its letter (Difference 79). The paradoxical claim with which Hegel opens his 
discussion of traditional metaphysics is an evidence of the complex and multi-
faceted relation between Hegel and Kant, as well as between Hegel and the 
rationalist tradition. It is due to this complexity that Hegel’s project can be seen as 
Kantian through and through, while at the same time he can be upholding certain 
commitments of the traditional metaphysics as superior to the Kantian stance (or at 
least a certain interpretation of Kant).  
Hegel locates the advantage of traditional metaphysics in its “naïve” but 
nevertheless correct “conviction” that thought “goes straight to the objects” and 
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therefore it can gain access to the genuine nature of reality. This confidence of the 
tradition is contrasted with certain reading of Kant (the one Hegel often draws on 
when highlighting the differences between Kant’s and his own positions), according 
to which we are “the citizens of two worlds,” of noumena and of phenomena. The 
latter encompasses the things as they appear to us as variously determined by our 
sensibility and understanding, while the former is the realm of things in themselves 
as independent from our cognitive constitution. Hegel’s point is that the two-world 
picture ultimately commits us to skepticism, or, to be more specific, to the 
skepticism of the modern kind that emerged from Descartes and attained its full 
fruition with Hume (Hegel was of a much higher opinion of the ancient form of 
skepticism), while traditional metaphysics maintains the thesis of the accessibility 
of the true nature of reality by thought. In the passage just quoted, I omitted the 
clause in which Hegel describes the nature of the “presupposition” that renders the 
tradition superior to critical philosophy “in virtue of this presupposition, that the 
cognition of things as they are in-themselves results from the thinking of what is, it 
stood at a higher level than the later critical philosophizing” (EL §28). The reference 
to the specific weakness of the critical philosophy is obvious—the Kantian 
postulation of inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself; so is the corresponding strength 
of traditional metaphysics—the identity of the determinations of thought and 
determinations of things. What we can take home from this point is that Hegel’s own 
ontology cannot maintain any gap between the determinations of things and 
determinations of thought; he has to present a conception of being that is not 
foreign to thought and a conception of thought that is not external to being.     
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At the same time, we should keep in mind that Hegel’s endorsement of the 
epistemic optimism of traditional metaphysics is not unqualified. He sees it 
stemming not from the strength of the tradition but from its weakness, not from 
having successfully dealt with the challenges of epistemological and ontological 
nature that critical philosophy has succumbed to, but from a blunder—the failure to 
see them. Dogmatic metaphysics, according to Hegel, was “still unconscious of the 
antithesis of thinking within and against itself” (EL 26) and this is what affords it the 
courage to take the content of thought to be identical to the determinations of the 
world. Clearly, the antithesis that Hegel is talking about here goes along the lines of 
the question that Kant stumbled upon as he reported in the well-known letter to his 
former student Herz and from which the entire project of the critical philosophy 
arose: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ 
to the object?” Therefore, for Hegel what the tradition was “still unconscious of” was 
the problematicity of the assumption of the identity of thought and being, the need 
for the justification of applicability of the concepts to the world. Consequently the 
tradition was unaware of the whole cascade of the ontological and epistemological 
problems that emerge from this.  In Kant’s hands philosophy had lost this naïveté, 
but as Hegel sees it, Kant himself was not able to realize the potential that “the 







1) Critique of Traditional Metaphysics 
 
1.1) Abstract Universals as Inadequate Medium of Cognition   
The first critical strategy Hegel advances against traditional metaphysics 
concerns the nature of abstract universals and their function as the medium by 
means of which a true account of reality is supposed to be attained. Hegel argues 
that “these determinations, in their abstraction, were taken to be valid on their own 
account” and by doing this the tradition was misinterpreting their nature. The 
universal determinations that he is concerned with here can be seen as abstract in 
two distinct senses. First, they are taken to be independent of the object they are 
predicated of; they are abstracted from the individual the properties of which they 
allegedly represent. The idea is that a universal determination picks out a specific 
property (or a set of properties) that a given individual has, together with an 
indefinite number of other individuals; but at the same time they are taken to be 
independent of the individuals, just as the individuals are taken to be independent 
of the universal representing their properties. The universal determinations are 
assumed to exist in the realm of representations, while the individuals exist in the 
realm of the represented entities; they belong to two different ontological domains. 
The existence of a given abstract universal that represents a property of an 
individual entity clearly cannot depend on the existence of the individual being 
represented as the abstract universal represents properties of indefinite number of 
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other individuals. The universal concepts of green or round, for example, can 
represent the properties of an individual entity, but they would not be affected 
either in the ontological or the semantic sense if the individual didn’t exist.  
Hegel’s criticism is directed at what he sees as a mistaken conception of the 
relation between objects and the determinations of their properties regarded as 
external to one another. Traditional metaphysics, according to Hegel, was engaged 
in the “external reflection about the object, since the determinations (the 
predicates) are found ready-made in my representation, and are attached to object 
in a merely external way” (EL §28, 28.5). This bifurcated model, the dualistic 
ontology that conceived of reality as comprised of two domains (represented vs. 
representations), has interesting epistemological and semantic implications. “In the 
proposition ‘God is eternal, etc.,’ we begin with the representation ‘God;’ but what he 
is , is not yet known; only the predicate states expressly what he is” (EL §31, 69.2). 
First, due to the bifurcated ontological backdrop and the naïve confidence about the 
accessibility of the things by thought, traditional metaphysics substitutes the objects 
with their representations; “this metaphysics took them [objects] from 
representations” (EL §31, 68). But the representation that is taken for the object is 
conceived as completely indeterminate and the determination is supposed to be 
carried out through the attribution of the abstract universals to it. The object of 
cognition is therefore taken as completely deprived of conceptual content, but it is 
nevertheless to be individuated as either the soul, or God, or, the world, etc. Hegel’s 
point here is that the alleged identification of an object without ascribing to it any 
conceptual content is a mere illusion: “The representation of the soul, of the world, 
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of God, seems at first to provide thinking with a firm hold” (EL §31, 68), but it 
merely seems to do so. How are we to know that it is the World and not God, for 
example, that we are attempting to represent by means of abstract determinations if 
there is no cognitive content already immanently present in it? Hence, the 
bifurcated ontological model with its abstract universals and the illusory grasp of 
the true nature of objects is fundamentally flawed, according to Hegel. Therefore, in 
Hegel’s transcendental ontology we are to expect a radically different take on the 
relation between the objects and the determinations of thought. Hegel in fact gives 
us some indication of the direction he wants to take his project: “Genuine cognition 
of an object, on the other hand, has to be such that the object determines itself from 
within itself, and does not acquire its predicates in the external way” (EL §28, 67.5). 
Presentation of the full-fledged account of this self-determining object is the overall 
task of my dissertation and it should gradually emerge throughout the following 
three chapters, but already at this point we can see how it will radically differ from 
the standard approach used by traditional metaphysics. 
The second sense in which we can read the thesis that the determinations of 
thought are considered “valid on their own account” is not concerned with their 
relation to the object of cognition but to one another and the origins of their content. 
The target of Hegel’s criticism here is the semantic atomism of traditional 
metaphysics. According to him, the universal determinations by means of which the 
representation of actuality is to be accomplished were taken by the tradition to be 
semantically independent of one another as well as from the cognitive effort of the 
mind. Old metaphysics, claims Hegel,  
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did not go beyond the thinking of mere understanding. It 
took up the abstract determinations of thought 
immediately, and let them count in their immediacy as 
predicates of what is true. When we are discussing 
thinking we must distinguish between finite thinking, 
the thinking of the mere understanding, from the infinite 
thinking of reason. Taken in isolation, just as they are 
immediately given, the thought-determinations are 
finite determinations. But what is true is what is 
infinite. (EL §28, 66.4)  
Hegel further spells out what he means by the abstract determinations taken by the 
tradition as immediately given: “that metaphysics moved in thought determinations 
whose restrictions counted for it as something fixed” (EL §28, 67.3). It is clear that 
Hegel is critical of the rigidity of the conceptual content the tradition used to 
comprehend the world. It took the conceptual content of the abstract 
determinations as a given, presented to the consciousness in its inner space of 
representations as a set of fixed determinations of thought that correspond to the 
determination of a thing in the outer realm, that of represented entities. The basic 
elements of the representation are thus conceived of as kinds of atoms that the mind 
needs to arrange in a correct way to represent the world, but neither their meaning 
nor their interrelation with one another is alterable by the mind. As such, we are 
essentially dealing here with a variation of the myth of the given, wherein what is 
given is the specific conceptual content as a set of immutable elements that needs to 
be organized in the right way as a mosaic that maps onto the immanent structure of 
the world, which also is postulated as given.  
Hegel’s alternative to what he sees as a mistaken conception of conceptual 
content as “fixed” and “immediately given” is hinted at in the following passage: 
42 
 
“Thinking is only finite insofar as it stays within restricted determinations, which it 
holds to be ultimate. Infinite or speculative thinking, on the contrary, makes 
determinations likewise, but, in determining, in limiting, it sublates this defect 
again” (EL §28, 67.2). Hegel wants to substitute the fixed, restricted determinations 
with an account of a process that generates such determinations, but at the same 
time sublates them. The rigidity is to be replaced with plasticity and the givenness 
with the production of determinations. Moreover, the way the relation between 
these determinations was conceived will also have to undergo fundamental revision. 
Semantic atomism will have to be left behind for a more closely tied systematic 
relations, and the law of non-contradiction—as the following statement makes 
clear—will assume quite a different function in Hegel’s hand from the one it had in 
the traditional approach.  
…dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided 
determinations of the understanding whilst excluding 
their opposites. This is just the strict ‘either-or,’ 
according to which (for instance) the world is either 
finite or infinite, but not both. On the contrary, what is 
genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have 
any such one-sided determination in it, and is therefore 
not exhausted by it ... what is one sided is not fixed and 
does not subsist on its own account; instead it is 
contained within the whole as sublated. (EL §32, 70) 
As the passage clearly shows, Hegel is not claiming—as is often mistakenly 
thought—that the law of non-contradiction is false and ought to be rejected; instead, 
he states that the law “is contained within the whole.” Thus, we should expect that it 
will have an important function in “the whole,” by which Hegel clearly means the 
systematically related determinations. Moreover, the law of non-contradiction will 
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be contained in a sublated form, claims Hegel. It is important to notice here that the 
same term was used in reference to the abstract universals in the above-cited 
passage. To sublate for Hegel does not mean to reject; rather, it is to go beyond and 
retain it by locating its place in a more fundamental account. Just like with the 
abstract universals that are still part of the Hegelian system (as the above-cited 
passage claims, “the speculative thinking … makes determinations likewise”) while 
its misconstrued aspects are left behind, we should expect that in like manner the 
law of non-contradiction will be presented in Hegelian transcendental ontology in a 
different light with a different function. I shall return to this theme later in this 
chapter when discussing Hegel’s critical analysis of Kant’s philosophy and take a 
closer look at that time at Hegel’s take on contradiction and its role in his overall 
system.  
Brady Bowman presents a similar reading of the Hegelian distinction 
between the finite vs. infinite thought determinations. Of finite determinations, 
Bowman writes: 
finitude and untruth was said to consist in the fact that, 
although they display the form of independently 
determinate identity and hence an absolute character, 
in fact they have their determinate content only via 
their relation-to-other, into which other they therefore 
pass over and pass away. So finitude is here glossed as 
relation-to-other, while infinitude and eternity are to be 




Hence, the content of the finite determinations of thought, instead of being fixed and 
given to the mind as independently determined, is conditioned by the relation to 
others. These determinations have meaning only as a part of a systematically 
interrelated constellation of concepts, which according to Bowman has self-
relational structure and is understood by Hegel as infinite thought. I agree here with 
Bowman, and he is also right in associating the self-relational structure of 
interrelated systems of concepts with the Hegelian notion of the Concept: “Thus it 
would seem that what distinguishes the Concepts from the merely finite thought-
determinations is its instantiation of pure relation-to-self or, as Hegel also calls it, 
the relation of infinity” (Bowman 39). Indeed, as my analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 
shall show, the self-relational structure is an essential feature of the Hegelian notion 
of the Concepts, which rejects traditional metaphysic’s rigid and atomistic 
conception of abstract determinations of thought and replaces it with a dynamic 
theory of empirical concepts as systematically related constellation of 
determinations marked with perpetual plasticity.        
 
1.2) Projection of the Substance-Property Formal Structure 
The second critical strategy Hegel deploys concerns the projection of a 
certain formal structure onto reality. The claim is that dogmatic metaphysics 
“presupposes that cognition of the Absolute could come about through attaching of 
predicates to it.” Although here he uses his technical term absolute for the reasons 
that shall become apparent later, I shall treat this term as identical to actuality. In 
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another passage Hegel is even more explicit about traditional metaphysic’s 
unjustified imposition of the formal structure borrowed from language onto 
actuality: “the form of the proposition, or more precisely that of the judgment, is 
incapable of expressing what is concrete (and what is true is concrete) and 
speculative; because of its form. The judgment is one-sided and to that extent false” 
(EL §31, 69.2). Hegel sees not only the nature of determinations of thought and their 
interrelation with one another and the relation to the object as fundamentally 
mistaken, but he also believes the formal structure of the judgment is inadvertently 
projected as the basic fabric of the world. Here we are dealing with another aspect 
of the naïveté of traditional metaphysic, which unwittingly presupposes the 
substance-property ontological structure of reality. By taking for granted that 
reality can be cognized through deployment of judgments wherein predicates are 
attributed to subjects, the tradition is assuming the amenability of the world to the 
subject—predicate structure of judgment. In other words, dogmatic metaphysics 
presupposes that reality is made up of substances and the properties that inhere in 
them, wherein the logical subject of judgments denotes the substance while the 
predicate refers to the property inhering in it.  
Hegel’s criticism of the projection of the subject-predicate structure onto 
reality offers an interesting perspective on Stern’s reading of Hegel’s notion of 
object. He reads Hegel as providing an alternative to the model of object as a bundle 
of property-universals.  
It is Hegel’s aim in the Logic to show that this 
reductionist ontology rests on the mistaken assumption 
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that all individuals can be analysed into a plurality-
universals. His analysis of the notion, judgment, and 
syllogism is designed to establish that in fact substance 
universal forms the essential nature of the individual as 
a whole, and that this universal cannot be reduced to a 
collection of universals of another type. (Stern 1990, 
74) 
Stern is indeed correct: Hegel rejects the bundle theory of the object as a part of his 
overall criticism of the projection of the form of the judgment onto the world. The 
basic ontological fabric of actuality conceived as made up of the individuals as the 
indeterminate substances that serve as the placeholders in which the property-
universals inhere is clearly one way in which the judgment’s formal structure can be 
seen as projected onto and ossified in the world.  
But it is not clear that the alternative model Stern ascribes to Hegel does not 
fall under the same criticism. The substance universal that forms the essential 
nature of the individual indeed appears to be a prime candidate for the Hegelian 
criticism. For the presence of this central element in the Hegelian conception of an 
object as Stern sees it implies a projection of the subject-predicate structure onto 
the world, and not only on one (as was the case with the bundle theory) but on two 
different levels. First, is a predicating those universals to substance-universal that 
are not included in it, for instance, using Stern’s example, “this rose is red” or “this 
man is Greek,” etc. This can be described as a surface level projection of the formal 
structure of judgment onto reality. But there is a more fundamental level on which 
the very same structure is being imposed. Examples of these would be “roses are 
flowers” or “men are mammals.” In this case, the judgment form projection is taking 
place on a more basic level, within the substance-universal that, according to Stern, 
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“forms the essential nature of the individual as a whole” (Stern 1990, 74). Hence, 
were the perspective advanced by Stern expressing Hegel’s ontological outlook, the 
criticism of projecting the structure of judgment onto actuality would apply not only 
to traditional metaphysics but also to his own theory. As such, what Stern presents 
cannot be the Hegelian vision of actuality on the most fundamental level.  
Hegel’s criticism of traditional metaphysics for presupposing that the formal 
relations between the terms of judgment also obtain within the immanent structure 
of the mind-independent reality is both to the point but nevertheless still quite 
puzzling. On the one hand, Hegel is clearly right—not only the immediate target of 
his criticism but pretty much the entire tradition of Western philosophy can be 
accused of simply presupposing the substance-property ontological model. But at 
the same time, it is hard to see where Hegel is heading with this criticism, or what 
other structure, if any, could reality have if not the one that he accuses the tradition 
of having assumed. The Hegelian alternative to the traditional ontological model 
shall become clear in Chapters 4 and 5, where I examine his theory of the Concept. 
However, we can already see at this point that neither the atomistic semantic theory 
of abstract universals nor the structure that mimics the subject-predicate form of 
the assertoric judgment has a place on the ground floor of Hegel’s transcendental 
ontology. At the same time, this does not mean that Stern’s reading is completely 
misguided. In fact, as we shall see, the substance-universals will play an important 
function in the individuation of entities, although they are not the most basic 
building blocks of reality as Hegel’s transcendental ontology conceives it.  
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Having looked at the two critical points Hegel makes in the opening pages of 
the Encyclopedia Logic, we can already start seeing the contours of a fundamental 
shift for which Hegel is preparing his readers. Robert Brandom describes this 
transformation as a historic turn regarding “the origin and the justification of our 
ideas” that replaces the representation with inference as its “master concept” 
(Brandom 2000, 46). The relative explanatory priority accorded to the concepts of 
representation in Descartes is gradually replaced by inference, and division of the 
world into “what is by nature a representing and what by nature can only be 
represented” is left behind. Our analysis of Hegel’s criticism of traditional 
metaphysics confirms Brandom’s thesis; in the Vorbegriff Hegel is clearly preparing 
ground for the rejection of the bifurcated ontological model and placing the 
systematic relatedness between the empirical concepts at the epicenter of his 
project. But Brandom, by focusing almost exclusively on the semantic aspects of the 
Hegelian turn, does not do full justice to its ontological dimension. Hegel’s praising 
of traditional metaphysic’s confidence in the unity of thought and being indicates 
that the stance he is setting up to present will not be confined to the semantic issue 
about the origins and justification of ideas or the role of inferential relation in the 
generation of conceptual content. Instead, his project is primarily ontological. Hegel 
will not only be concerned with the questions of the source and genesis of the 
concepts through which the world manifest itself to us; instead he is primarily 
concerned with the question of the relation between the nature of thought and its 
determinations on the one hand and the world on the other. If these are not to be 
conceived as standing in the representing vs. represented relation to one another, 
49 
 
then how are we to think of their relation? This is one of the central questions for 
which we should expect Hegel’s answer in the pivotal parts of his Logic, which will 
be discussed in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
1.3) Sensible Representations  
The third central critical theme Hegel develops in the part of Vorbegriff 
dedicated to traditional metaphysics is that of misunderstanding the epistemic 
function of sensible representations. Hegel claims that traditional metaphysics tries 
to “reproduce the content of sense-experience and intuition” and upholds this “as 
the truth” (EL §26, 65). On its face, this criticism seems completely groundless, since 
taking the sense experience as the source of knowledge is traditionally associated 
not with the rationalist metaphysics that Hegel is targeting here but with the 
empiricists who will be dealt with by Hegel in the following section. A close 
examination of the view under consideration, however, reveals that Hegel’s criticism 
is indeed well justified.  
According to Leibniz, the prime representative of the tradition Hegel is 
considering here, empirical concepts, are generated through experience; they are 
formed via the operation of the intellect on the sense perception that experience 
offers (Die philosophischen Schriften, IV 425). Sense perceptions themselves are 
confused perceptions originating from the aggregates of monads. For Leibniz, every 
single monad perceives every other one, but the clarity and distinctness of this 
perception is a function of the perfection of the perceiving monad as well as the 
disposition between the perceiving and the perceived monads. God, for example, 
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perceives the totality of the world perfectly clearly; on the other hand, the monads 
of the most rudimentary sort (Leibniz calls them bear monads, which are associated 
with the inanimate objects although they are not reducible to them) have extremely 
obscure perceptions. Humans are somewhere in between; besides the ability to 
perceive they are also endowed with the faculty of apperception—that is, the 
reflective awareness of their inner states, including perceptual states. In other 
words, if a perception is a state of relation with other monads, apperception is that 
of self-relation of the monad; it is the perception through which the mind (which is 
the human monad according to Leibniz) turns an introspective gaze toward its own 
inner states: the perceptual states of other monads.  
Now, sense perceptions on which our cognition of physical objects rests 
involve both perception of other monads and apperception of our own inner states. 
Physical objects, according to Leibniz, are associated not with individual substances 
but aggregates of monads, that is, a group of monads that form an organized unity. 
Human mind perceives each one of the infinite number of individual monads, but 
these perceptions are not conscious; the mind is merely perceiving them without 
taking note of the perceiving, its introspection is not directed at these perceptual 
states. Leibniz refers to these as small perceptions; they do not merely happen to be 
unnoticed but in principle cannot become conscious. What we are conscious instead 
of these perceptions taken individually, is the plurality of them run through and held 
together, and these are sensations. Moreover, since sensations are confused 
perceptions, they will not allow discrimination of the individual components of 
which it is made. In other words, there exists not even a theoretical possibility that 
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we can “climb” from the confused perceptions to the clear and distinct ones that 
express the true nature of reality. 
Hence we can see where Hegel is coming from in criticizing rationalist 
metaphysics for a hopeless attempt (according to its own criterion) to ground 
cognition on the reproduction of the content of sensible representations. According 
to Leibniz, sensible representations are intrinsically defective media for gaining 
access to the ultimate structure of reality. Hence, Hegel’s point is that while 
traditional metaphysics starts with a correct insight about the accessibility of the 
true nature of the worlds by thought, i.e., the identity of the completely individuated 
concepts and the monads, when it comes to its theory of human cognition and 
generation of empirical concepts, traditional metaphysics essentially undermines its 
own fundamental assumption. The reason for this failure, according to Hegel, is that 
traditional metaphysics attempts to derive the content of its empirical concepts 
from sensible intuitions. The initial confidence in the power of thought and 
accessibility of truth through its determinations is undermined by positioning 
“sense-experience and intuitions” as the origin of the content of the empirical 
concepts. Instead of thought being granted the function of the active power that 
generates determination of its own, it is taken as a passive faculty that receives 
content from sensations. Traditional metaphysics mistakenly takes the objects of its 
cognition from “representation, laid them down as ready-made, given subjects for 
the application of the determinations of the understanding to them, and possessed 
in this representation alone the criterion of whether the predicates were adequate 
and sufficient or not” (EL §30). 
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Wilfrid Sellars agrees with Hegel’s criticism here by describing such a 
conception of the sense impressions as the prime example of the myth of the given. 
He sees it as a confused notion that mangles together two distinctly different 
phenomena with different epistemological and ontological purports.  
Sellars diagnoses ‘the classical concept of sense datum’ 
as a ‘mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two 
ideas’: first, an idea of non-concept-involving sensory 
episodes, such as sensations of red; and, second, an idea 
of non-inferential knowings that such-and-such is the 
case. This is a mongrel, a conflation, because 
attributions of non-concept-involving episodes belong 
below the line drawn by Sellars’s master thought, 
whereas attribution of knowing belong above it. 
(McDowell 2009, 9) 
The line mentioned here is supposed to separate the episodes of our experience that 
need to be understood in terms of actualization of our conceptual capacities (above 
the line) from those that do not need to (below the line). What Sellars is pursuing 
here is a Hegelian thread of arguing the impossibility of reduction of the conceptual 
content to sensations. The “classical conception of sense” datum according to him is 
a fantastic transplantation of the element immanent to one ontological domain into 
its opposite one. Instead of solving the question of the origins of conceptual content, 
it is merely creating an illusion of such a solution.  
Having looked at Hegel’s critical analysis of traditional metaphysics and 
considered the aspects of it that he endorses, as well as the ones that he rejects, the 
following conclusions can be drawn about the position he is setting the stage for.  
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1) The dualistic ontology and the correspondence theory of cognition that is 
tied to it cannot be a parts of Hegel’s system. He has to present an account 
of actuality and the nature of cognition that offer an alternative model of 
relation between thought and being. Determinations of thought and 
individual objects that they represent in the traditional model will have to 
be reconceived in such a way that the gap between them is no longer part 
of the account.  
2) Semantic atomism has to be replaced with an account in which the 
conceptual content of the determinations of thought is much more closely 
tied with one another and constitute a systematically related whole. 
3) The traditional substance–attribute model that Hegel criticizes as a 
projection of the form of judgment onto actuality has to be replaced with 
an alternative that cannot be faulted in imposing the structure of 
language onto reality. 
4) Sensible intuitions cannot be the source of the conceptual content 
through which the mind is related to the world. In other words, we 
should expect that in Hegel’s transcendental ontology, sense perception 
will not play the central role in the generation of the determinations of 




2) Critique of Empiricism  
Hegel’s examination of the second position of thought consists of two parts: 
The first one concerns empiricism, and the second Kant’s critical philosophy. At first 
it may be surprising to find Kant, with whom Hegel shares much in common, 
included within the same position of thought as thinkers like Locke and Hume, who 
could hardly be more distant from him. But as our analysis will make clear, this 
move by Hegel is motivated by stressing the difference between his and Kantian 
stances.  
 
2.1) The Mind vs. the World 
The critical strategies Hegel develops against empiricism are quite helpful in 
furthering our understanding of his position. The fundamental flaw of empiricism in 
Hegel’s eye is that according to it, “the external is the true” while our cognition is 
“supposed to cling exclusively to what belongs to perception.” (EL §38, 81.2). All 
central figures within the classical empiricist tradition maintain that the mind has 
immediate access only to its inner content. Locke, for example, describes ideas as the 
objects internal to the mind to be distinguished from the mind external objects the 
qualities of which they are to correspond to: “Whatsoever the mind perceives in 
itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call 
idea”(Locke VIII §8, 75). When Locke describes idea as “the immediate object of 
perception,” he is setting it apart from the mediated relation that the mind stands to 
the objects as they are in the actual world. Immediate objects or ideas are 
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immediate because the mind “perceives [them] in itself;” the mind-external objects, 
on the other hand, are postulated to belong in the world external to the mind, which 
we never perceive directly. According to Hegel, this abyss between what is available 
to the mind on the one hand and the world on the other inevitably leads to 
skepticism, whether acknowledged (as in Hume) or not (as in Locke). Locke 
attempted to privilege certain simple ideas (extension, shape, number, etc., 
corresponding to the primary qualities) over others (color, taste, paint, etc., 
corresponding to the secondary qualities) as corresponding to the features of the 
actual, mind-independent reality. But very few have been convinced by Locke. The 
kinds of arguments he offers against the ideas of secondary qualities can clearly be 
applied to the ideas of primary qualities as well. Hegel elaborates on the theme he 
has already developed in his discussion of traditional metaphysics. However, if there 
the central theme is the abstract nature of relation between the determinations of 
thought and the objects, here the alleged correspondence between the featured on 
the inner vs. the outer realm is brought to the fore. Obviously, both of these are 
different strategies he employs in rejecting the traditional dualistic ontology that is 
shared by both rationalist and the empiricist hairs of Descartes. Therefore, we can 
expect Hegel to articulate a relation between the mind and the world in which they 
no longer stand in opposition to one another, and the bifurcated ontology of the 
realm of ideas vs. real of mind-external entities together with its correspondence 
theory of truth is left behind. 
At the same time, we should not assume that, having rejected the 
correspondence theory of truth and criticized the externality of truth, Hegel is 
56 
 
upholding the identity theory of truth. The identity theory of truth, upheld by a wide 
spectrum of influential thinkers like Bradley, Frege, and Russell, has emerged as an 
alternative to the correspondence theory, and if according to the correspondence 
theory the truth-bearers like propositions and judgments are made true by their 
correspondence to facts, according to the identity theory they are identical to facts. 
Thomas Baldwin has recently suggested that Hegel’s claims, such as “The truth in 
the deeper sense … consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion” 
(Baldwin 1991, 40), are evidence that he is putting forward a version of the identity 
theory of truth. But the problem with this thesis is that it is still based on the 
dualistic ontological model and cannot even be articulated without having it as its 
backdrop. The identity theory of truth that attempts to secure an intimate 
connection between the mind and the world presupposes in the first place an 
ontological gab between them; the connection is sought on the backdrop of 
difference. On the other hand, as the subsequent chapters will make clear, Hegel 
rejects dualistic ontology altogether, offering a much more radical rejection of the 
correspondence theory than the identity theory of truth does. I agree with Robert 
Stern when he points out that the passage based on which Baldwin is advancing his 
thesis is concerned not with propositional but with material truth.  
Truth is propositional when it is attributed to 
statements, judgments, or propositions on the basis of 
their accordance with the way things are. Truth is 
material when it is attributed to something on the basis 
of the accordance of the thing with its essence… Hegel’s 
interest is in material truth: in how far an object can be 
said to be true, in the sense of conforming to its 
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“concept” (Begriff), where by this he means its nature or 
essence. (Stern 2009, 77-78) 
Indeed, the subsequent chapters of this work are dedicated to the articulation of the 
immanent structure of the Hegelian notion of the Concept and the accordance of 
actuality to this structure is the criterion of the material conception of truth that 
Stern is putting forth here.  
  
2.2) Universals as Abstraction from Sense Perception 
  Another critical point Hegel raises against empiricism is its 
misunderstanding of the nature of relation between sense perceptions and the 
universals. For Locke and his followers, empirical concepts, or the universal ideas, 
are the products of the process of abstraction from sensible perceptions or the 
particular ideas. The conceptual content hence is extracted from the sensible 
representations, which in turn are thought of as effects that external objects bring 
about in the mind. But as Hegel points out, this renders the epistemic purport of the 
universal determinations spurious.  
Empiricism raises the content belonging to perception, 
feeling, and intuition to the form of universal 
representations, sentences, and laws, etc. This happens, 
however, only in the sense that these universal 
determinations (e.g. force) are to possess no other 
meaning and validity for themselves than that taken 
from perception, and that no connection is supposed to 
be legitimate unless it has been exhibited in the 
appearances. (EL §38, 77.1) 
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Hegel’s point is that such a conception of universality fundamentally undermines its 
viability for attaining knowledge, for what is supposed to represent the “outer,” 
mind-independent reality is conceived as derived from the content of the “inner” 
subjective states. It is interesting to note here that, when explaining the reasons that 
the claim of sense perceptions being the source of universal determinations 
diminishes their “meaning and validity,” Hegel is clearly striking Kantian notes: 
“insofar as perception is to remain the foundation of what is to count as the truth, 
universality and necessity appear to be something unwarranted, a subjective 
coincidence, a mere habit, and its content might just as well be as it is or otherwise” 
(EL §39, 80.1). Obviously, the argument against the “unwarrantedness” of 
universality is borrowed from the well-known passage from the Preface of the CPR, 
in which Kant claims that “Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is 
constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise… Thus is a judgment 
is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception is at all is 
allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid 
absolutely a priori” (B3-4). So Hegel uses the argument of the “empiricist” Kant (this 
is, the implication of placing Kant within the same position of thought as 
empiricism) against the major tenets of the empiricist tradition. This is clear 
evidence that Hegel is fully aware of the fundamental differences between Kant and 
empiricist positions. Moreover, as we shall see later, Hegel inherits a great deal of 




However, whatever the relation between the Hegelian and Kantian stances 
on the origin of universals, one thing is clear: Hegel is further developing the theme 
already mentioned in his critical analysis of traditional metaphysics—the 
conceptual content of the universal determinations cannot be postulated as given in 
the sense perceptions. Hence, if the central attack against the Leibnizians’ 
conception of the universals was its misconstrual of the relation between the 
universals as well as the relation between universals and the object of cognition, the 
key flaw of the empiricist tradition’s notion of universality is its epistemic 
inadequacy due to the reduction of its content to the subjective states of sense 
perceptions. As such, from Hegel’s own theory we should expect an alternative 
account of the origins of the universal determination and their content.  
My understanding of Hegel’s take on the relation between the sense 
perceptions and the universals is quite close to the position Sellars puts forth in 
Science and Metaphysics.  McDowell sees this position as ascribing to sense 
perceptions a transcendental function. “Sellars’s ‘sense impression inference’ is a 
piece of transcendental philosophy, in the following sense: it is directed towards 
showing our entitlement to conceive subjective occurrences as possessing objective 
purport” (McDowell 2009, 17). Sense perceptions play the function of the conditions 
of the possibility of the objective purport of conceptual occurrences. Instead of 
containing the claims about the world, they are the accompanying conditions that 
render the world accessible to us thought them.  
visual sensations or sense impressions are not simply 
an extra part of the truth about visual experiences, over 
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and above the part that deals with the distinctive way in 
which visual experiences ’contain’ claims … it is not that 
visual experiences “contain” claims in their distinct way, 
and then there is a simply additional fact about them, 
that they involve visual sensations. The reason we have 
to acknowledge the ‘additional’ fact, in Sallars’s view, is 
that only so can we be entitled to have spoken as we did 
when we gave our above-the-line characterization to 
visual experiences. (McDowell 2009, 17) 
Hence, the claim is that sensations, rather than containing the conceptual content or 
merely accompanying it in experience, are the transcendental condition of objective 
purport of the content.  
 
2.3) Mere Analysis  
Another important critical point Hegel raises against the empiricists 
concerns the method used for generating universal determinations. He describes 
this as a process of analysis that dissects and separates the content of the objects of 
representation into the marks that have to be abstracted from them in order to 
generate empirical concepts and the ones that don’t belong to these determinations. 
Hegel describes this method as killing of an “alive being,” as it moves away from the 
“concrete” towards abstract: “Because empiricism analyses objects, it is in error if it 
believes that it leaves them as they are, since it in fact transforms the concrete into 
something abstract. By this process, it happens at the same time that life is taken 
from the living, for only the concrete, or one, is alive” (EL §38, 78).  
Of note here is that Hegel is not simply rejecting analysis as a moment in the 
generation of empirical concepts; what he is attacking is the misconceiving of 
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analysis as the only method used in this process. His point is that it is not merely or 
even primarily analysis, but first and foremost the synthesis, that plays the key role 
in furnishing the determinations through which the mind is mediated to the world: 
“Nonetheless, this severing [Scheidung] must occur in order to comprehend, and 
spirit is itself the severing in itself. This, however, is only one side, and the chief 
Point consists in the unification of what has been severed” (EL §38, 78.3). Hence, for 
Hegel, the synthesis, i.e., the unification of distinct determinations, plays at least as 
much importance as the analysis of their dissection into component parts.  
According to Hegel, the central tenet of empiricism that conceptual content of 
universal determinations is traceable back to sense perceptions is contradicted by 
empiricists themselves:  
The fundamental delusion in scientific empiricism is 
always that it uses the metaphysical categories of 
matter, force (not to mention those of the one, the 
many, universality, and infinity, etc.), and proceeds to 
make inferences guided by such categories, all the while 
presupposing and applying the forms of syllogistic 
inference, ignorant that in so doing it itself contains and 
pursues metaphysics and that it uses those categories 
and their relationships in a completely uncritical and 
unconscious fashion. (EL §38, 77-78) 
Indeed, Locke introduces a category of simple ideas, like unity, existence, power, 
succession, etc., that originates neither in the senses nor in reflection; instead, these 
ideas are “suggested,” as Locke claims, by the ideas of both sensations and 
reflection. Hegel’s point is that clearly Locke is helping himself to the basic 
determinations of thought that could not have been traced back to sense 
perceptions, and so he comes up with an obscure explanation of their origins in 
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order to avoid directly contradicting the main thesis of empiricism. Therefore, the 
empiricist, for Hegel, gets completely wrong the issue of the origin of the conceptual 
content, and we can expect a radically different approach from his own alternative.  
 
2.4) Unfreedom     
Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the unacceptability of the 
empiricist doctrine for Hegel lies in its being the “doctrine of unfreedom.” By 
conceiving of the world with its determinate features as already individuated and 
given to us through sense perceptions, the empiricist tradition is postulating what 
Hegel sees as its key thesis “the external is the true” and confines the intellect to the 
passive role of a mere recipient that takes in the world with its already-formed 
determinate features.  
Now, insofar as this sensory component is and remains 
a given for empiricism, it is a doctrine of unfreedom, for 
freedom consists precisely in my having no absolutely 
other over against me, but depending instead only on a 
content that I am myself. (EL §38, 79.5) 
The “sensory component” as we know is the source of all cognition, according to 
empiricists; as such, the world with its determinate features is completely given to 
us according to the empiricist view. This for Hegel means that actuality as conceived 
by empiricists is confronting us as “absolutely other.”  
Here we can clearly see the Kantian influence on Hegel’s position. Freedom 
as self-determination or related to the content that “I am myself” is contrasted with 
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the mere reception wherein we passively take in the content given to us from some 
external source. Kant postulated that we are citizens of two worlds, one sensible and 
the other rational. The former is the realm of determinism and the latter of freedom. 
The freedom is afforded to us via the spontaneity of our rational faculty that posits 
content of its own. Hence, for Hegel, just like for Kant, “unfreedom” is associated 
with the passive “taking in” of the determinate content that is not a product of one’s 
own, while the logical space of freedom is that of reason’s production of the 
determinate content of its own. I thus agree with McDowell’s take on the Kantian-
Sellarsian position that “judging, making up our minds what to think, is something 
for which we are in principle responsible—something we freely do, as opposed to 
something that merely happens in our lives… this freedom, exemplified in 
responsible acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism 
in the light of rationally relevant considerations. So the realm of freedom, at least 
the realms of freedom of judging, can be identified with the space of reason” 
(McDowell 2009, 6). As Hegel’s criticism of the “unfreed” of the empiricist doctrine 
indicates, Hegel will be developing an account of epigenesist of “the space of reason” 
within which the relation to “absolute other” is substituted with the relation to self.  
To summarize my discussion of Hegel’s critical analysis of empiricism, the 
following conclusions can be drawn:  
1) As a further elaboration of the insights reached through his analysis of 
traditional metaphysics and its dualistic ontology, Hegel rejects the 
empiricist idea of truth as correspondence between reality and 
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representations. Hence, we should expect from Hegel an epistemological 
account that is alternative to both the correspondence and identity 
theories of truth. 
2) The strong Kantian influence can be traced in Hegel’s attack on the 
empiricist postulation of sense perception as the source of universal 
determinations, as well as its exclusive emphasis of analysis and 
abstraction in generation of universals. Hence, the Kantian positing of 
synthetic judgments as the basic condition of the possibility of any 
cognition should be expected to see further development in Hegel’s 
doctrine.  
3) The empiricist ontological and epistemological stances exemplify for Hegel 
denial of freedom, which he clearly associates with the relation to the 
world in which it is passively taken in by the subject. The alternative 
account that is hinted at in his comments would elaborate as the medium 
of relation with the world the system of determinations that comprise the 







3) Critique of Kant 
 
After his critical analysis of empiricism, Hegel turns to a lengthier 
examination of Kant, whom he also includes in the second position of thought. The 
close proximity of his own system with the position examined makes studying this 
part of the Vorbegriff particularly fruitful, as each critical point Hegel raises will be 
an indicator of the pivotal points of difference between the two outlooks with a 
largely shared background. I shall focus on three central themes Hegel develops 
throughout his critical examination of the Kantian philosophy. The first one 
concerns Kant’s conception of universality. Hegel’s take on the Kantian notion of 
universality, as the following analysis shall show, is geared not to its outright 
rejection but to its critical appropriation. He supports the main thrusts of the 
Kantian approach, while at the same time criticizing him for not fully developing its 
potential. Another prominent critical point Hegel deploys against Kant is that his 
system is fractured into subjective vs. objective moments. Hegel criticizes Kant’s 
notion of the thing in itself, which he sees as undermining the epistemic purport of 
the determinations of thought, turning his critical philosophy into a mere subjective 
idealism. The claim is that by introducing the thing in itself in his system, Kant fails 
to overcome the gap between the determinations of thought on the one hand and 
the true nature of reality on the other. The last line of criticism that I will discuss 
here is that of the role of contradiction in the determination of objective reality. As 
we shall see, Hegel is critical of Kant’s use of contradiction that grants it only 
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negative function. The Hegelian alternative that will be indicated in his critical 
remarks and will be more fully fleshed out in the Doctrine of Essence will grant to 
contradiction a much more important a role in the determination of objective 
reality.       
 
3.1) Immanence of universals  
Hegel opens his critical analysis of Kant by pointing out the similarity 
between Kant’s and the empiricist positions—clearly an attempt to justify placing 
Kant within the same position of thought as empiricism. “Critical Philosophy has in 
common with Empiricism that it accepts experience as the only basis for our 
cognitions” (EL §40, 80.3). These words undeniably echo the well-known thesis 
from the opening lines of his B-edition Introduction: “There is no doubt whatever 
that all our cognition begins with experience; for how else should the cognitive 
faculty be awakened into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our 
senses….” (B1). And just as Kant soon qualifies this empiricist-sounding claim, “But 
although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that 
account all arise from experience” (B1), so does Hegel; and in addition to this he 
explicitly states the element that “does not arise” from experience: “universality and 
necessity … are found to be present in … experience” and this aspect of experience 
“belongs to the spontaneity of thinking, or is a priori” (EL §40, 81.1). 
Hegel here points to the key move Kant makes that sets him apart from the 
empiricists—the internalization of the universals to the empirical reality. Recall that, 
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for Locke, universals don’t belong to the actual fabric of the mind-external world; 
rather, they are products of abstraction and reside only within the inner realm of 
representations. Contrary to this, Kant not only acknowledges that universals 
belong to the experienced reality, but asserts that they “make up the objectivity of 
the cognitions of experience” (EL §40 81.1). Hegel is clearly impressed with the step 
Kant takes toward conceptual realism, but at the same time he also criticizes Kant 
for not going far enough and not fleshing out the full potential in this move. “To be 
cognizant, however, means nothing else but the knowing of object according to its 
determinate content. A determinate content, however, contains a manifold 
connection within itself and is the basis for connections with many other objects” 
(EL §46 89.2). According to Hegel, the “Kantian reason has nothing but the 
categories” (EL §46 89.2). Hence, Hegel sees the key defect in Kant’s system to be its 
inability to do justice to the “manifold of connection” that makes up its “determinate 
content.” Kant confines himself to the categories and is unable to flesh out the 
determinate content of the objective cognition that the immanence of the universal 
to the objective reality implied. The idea here is that if we acknowledge that certain 
universal determinations make up the basic structure of actuality, we are also 
implicitly committed to the thesis that the relations and the “manifold of 
connections” that obtain between these element make up the immanent structure of 
the actuality.   
In order to gain a good understanding of what Hegel has in mind when he 
claims that Kant’s conception of cognition fails to appreciate the “manifold of 
connections” between universal determinations and interrelatedness of the objects 
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of cognition through determinate content, we must look closely at what Kant means 
by universality and what role it plays in cognition. This shall also shed light on the 
question of to what extent Hegel’s criticism is justified. For Kant universality is the 
form of concepts while their matter is the objects of experience. Hence, the issue of 
the relation between universality and empirical reality is directly tied to the relation 
between concepts and the empirical realm on the one hand, and between the 
concepts and their form on the other. Objects for Kant are not entities 
heterogeneous to the human intellect, but they are a certain subcategory of the 
determinations of the mind. His Copernican revolution, which turns on the insight 
that “the objects must conform to our cognition” (B XVI), is carried out through the 
internalization of the objects of experience (phenomena) to representations (the 
determinations of the mind): “an object … is that in the concepts of which manifold 
of a give intuition is united” (B137). A concept for Kant is not merely “a general and 
reflected representation” but also a “consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis 
of a sensible manifold;” in other words, concept is what underlies and guides the 
process of the unification of sensible intuitions furnishing objects of cognition. 
Hence, the conceptual content is present in the perceptual experience as integral 
elements of the rule of apprehension. To be sure, the outcome of the process of 
apprehension is not yet equivalent to full cognition, as the latter implies two 
additional syntheses: reproduction in imagination and subsumption under a 
concept (this time not as the rule of synthesis but universal and reflected 
representation). The former is merely an appearance, “undetermined objects of 
empirical intuition,” thus it has not yet been determined, i.e., subsumed under a 
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concept and thus become phenomenon or “determined object of empirical intuition.” 
This, however, does not mean that the merely apprehended appearance is free of 
conceptual content, as a concept qua the unity of an act of synthesis has already 
been employed in the apprehension of sensible manifold. 
Therefore, for Kant, conceptual content is present on both ends of the 
cognitive process. Initially, it is present as the schema of the synthesis of 
apprehension as a result of which the empirical reality as a plurality of appearances 
manifests themselves to the mind. At this level, concept is functioning as the 
“consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis of a sensible manifold,” essentially 
as a function of unity through which appearances are perceived or taken in by the 
mind. This level of presence of conceptual content corresponds to what Kant in the 
Prolegomena calls judgment of perception. At this stage, the world taken in by the 
mind is appearing in a certain way, i.e., reality the way it manifests itself prior to 
being cognitively determined by the intellect. There is a second level of application 
of the concepts, this time at the other end of cognitive activity, wherein these 
appearances are subsumed under concepts. This second level of application of the 
concepts corresponds to what Kant in the Prolegomena calls judgments of 
experience. The question of the presence of “the manifold of connection” or the lack 
thereof can thus be addressed on these two different levels. But clearly, while the 
relations under consideration will be present in different form in the judgments of 
perception and the judgments of experience, they are without a doubt available on 
both levels. The concept that is used as the rule of apprehension has “the manifold of 
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connections” within it, as do the universal and reflected representation under which 
the appearances are subsumed.  
As such, Robert Stern misses the point when contrasting Hegel’s positions 
with Kant’s regarding the immanence of concepts when he maintains that  
I will claim that Kant’s idealism is subjective for Hegel in 
employing the activity of the synthesizing subject to 
explain the genesis and structure of the object, while 
Hegel’s idealism is objective in treating the substance-
universal which it exemplifies as constituting the unity 
of the individual. As a result, whereas Kant’s philosophy 
is idealistic because it treats the unity of the object as 
dependent on the structure imposed on experience by 
the transcendental subject, Hegel’s philosophy is 
idealistic because it operates with a realist theory of 
universals, which have a fundamental place in his 
ontology. (Stern 1990, 110) 
Stern’s reading of Kant misses a crucial point: “the synthesizing subject” is not 
combining in a random fashion manifolds of representations; rather, the object is 
formed through a rule-guided synthesis. And this rule through which “the structure 
of the object” is formed is nothing else but the concept or “the substance-universal” 
as Stern calls it. Therefore, the two positions are much closer than Stern would have 
it.  
Kant’s well-known example about a savage perceiving a house for the first 
time can be helpful in clarifying the point here. While analyzing the differences 
between two cases of apprehension of representations of the very same object, one 
guided by a concept qua schema of synthesis of apprehension and the other that is 
not, Kant explains:  
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If, for example, a savage sees a house from a distance 
whose use he does not know, he admittedly has before 
him in his representation the very same object as 
someone else who knows it determinately as a dwelling 
established for human beings. But as to form, this 
cognition of one and the same object is different in the 
two cases. In the former it is mere intuition, in the latter 
it is simultaneously intuition and concept. (Logic, 
Intorduction V, Ak. IX, 33; 544-45)  
 
For Kant, both intuition and concept are perceptions or conscious representations, 
and both are related to an object (unlike mere sensations, which are perceptual 
state of subject only). In other words, they are related to something independent of 
the mind engaged in apprehension. The difference between them, however, is that 
while intuition is related to the object immediately, the concept is related to it 
mediately. Thus, someone who has the concept of house while apprehending the 
representations of the house has, according to Kant, both mediate and immediate 
representation of the object. The immediate element is the intuition, whereas the 
mediated is the schema, i.e., the rule that guides the synthesis of apprehension of 
this intuition. The manifold connections that Hegel refers to make up the relations 
between the elements that make up the internal structure of the rule and their 
relations with the content of other empirical concepts. For the savage who sees such 
an object for the first time, the rule that would enable him to apprehend the 
representation as a house is not available. But once the savage sees many similar 
objects and acquires the concept of house, the nature of his subsequent 
apprehensions will also change and it will have no longer merely intuition but 
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“simultaneously intuition and concept.” Therefore, his subsequent episodes of 
apprehension of similar objects will also have “the manifold of connections” in them.  
At the same time, if the conceptual content involved in the genesis of 
experience of an object is an integral part of the network of determinations that are 
interrelated to one another, the objects the apprehension of which will involve these 
determinations will also be related to one another. For instance, if an apprehension 
of a house involves a concept of a house as a dwelling of human beings and hence 
one amongst a manifold of connections in place, there is the connection between the 
concept of a house and the concept of a human, then any particular house 
apprehended is related to any particular human apprehended due to the relation 
between the concepts that made individuation of these objects possible. Therefore, 
Hegel’s criticism of the lack of appreciation by Kant of the manifold of connections 
between the conceptual content involved in experience, as well as between the 
objects of experience, is not based on a charitable reading of his position to say the 
least.  
But Kant is not blameless here as he rarely discusses the question of 
interrelation between the conceptual content of empirical concepts and the process 
of their formation. For Kant, the key question is the origin of the pure a priori 
concepts and the justification of their applicability in the cognition of empirical 
objects. Hegel, on the other hand, stresses the need for a closer attention to the 
manifold of relations that obtains between the determinations of thought and the 
interrelatedness of the objects individuated through these determinations. 
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Therefore, even if the criticism of Kant is based on an uncharitable reading on his 
position, it nevertheless reveals what Hegel sees as the aspect of the Kantian system 
that is in need of further development. Therefore, we can anticipate that tracing the 
manifold of relations between the determinations of thought will be one of the 
priorities in Hegel’s appropriation of the Kantian system.   
 
3.2) Kant as a Subjective Idealist  
Another critical angle from which Hegel investigates Kant’s position is its 
rigidly maintained distinction between the subjective and the objective moments of 
actuality. In Hegel’s eye, Kant is maintaining the distinction between the subjective 
and the objective ontological spaces while wanting to ground the objective on the 
subjective:  
That the categories should be regarded only as 
belonging to us, i.e. as subjective, must seem rather 
bizarre to the natural consciousness, and there is 
indeed something skewed about it…. Now although the 
categories (such as, unity, cause, effect, and so forth) do 
belong to thinking as such, it does not follow at all from 
this that they should for that reason be ours alone and 
not also determinations of the objects themselves. This, 
however, is supposed to be the case according to Kant's 
outlook. His philosophy is a subjective idealism. (EL 
§42, 87) 
Hegel’s criticism in this case appears to be quite on point. If Kant maintains that the 
categories originate in the logical forms of judgment and are the source of the 
objective purport to our representations, while he also wants to keep the thing-in-
itself as a part of his system, then subjective idealism indeed seems to be an 
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inevitable outcome. The “objectivity” that is grounded on the subjective functions of 
the operation of the mind clearly appears as a watered-down version of the true 
actuality represented by the thing-in-itself. With the noumenal realm as its 
backdrop, any attempt to ground objectivity of the phenomena and its cognition on 
the specific constitution of the faculties of the subject indeed appears to inevitably 
lead to subjective idealism.  
Very often, a solution to this problem is sought in a fundamental 
misinterpretation of the Kantian stance according to which sense perceptions are 
taken to be the source-conferring objectivity to the representations of the mind. 
Hegel is quite right to point out that, according to Kant, sensible intuitions are also 
states of the subject: “The categories are empty, having application and use only in 
experience, the other element of which, the determinations of feeling and intuition, 
are likewise something merely subjective”(EL §43, 88). Indeed, for Kant all 
representations, the subspecies of which are sensible intuitions as well as mere 
sensations, are “inner states of the mind.” What is different between mere 
sensations and intuitions is that while the former belong only to the subject, the 
latter in addition to that are also related to the objects of cognitions. But this 
objectivity, as Hegel points out, arises from another subjective element: the logical 
forms of judgment and the categories. Therefore, Hegel’s charge that the source of 
objectivity within the Kantian system is a highly problematic issue that is not dealt 
with in a satisfactory manner is not an unwarranted one.  
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The point here is that while all components of this objective realm are of 
subjective origin, when combined together, according to Kant, they somehow form 
objective determinations. A possible defense of Kant’s position could be offered 
along the following lines: The knowledge derived from experience of the 
phenomenal reality is true only with qualification—it is true only as it appears to us, 
while things independent of our cognitive constitution, or things in themselves, are 
never accessible for us according to Kant, hence the “subjective” origins of 
objectivity cognition. However, Hegel thinks that this position amounts to nothing 
but an indirect admitting of skepticism—the impossibility of grasping the ultimate 
nature of reality. As he puts succinctly: “for Kant … what we think is false just 
because we think it” (EL §60, 107). Therefore, we should expect the Hegelian 
transcendental ontology to, in one way or another, deal with the problem of the gap 
between the subjective and objective moments that he criticizes in Kant; 
additionally, determinations of thought will no longer be “ours alone” but will 
determine objective reality the way it is in itself and not merely as it appears to us.  
 
3.3) Contradiction   
Another critical theme Hegel develops that I want to examine here is the 
epistemic function and the ontological status of contradiction. Hegel takes up the 
issue with Kant for whom reality is assumed to be free of contradiction, which is 
confined to the subjective side of Kant’s bifurcated system. It is only the 
determinations of thought that can and do come to contradict each other, according 
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to Kant. Reality on the other hand is pre-postulated to be free of contradictions. In 
fact, this confining of contradiction to the subjective side is where Kant locates the 
key to his solution to the problems of paralogisms and antinomies:  “The resolution 
is that the contradiction does not apply to the object in and of itself, but pertains 
solely to reason engaged in trying to know” (EL §48, 93). By limiting the scope of 
contradiction to the realm of thought, Kant is attempting to “save” the objective 
reality from it. In Hegel’s eye, however, had Kant been more open to embrace the 
inner thrust of his own thought, he could have put the difficulties generated through 
these contradictions to his advantage, but Kant is too much a child of his own time 
and unable to free himself from the basic assumptions of both rationalistic and 
empiricist traditions.  
Nevertheless, Hegel thinks it is still to Kant’s credit that he uncovers the 
necessity of contradiction brought about by cognitive effort. He sees this as an 
important insight with far-reaching epistemological and ontological consequences.  
This is where it is brought up that it is the content itself, 
namely the categories themselves, that bring about the 
contradiction. This thought that the contradiction 
posited in the realm of reason [am Vernunftigen] by the 
determinations of the understanding is essential and 
necessary must be regarded as one of the most 
important and profound advances in the philosophy of 
recent times. The resolution is as trivial as the view is 
profound. It consists merely in a tenderness for worldly 
things. It is not supposed to be the worldly essence that 
bears the blemish of contradiction, but it is supposed to 




Clearly, for Hegel the Kantian “solution” to the antinomies and parallogisms does 
not measure up to the “problems” themselves. Hegel thinks that it is the “solution” 
that is the problem, while the “problem” is the key to the qualitatively higher 
philosophical vision that Kant could have brought about but fails to. While the full 
account of what Hegel has in mind by this missed opportunity shall be gradually 
emerging throughout the remaining chapters of the present work, we can already 
see some of its features hinted at in these passages in Hegel’s texts.  
To begin with, it is clear that if Hegel is to develop the theme of 
groundedness of individuals on the universals, then the confinement of the 
contradictions to the realm of determinations of thought and sheltering the 
determination of things from it will become problematic. If the individuals are 
grounded on universals and hence the determinations of thought are immanent to 
them, so are the relations between these determinations. Further, Hegel is explicit 
that the number of necessary contradictions is not limited to those presented by 
Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic: “the main point that has to be made is that 
antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmology, but 
rather all objects of all kinds” (EL §48, 92.2). Claims like this have often been used in 
discrediting Hegel as an upholder of an utterly confused position, according to 
which for any true proposition “x is y,” there is at the same time corresponding true 
propositions “x in not y.” Were this a correct interpretation of his thought, Hegel 
could not have been ascribed to uphold any meaningful proposition. This is, 
however, not the most interesting reading of Hegel’s thesis, nor the one that best fits 
his philosophical system as a whole. If we recall the conclusion we drew earlier in 
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the chapter from Hegel’s critical remarks on semantic atomist, hence his 
commitment to the strong interrelation between the determinations of thought, and 
combine it with another commitment of Hegel regarding the immanence of 
determinations of thought to “all objects of all kinds,” then a very interesting 
perspective on the thesis about ubiquity of contradiction comes to the fore.  
Robert Brandom points to this alternative by offering to read the 
contradiction thesis as a claim of necessary inadequacy of any system of empirical 
concepts wherein contradiction serves as an immanent source of their inevitable 
instability:  
What we must realize to move to the standpoint of 
Vernunft is that we will always and necessarily be led to 
contradict ourselves by applying determinate concepts 
correctly—no matter how the world happens to be—
and that it is in just this fact that the true nature of the 
immediacy, particularity, and actuality revealed to us in 
experience consists … When Hegel says of the concrete 
that “the true, thus inwardly determinate, has the urge 
to develop,”  and that “The Understanding, in its pigeon-
holing process, keeps the necessity and the Notion of 
the content to itself—all that constitutes the 
concreteness, the actuality, the living movement of the 
reality which it arranges,”  he means that no concepts 
with fixed, determinate boundaries can capture how 
things are in a way that will not turn out to require 
eventual revision. (Brandom 2004; Sketch of a Program 
for a Critical Reading of Hegel 13) 
That is to say, the claim that “everything actual contains opposite 
determinations”(EL §48, 93.2) is not an attempt to reject the law of non-
contradiction but its integration within the new ontological vision, according to 
which any system of empirical determinations of thought that immanently structure 
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actuality is intrinsically inadequate. This means that when the inferential relations 
are pursued far enough, any given constellation of empirical concepts and doxastic 
commitments will inevitably lead to mutually contradicting claims. This in turn calls 
for a revision and continuous redefinition of the content of empirical concepts that 
constitute the basic determinations of actuality, throughout the revisions of which 
transfiguration of not only the meaning of the empirical concepts but also the basic 
fabric of actuality is taking place. While I shall repeatedly return to Brandom’s 
reading in the subsequent chapters, the centrality of the contradiction to the 
Hegelian project shall become evident already in the next chapter where the 




4) Conclusion  
 
Having looked at the major critical themes Hegel develops in his examination 
of the key alternative doctrines, the following conclusions can be made: 
1) Hegel’s transcendental ontology shall offer an alternative to the 
traditional dualistic metaphysics and the representation theory of 
knowledge. Division of the world into two realms, represented vs. 
representations that takes the mind to be a kind of mirror and the 
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concepts as generalized versions of the images reflected in it, has to be 
replaced with a model that leaves behind this bifurcated picture and the 
plethora of the ontological and epistemological problems that arise from 
it. As we see, Hegel understands Kant’s postulation of the thing-in-itself to 
render his critical system into one more example of the dualistic 
ontology. As the subsequent chapters shall show, the Hegelian alternative 
will make a turn along the lines of what Brandom describes as 
substituting representation with expression as the master concept of 
epistemological doctrine. The conceptual content in this model is hinged 
not on the external reality, which it purportedly replicates, but on the 
process of the application of empirical determinations through which the 
implicit content is made explicit and the individual determinations are 
given meaning as elements of the systematically related constellation of 
determinations.  
2) The traditional approach of taking the sensations as the source of content 
for universal determinations shall be replaced with an account of the 
universals as the immanent grounds of individuation of entities that we 
“find” in the world. These universals, instead of being self-sufficient 
atomic determinations, derive their meaning from their relation to the 
other determination, together with which they make up a systemic whole. 
As such, the relations between the concepts serve as the background 
condition on which individual determinations are grounded. The 
relations between elements of the system making up the totality of 
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conceptual content will play the key role in constituting individual 
determinations, and, as we have seen, Hegel indicates that contradiction 
will play a very important role amongst them. I shall examine this issue in 
the following chapter.  
3) The third general strategic line that can be extracted from Hegel’s critical 
analysis of alternatives doctrines is his aim to put forth an ontological 
vision that is marked with the radical plasticity of actuality as its key 
feature. This plasticity is what sets his stance apart from the doctrines 
like that of empiricists that he saw as philosophy of unfreedom. Concepts, 
instead of representing pre-existing reality, are the nodes in a network of 
interrelated and continuously revised system of universal 
determinations, which not only constitute the objects but also constitute 
them differently, and are different objects at successor stages of the 
continuously transforming system. Hegel’s master word, dialectic, is this 
movement of self-determination of interconnected constellation of 
concepts within which any determination is perpetually subjected to 




CHAPTER 3: Determinations of Reflection and Generation 
of Conceptual Content 
 
 
1) Essence as Truth of Being 
 
Hegel’s striking claim with which he opens the Doctrine of Essence, “The truth 
of being is essence” (WL 337), is a clear testimony of the important role that this 
central part of the Logic occupies in his transcendental ontology. Here is how Hegel 
describes the relation between the previous part of the Logic, the Doctrine of Being, 
and the one that he is about to present, the Doctrine of Essence: “behind this being 
there still is something other than being itself, and … this background [essence] 
constitutes the truth of being” (WL 337). Hence, while presenting the basic 
determinations of the essence Hegel is laying out the “background,” the underlying 
structure of being and its determinations. Here we can clearly see the traces of the 
Kantian move of grounding objects on determinations of thought—an empirical 
entity that is out there in the world is conditioned by the act of synthesis guided by a 
rule that constitute its essence. What Hegel is doing in this part of the Logic is to give 
a detailed account of the process (and its determinate features) through which the 
essence as the ground of being is furnished, the inner architectonics of “this 





2) Reflection as the Process of Generation of Essence  
 
Hegel sees reflection as the modality of operation of Essence. This is already 
made evident in the title of the opening section of the Doctrine of Essence: “Essence 
as Reflection Within Itself,” as well as the numerous claims of the following kind “in 
its self-movement, essence is reflection” (WL 345) and “essence is reflection. 
Reflection determines itself; its determinations are a positedness which is 
immanent reflection at the same time” (WL 340). Thus, reflection and its basic 
determinations, or essentialities, play the central role in the doctrine of essence and 
Hegel’s ontology in general. Indeed, as my analysis shall demonstrate, the 
determinations of reflection or the essentialities are the most elementary functions 
that guide the activity of the generation of conceptual content—the content that 
serves as the medium of our cognitive relation to actuality, as well as the content 
through which entities comprising this actuality are individuated.       
Dieter Henrich has describes “the basic operations” discussed by Hegel in 
“the chapter on ‘Reflection’ at the beginning of the ‘Logic of Essence’” as “the core 
and the key” to The Science of Logic (Henrich 2003, 319).  Reflection therefore 
comes to the fore as the main mechanism of the generation of the space of reason. It 
is the process of formation of the systematically related constellation of 
determinations. As such, close attention to reflection and its basic determinations is 
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necessary for proper understanding of the Logic and the ontological doctrine laid 
out therein.  
A natural question to ask at this point is how the thesis “the truth of being is 
essence” (WL 337) and the identification of essence with reflection and its basic 
functions (i.e., essentialities) square with another crucial thesis of Hegel’s ontology 
offered later in the Logic: “reality properly comprehended is the concept.” In other 
words, how should we make sense of the relation between the reflection and its 
essentialities that make up the schema of essence on the one hand, and on the other, 
the concept—the fundamental ontological substructure Hegel introduces at a more 
developed stage of his Logic? Longuenesse offers a good starting point for 
understanding this relationship by tying the unifying or self-relational dynamic 
moment of the concept with reflection that gradually manifests itself as the moving 
force in the unfolding of the Logic. 
In Being (expounded in Part 1, Book 1 of the Science of 
Logic), the concept and its aim of the true are only 
implicit; the determinations of the object are received 
as immediate, and the mediation of their mutations by 
the movement of the concept is masked. This is why 
they “pass” into one another, without an explicit 
unifying principle. In reflection, or Essence (expounded 
in Part 1, Book 2) the role of the unity of the concept in 
pushing forward the movement of determinations is 
made explicit, although the concept does not yet 
manifest its capacity to produce from itself all 
determinations. … In contrast, in the concept 
(expounded in Part 2 of the Science of Logic), each 
determination is produced from the unity of thought, 
and reflection is now a development (Entwicklung) of 
the concept rather than the “shining into another” that 
it is in essence. (Longuenesse 2007, 34) 
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Hence, reflection is integrated within the larger ontological structure with clear 
Kantian roots as its self-relational or unifying aspect. In Being, this activity of the 
concept has not come to the surface yet; the development and transition from one 
determination of Being to another, although conditioned by this activity of the 
concept, is never made manifest. Reflection comes to the fore in the Doctrine of 
Essence, where Hegel takes up explicitly the drive to the unification, the self-
relational activity of thought. The difference between the Doctrines of Essence and 
the Concept, according to Longuenesse, lies in the degree of assimilation of 
everything external to the reflective activity of thought. In the former there is still 
content given to the reflection that is taken as standing external to it. The complete 
self-relational transparency is not yet accomplished, which serves as the impetus for 
the continuous effort of reflection. In the latter, this resistance to unity has been 
overcome and all determinations are acknowledged as the products of the activity of 
thought. Longuenesse is right, indeed: The complete integration of determinations 
within the self-related holistic unity is one of the key developments that becomes 
accomplished in the concept, but it needs to be mentioned that this activity is 
integrated within the fundamental ontological substructure that Hegel calls the 
concept as one of its three moments, the moment that Hegel will describe as the 





3) Determinations of Reflection as the Basic Functions 
Through Which Conceptual Content is Generated 
 
The determinations of reflection, or essentialities, include identity, difference, 
diversity, opposition, and contradiction. This is the list of the basic functions that 
guide the process of reflection in its effort of generating conceptual content. Hegel 
claims that these fundamental forms were traditionally taken as “the universal laws” 
that are “accepted as true by all thinking that grasps their meaning”:  
The determinations of reflection have customarily been 
singled out in the form of propositions which were said 
to apply to everything. They were said to have the 
status of universal laws of thought that lie at the base of 
all thinking; to be inherently absolute and 
indemonstrable but immediately and indisputably 
recognized and accepted as true by all thought upon 
grasping their meaning. (WL 409.6) 
The question that used to be ignored and thus left unanswered by the tradition was 
this: What is the reason behind this apparent self-evidence of the universal laws of 
thought? Of note at this point is that Hegel is not merely raising the theme of 
analytic vs. synthetic relations. In other words, he is not repeating the Kantian thesis 
that what the tradition took for analytic was in reality synthetic and thus 
presupposed the unifying activity of thought. Hegel wants to go further and assert 
that even the most basic analytic relations imply functions of thought that need to 
be closely examined. The self-evidence of the universal laws of thought, such as 
“everything is identical with itself,” needs to be demystified and the ground for their 
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validity have to be made explicit. Once this is done, Hegel claims that we shall 
discern a relational structure of the most basic determinations that are present even 
on this level. The essentialities and the universal laws that correspond to them are 
not the atomic units given as the most basic pieces of the mosaic that make up 
actuality. “In the form of the proposition, therefore, in which identity is expressed, 
there lies more than simple, abstract identity; in it, there lies this pure movement of 
reflection in which the other appears as schein” (WL 415.4). Instead, they are the 
functions of thought, the reflective activity, which, when closely examined, reveal 
relatedness to one another.  
Now, a striking testimony of the Kantian origins of Hegel’s project emerges 
from how closely the determinations of reflection deduced and examined by Hegel 
in the Doctrine of Essence correspond to the concepts of comparison that Kant 
presents in The Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s goal in 
Amphiboly is to distinguish between the reflection that compares concept and the 
reflection that compares sensible representations. The concepts concerned in 
Amphiboly include identity and difference, agreement and conflict, inner and outer, 
and matter and form. Kant also draws an explicit parallel between the concepts of 
comparison and the logical forms of judgment “Prior to all objective judgments we 
compare the concepts, with respect to identity (of many representations under one 
concept) for the sake of universal judgments, or their difference, for the generation 
of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgments, or 
opposition, for negative ones, etc.”(A262/B318). As Longuenesse has shown in her 
detailed study of the concepts of comparison, they are, for Kant, the basic operations 
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of thought involved in the generation of empirical concepts. The first three pairs of 
the concepts of comparison correspond almost one to one to the determinations of 
reflection from The Essence chapter of Hegel’s Logic, while the last pair that deals 
with the modality of judgment is also reflected in the Hegelian system, as we shall 
see. Hence, in what follows I shall first present Kant’s account of the concepts of 
comparison in a manner that closely follows Longuenesse’s detailed analysis of 
them. Through this analysis, it shall also become apparent that the concepts of 
comparison correspond to the logical functions of judgment. Having gained a good 
understanding of the key element of the Kantian system, I shall return to Hegel’s 
text, take a close look at his deduction of the determinations of reflection, and draw 
the relation between the Kantian and the Hegelian accounts of the elementary 
function of thought that generates empirical determinations. This side-by-side 
reading of Kant’s and Hegel’s texts should allow us to see how much light can we 
shed on the role that the Hegelian determinations of reflection play in the 
generation of empirical concept based on illuminating the corresponding function of 
concepts of comparison in the Kantian system.  
 
 
4) Longuenesse’s Thesis About the Key Role of the 




Hegel’s discussion of essentialities and reflection in general makes it clear 
that these operations are the elemental functions of the activity of thought through 
which conceptual content is generated. However, Hegel focuses on their deduction 
and the articulation of the relations between the determinations of reflection, 
instead of presenting an account of how exactly they are employed in the process of 
generating empirical concepts. In other words, Hegel is mostly concerned with 
demonstrating how identity implies operation of reflection that is tied to 
differentiation, which in turn is related to diversity, etc. But he takes for granted the 
transparency of how these interrelated determinations function as the basic 
operations guiding the process of the generation of conceptual content. It is 
interesting that Beatrice Longuenesse makes a similar observation regarding Kant. 
As she points out, in The Critique of Pure Reason Kant also assumes the familiarity of 
his readers about the use of concept of comparison in the generation of empirical 
concepts. Kant is explicit about it only in his lectures on Logic (Longuenesse 1998, 
131-132). 
The first thing to note about the Kantian concepts of comparison (or the 
concepts of reflection, as Kant also calls them) is that they are a very specific kind of 
concepts. Instead of being concepts of object and their properties, Kantian concepts 
of reflection represent the forms of activity of comparison that the mind is engaged 
in. Now Kant’s discussion in Amphiboly focuses on the employment of these 
concepts in comparison of concepts in judgments, but as Beatrice Longuenesse 
conclusively demonstrates, the very same operations are involved in the activity of 
the generation of new concepts. “[I]n its fully achieved discursive form is a 
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comparison of concepts, but in ‘silent,’ or embryonic form, is a comparison of 
sensible representations in order to form concepts” (Longuenesse 1998, 124). 
Hence, these basic functions of the operation of the mind, which Kant calls concepts 
of comparison or concepts of reflection and Hegel presents as determinations of 
reflection or essentialities, are in operation both with building concepts from 
sensations (singular and immediate representations) and from already available 
concepts (universal and reflected representations).  
An exploration of the Kantian concepts of reflection and identifying their 
correspondence with the Hegelian determinations of reflection from the Doctrine of 
Essence shall help us to clarify the role of these determinations in the generation of 
empirical content and subsequently the aspect of Hegel’s theory of the concepts that 
is associated with the determination-generating activity. In other words, with 
illuminating the way in which these functions guide the process of generation of 
conceptual content, we shall shed light on the internal structure of that moment of 
the Hegelian notion of the Concept, which is associated with conceptual content 
generation—the universality. As such, what follows in this chapter is an exploration 
of the internal architectonics of the universal moment of the Concept, to the close 
study of which I shall turn in the subsequent two chapters of this work. 
 
4.1) Identity and difference 
The first pair of concepts Kant considers is identity and difference, which he 
associates with the quantitative judgment. Identity corresponds to the universal, 
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and difference to particular judgment. “Prior to all objective judgments we compare 
the concepts, with respect to identity (of many representations under one concept) 
for the sake of universal judgments, or their difference, for the generation of 
particular ones” (A262/B317). The identity we are dealing with in universal 
judgment obtains in relation between the determinations falling under the subject-
concept in regard to the predicate-concept. For example, statements such as “All 
bodies are divisible,” or stated more generally “all As are B,” assert the identity not 
of the concepts of A and B but of those determinations that are thought under A with 
respect to the concept B. In other words, the statement means: this x-body is 
divisible, that y-body is also divisible, another z-body is divisible as well, etc. Hence, 
“All bodies are divisible.”  
On the other hand, particular judgment, such as “Some divisible things are 
bodies,” or stated more generally, “some As are B,” introduce difference—while this 
divisible-x (for example, this desk) is a body, but that divisible-y (for example, the 
time interval used to write this sentence) is not. In other words, x and y are different 
with respect to the concept of “body.” In this respect, x and y that are both thought 
under the concepts of divisibility are determined as different with respect to their 
relation to the concept of body. If, in the case of universal judgment, all 
determinations falling under the concept were identical in regard to their relation to 
concept B, with particular judgment they are differentiated into groups with 
different relations to the concept B. In other words, when applying the concept of 
comparison identity and difference we are engaging in the process of reflection that 
is aiming at determining the extension of the domains of the two concepts that are 
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being compared. This internal differentiation of the initial self-unity is what we shall 
see when Hegel introduces difference as the second determination of reflection after 
identity. Both Kant and Hegel present identity and difference as the unity and its 
internal differentiation. With Kant, the extension of the one determination is 
differentiated into two parts, one belonging to another determination and the other 
excluded from it. With Hegel, as we shall see, the very same move of internal 
differentiation of the unity will be restated in more general terms. 
Now, according to Longuenesse, the very same formal structures are guiding 
our conceptual-content-generating activity.  
[I]n order to form concepts, we sift through our sensible 
representations by means of our concepts of 
comparison, which thus guide the formation of concepts 
for judgments. Recognition of the (generic) identity of 
the “rule of our apprehension” in different 
representations yields a universal judgment. 
Recognition of the difference of the “rule of our 
apprehension” in various representations yields 
particular judgment. (Longuenesse 1998, 134)  
In other words, it is through the identifying and differentiating activities of the mind 
engaged in the process of apprehension of representations that new determinations 
are generated. The process of reflection that attends apprehension of a variety of 
representations and is guided by these functions of comparison is geared to 
generating new empirical concepts. For example, this tree (x), that tree (y), and 
another tree (z) all have such and such identical types of leaves, trunks, branches, 
etc., which differentiates them from numerous other representations that are also 
apprehended as trees. Based on the shared properties that set these trees apart 
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from others, I can arrive at a new concept that includes the shared properties, a 
concept under which falls a certain subcategory of the object apprehended as trees.  
 
4.2) Agreement and Opposition   
The second pair of the concepts of comparison Kant considers is agreement 
and conflict. “Prior to all objective judgments we compare the concepts, … with 
regard to agreement, for affirmative judgments, or opposition, for negative ones, 
etc.” (A262/B318). In relating two determinations to each other, not only do we 
specify how they are related regarding their extension—whether one is fully or only 
partially included in the other—we also determine whether this relation of 
extensions is positive or negative. In other words, we are making the determination 
of whether the extension of one concept is fully included (agreement) within the 
domain of the other, or fully excluded (opposition) from it; or whether they are 
partially included or partially excluded from each other. If identity and difference 
were related to quantitative judgment, the agreements and opposition are related to 
qualitative judgments (affirmative vs. negative). Hence, with the two pairs of 
already-considered concepts of comparison, we can have four different ways of 
relating determinations: identical agreement, or “all As are B”; identical opposition, 
or “no As are B”; differentiated agreement, or “some As are B”; and differentiated 
opposition, or “some As are not B.”  
Longuenesse relates the second pair of functions, agreement and conflict, 
with the previous one as mutually implying each other: “These two concepts of 
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comparison [agreement and conflict], and the acts of comparison they guide and 
reflect, are clearly inseparable from identity and difference. Earlier, we saw how 
judgments such as ‘all As are B’ presuppose acts of comparison with respect to 
identity. But comparison with respect to agreement is clearly involved as well: as to 
its content, B is in agreement with A” (Longuenesse 1998, 138). In other words, 
within the process of reflection that identifies one determination with another is 
involved agreement between their respective acts of apprehension, just as the 
process of differentiation involves registering an opposition. Delineation of 
extensional relations between determinations is inseparably tied with discerning 
agreement and conflict between their respective contents. We shall see that Hegel 
will advance a similar point in his discussion of determinations of reflection by 
deducing the relations of diversity and opposition from differentiation of self-
identical unity. That is to say, just as with Kant, identification and differentiation 
implies discerning agreement and conflict, so with Hegel identification and 
differentiation implies diversity and opposition.  
Therefore, together with identity and difference as the functions that guide 
the process of the generation of empirical content are also involved agreement and 
conflict as integral elements of the very same activity. In other words, the process of 
generating empirical concepts involves reflection that is searching for instances of 
apprehension of representations that are in agreement and/or conflict with one 
another and through discerning such relations gradually augmenting the content of 




4.3) Inner and Outer  
In addition to identity/difference and agreement/opposition, the concepts of 
reflection involved in the generation of empirical determinations, according to Kant, 
also include inner and outer. If the previous two pairs of concepts were related to 
quantitative and qualitative judgments, the present one corresponds to the 
judgment or relation: “If we reflect merely logically, then we simply compare our 
concepts with each other in the understanding, seeing whether two of them contain 
the very same thing, whether they contradict each other or not, whether something 
is contained in the concept internally or is added to it” (A279/B335). The inner 
relation between the determinations being related stands for attributing the 
predicate-determination to the subject determination without any external 
condition. In other words, there are no additional conditions that need to obtain in 
order to predicate the former to the latter. “All trees have branches” or “some trees 
are evergreen” would be examples of such a relation. This form of relation 
corresponds to categorical judgment. The outer relation, on the other hand, needs 
some external condition to be obtained, which necessitates the attribution of 
predicate-determination to the subject determination. An example of this could be 
“if roots of a tree are cut off, the tree will die.” Moreover, this external condition 
does not have to be related to the subject-determination: The outer relation can 
have not only the form of “If A is X, then A is Y” but also “If A is X, then B is Y.” For 
example, “If Professor Kant walks by, the clocks will strike four times” or “If the 
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climate dramatically changes, many animal species will perish.” One more important 
thing to note here is that, if with the other concepts of reflection we were relating 
two determinations, now we are relating two relations. As such, inner/outer formal 
functions are geared to articulating complex systematic relations between 
determinations and the relations between determinations. It is the systematizing 
function immanent to the determination-generating process.      
These functions (inner and outer), together with the two above-discussed 
pairs (identity/difference and agreement/conflict), are not merely used to relate 
already-existing concepts, but also are guiding the process of reflection through 
which conceptual content of empirical determinations is generated. In the process of 
the formation of empirical concepts, we examine appearances with the aim to 
discern the formal structure of either inner or outer relations between its 
determinations. For example, we observe that this x, which is a tree, has branches, 
and that y, which is also cognized as tree, has branches as well. We repeat this 
process until we eventually come up with a general rule that states that trees have 
braches. This is clearly an example of an inner relationship discerned amongst 
apprehended representations. On the other hand, we can also parse experiences 
with the aim of identifying external conditions under which new states of affairs will 
be obtained. For example, if this piece of metal x is heated it melts, if that other piece 
of metal y is heated, it also will be transformed from solid into fluid state, etc. Thus I 
arrive at a general rule that if metal is heated, it melts. This is clearly an example of 
an outer relation between the concepts of metal and fluid, established based on the 
external condition of increased temperature.  
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The search for the inner and outer relations between the determinations 
offered through experience is what constitutes the process of looking for 
regularities in nature and identifying empirical laws. This is what Kant has in mind 
when claiming in the Transcendental Deduction that understanding is continuously 
busy with “scrutinizing appearances in search for rules” (A126). Empirical laws of 
nature are nothing but a system of interrelated concepts that articulate rules of 
inner and outer relation. The former present the features that the given 
determination possesses due to its own constitution, while the latter articulate the 
necessary course of development if specific conditions are to obtain. It is important 
to note here that with the necessity involved in both the inner and the outer 
relations corresponding to the hypothetical judgments (“all As are B,” which is the 
same as “all x-s that are A, are also B”; “if A is L then A is M”; or “if A is K then B is 
M”) is implied another relational category: contradiction. This can be made evident 
from the fact that the very same relations can be formulated as a contradiction 
between two propositions, respectively, between “x is A” and “x is not B,” “A is L” 
and “A is not M,” or again between “A is X” and “B is not Y.” Here two relations that 
are perfectly non-problematic when taken on their own cannot be asserted together 
due to their mutual contradiction to each other. As we shall see, contradiction is the 
last element in the system of determinations of reflection that Hegel presents in the 
Essence chapter, and, indeed, here with Kant as well, it completes the portion of the 
concepts of reflection that is involved in the generation of conceptual content. The 




4.4) Matter and Form 
Kant opens his discussion of the fourth and the last pair of concepts of 
comparison with the following claim: “Matter and form. These are two concepts that 
ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the 
understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter its 
determination” (A266/B322). Hence, while the previous three pairs of concepts 
were specific functions guiding reflection in the process of the generation of 
empirical concepts, matter and form are seen by Kant to perform a somewhat 
different role. Instead of being specific forms of relating determinations, matter and 
form describe the totality of reflective activity that has the previously discussed six 
forms as the immanent functions of its operation. Kant goes even further and claims 
that they not only “ground reflection” but also are “inseparably … bound up with 
every use of the understanding” To the broader meaning of this claim I shall return 
shortly, but for now we are looking at the application of these functions that is 
geared to generating new conceptual content. For Kant the process guided by the 
concepts of comparison through which empirical determinations are formed is 
nothing but the application of form onto matter or determination of determinable. 
But if we keep in mind that the outcome of this application is the generation of new 
concepts that is matter of the logical forms of judgment, we can conclude that the 
application of forms of thought (concepts of comparison that correspond to the 
logical forms of judgment) is geared to generating the matter of thought (concepts). 
In other words, the very same functions that relate already formed concepts are also 
the functions through which these concepts are generated. As Longuenesse puts it, 
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“The thesis that the concepts of comparison, ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ ‘agreement’ and 
‘conflict,’ ‘identity’ and ‘difference,’ guide the formation of concepts from the 
sensible given is equivalent to saying that the matter of all thought (viz. concepts) is 
generated by the very activity that combines concepts in accordance with its proper 
form (the forms of judgment)” (Longuenesse 1998, 162).  
Indeed, as we have seen, the previous three pairs of concepts of comparison 
correspond to the logical forms of judgment:  the forms that related concepts with 
respect to their extension—to the quantitative judgment; with respect to their 
content to the qualitative judgment; and with respect to the inner/out conditionality 
of their interrelations to the judgments of relation. Hence, one ought not to be 
surprised that the conceptual content generated via the application of the concepts 
of comparison will be amenable to the logical forms of judgment. Empirical 
concepts, which are the matter to which the forms of judgments are applied, are 
generated through the process guided by the functions that correspond one-to-one 
to these very functions of judgments.  
The fact that the fourth pair of the concepts of reflection is—different from 
the previously considered ones—not additional formal elements that determine the 
activity of thought engaged in the generation of determinations is a reflection of the 
correspondence between the logical functions of judgment on which the categories 
are based and the concepts of comparison. In the case of the logical functions of 
judgment also, Kant explicitly states that the judgments of modality do not add 
anything new to the content of relations offered in the table; “the modality of 
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judgments is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in that it 
contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for besides quantity, quality, 
and relation there is nothing more that constitutes the content of judgment), but 
rather concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general” 
(A74/B100).  
Hence, as is the case with the concepts of comparison matter and form, so 
with the judgments of modality the very same theme of the totality of thought comes 
to the fore. In the former case, instead of specific forms of reflection (such as with 
identity, difference, etc.), we were dealing with the whole process of application of 
these functions. In the latter case, the modality of a proposition relies on the totality 
of empirical knowledge as its background. To better understand the meaning of this 
last point we can recall Kant’s distinction between problematic, assertoric, and 
apodictic judgments: “Problematic judgments are those in which one regards the 
assertion or denial as merely possible (arbitrary). Assertoric judgments are those in 
which it is considered actual (true). Apodictic judgments are those in which it is 
seen as necessary” (A75/B100). To see what Kant means here, let’s consider the 
distinction between assertoric and apodictic judgments. The relation between them 
can be described as follows: The generation of apodictic judgments is accomplished 
via the gradual accumulation of the assertoric types of judgments. Thus, if I observe 
that this swan is white, that another swan is also white, yet another one is white as 
well, I can finally conclude with a general rule that all swans are white. But it is 
important to note here that this is only possible if the totality of empirical 
experience does not include contrary cases, i.e., there are no black swans, in this 
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case. Hence, without the totality of empirical knowledge as the background, the 
distinction between the assertoric and apodictic judgments of empirical laws makes 
no sense. The same point can be made regarding the difference between 
problematic and assertoric judgments.  
As we have seen in the above-cited passage, Kant claims that the concepts of 
matter and form are not only applicable to the activity of the generation of empirical 
concepts, but they in general are “inseparably bound up with every use of the 
understanding.” Now, understanding for Kant means our active faculty of cognition, 
which he also often describes as spontaneity and contrasts with sensibility as the 
passive faculty of receptivity; and includes three types of actions of the mind: 
formation of concepts, subsuming objects under concepts as well as lower concepts 
to higher concepts, and formation of inferences. My discussion here has been mostly 
focusing on the formation of concepts and how application of the logical functions of 
judgment in this process yields generation of conceptual content. But Kant makes 
clear that the application of form for the generation of matter is taking place not 
only in this but “with every use of the understanding.” In other words, the 
matter/form relation can be discerned on a lower level where the concepts are not 
matter but the forms and the objects are their matter (subsuming objects under 
concepts), as well as on a higher level where the judgments themselves are the 
matter of the inferences (formation of inferences). As Longuenesse puts it,  
we can go further in our use of the concepts “matter” 
and “form” to reflect the generation of concepts through 
comparison/reflection/abstraction. (1) We can go 
further down, toward the determinable, and consider 
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the matter for which the concepts themselves are the 
form, namely the object. (2)We can go further up, 
toward the determination, and consider the form for 
which judgments are the matter, namely forms of 
inference, and the form of a system in general. 
(Longuenesse 162) 
The concepts of comparison, the role of which in the generation of empirical 
concepts we have examined, are also asserted to be ingrained in the empirical 
objects themselves as the immanent elements of their constitutive structure. This is 
apparent from the way Kant conceives objects of experience—for him they are 
grounded on the rule-guided synthesis of intuitions, these rules of synthesis being 
empirical concepts. As we have seen, however, the generation of empirical concepts 
is nothing but the application of forms on matter, that is, formation of determination 
through the activity of the mind guided by the functions present in the previous 
three pairs of the concepts of comparison. Hence, the form-matter relation within 
the concepts implies the form-matter relation within the objects of experience. But 
we can look at this issue from another angle by recalling Kant’s notion of the 
transcendental object from the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, which is 
basically the formal structure made up of the logical functions of judgment and is 
present in every object of cognition as the very condition of its possibility, as its 
immanent formal structure. The transcendental object, comprised of the functions 
of unity identical to those of the concepts of comparison, is therefore a necessary 
condition without which no combination of representations into an objected of 
experience is possible.  
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The pure concept of this transcendental object (which 
in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same 
= X) is that which in all of our empirical concepts in 
general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective 
reality. Now this concept cannot contain any 
determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns 
nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a 
manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to 
an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than 
the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of 
synthesis of the manifold through a common function of 
the mind for combining it in one representation. Now 
since this unity must be regarded as necessary a priori 
(since the cognition would otherwise be without an 
object), the relation to a transcendental object, i.e., the 
objective reality of our empirical cognition, rests on the 
transcendental law that all appearances, insofar as 
objects are to be given to us through them, must stand 
under a priori rules of their synthetic unity. (A109) 
Thus, the logical functions of judgment comprising the formal structure of the 
transcendental object are the elements that afford “objective reality” to the 
synthesis of sensible intuitions. Now, as we have seen, these functions correspond 
and are formally identical to the concepts of comparison, and the process of 
reflection guided by these concepts is described by Kant as an imposition of form on 
matter. Therefore, matter and form, which are described by Kant as the “two 
concepts that ground all other reflection” guided by the remaining six concepts of 
comparison, are present not only on the level of generation of empirical concepts 
but also on the level of formative synthesis of objects of representation. In fact, the 
generation of empirical objects out of sensible given is nothing but the process of 
combination of the latter in accordance to the formal structure of the transcendental 
object, hence the generation of the form within the matter.   
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The matter-form relation can be discerned not only on this “lower” level, but 
also on the “higher” level where the judgments themselves are the matter and the 
inferential relations that structure them aiming to give them systematic unity—their 
form. Kant presents a lengthy discussion of this drive toward systematic unity in the 
Introduction to The Critique of Judgment. Reflective activity is guided by the very 
same functions that generate empirical concepts and objects of experience while 
searching for the patterns of systematic relations between judgments and aiming at 
tying them through inferential relations into a unified whole. Hence, the reflective 
activity as the form-generating process that immanently structures its matter is 
present on all levels of the Kantian transcendental system—from the generation of 
empirical objects of representation, via the generation of concepts, all the way to the 
unified theories structuring the judgments into a systematic whole.  
 
5) The Form–Matter Relation in Hegel’s Concept 
It is striking that the exactly same relation between form and matter we have 
just seen in Kant is present on the most fundamental level of Hegel’s ontology—his 
theory of the Concept. Moreover, as is the case with Kant, here it is also related to 
the process of the generation of conceptual content. The Concept, which I shall 
examine closely in the remaining two chapters, is the kernel of Hegel’s ontological 
theory; it is his vision of actuality properly comprehended. For Hegel the Concept is 
a complex relational structure consisting of three moments: universality, 
particularity, and individuality. Now the relation between the key moment of this 
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fundamental ontological structure, universality, with another moment, particularity, 
is described by Hegel as that of the form to the content. Moreover, the universal 
moment of the concept is presented as the activity, or “creative force,” through 
which conceptual content is generated. The particular moment, on the other hand, is 
the system of determinations produced by universality. The similarities with Kant 
don’t end here, as even the terminology Hegel uses in describing the universal as the 
process (e.g., absolute self-identity positing differences, generating particular 
determinations as diversity, etc.) is clearly reminiscent of the Kantian account of the 
generation of concepts, as the logical functions of judgment for Kant are identical to 
the transcendental apperception—they are the functions of self-relation (§19, CPR). 
We shall also see that Hegel, while discussing the universal moment as the process 
of generating conceptual content, makes numerous direct references to the Essence 
chapter of the Logic, where determinations of reflection corresponding to the 
Kantian concepts of comparison and logical functions of judgment are presented.    
Here is a passage where Hegel describes the positing of determinations by 
the universal as a generation of differentiated content in relation to which it (the 
universal moment) functions as the form: 
The particular has this universality in it as its essence; 
but in so far as the determinateness of the difference is 
posited and thereby has being, the universality is form 
in it, and the determinateness as such is its content. 
Universality becomes form inasmuch as the difference 
is something essential, just as in the pure universal it is, 
on the contrary, only absolute negativity and not a 
difference posited as such. (WL 536, 12:39) 
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The “pure universal” is thus absolute negativity, the activity that aims at the 
generation of the differentiated determinations and it is related to its product as the 
form to the content. Just like Kant’s form-matter relation was referring to the 
activity of reflection through which empirical concepts were generated, so here the 
universal as the form posits differentiated determinations and is related to them as 
to its content. Here is another passage where Hegel describes the universality as the 
“creative power” that posits determinate content through self-differentiation and 
refers to universality as the form associated with “creativity of the concept”: 
It [universality] is creative power as self-referring 
absolute negativity. As such, it differentiates itself 
internally, and this is a determining, because the 
differentiating is one with the universality. Accordingly, 
it is a positing of differences that are themselves 
universals, self-referring. They become thereby fixed, 
isolated differences. The isolated subsistence of the 
finite that was earlier determined as its being-for-itself, 
also as thinghood, as substance, is in its truth 
universality, the form with which the infinite concept 
clothes its differences – a form which is equally itself 
one of its differences. Herein consists the creativity of 
the concept, a creativity which is to be comprehended 
only in the concept’s innermost core. (WL 533-34, 
12:36-37) 
Hence, the Kantian activity of reflection geared to generating empirical concepts and 
guided by the concepts of comparison is appropriated by Hegel as the universal 
moment of his basic ontological structure: the Concept. The detailed examination of 
the universal moment, as well as of the Concept in general, will be undertaken in 
subsequent chapters. Here I shall look at that part of the Doctrine of Essence where 
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Hegel deduces the basic functions corresponding to the concepts of comparison. He 
calls them determinations of reflection or essentialities. 
Having considered how the Kantian concepts of reflection guide the process 
of the generation of empirical concepts and having seen the correspondence 
between them and the Hegelian determinations of reflection, we can already make 
some preliminary conclusions about the function of the latter in regard to the 
empirical concepts even before moving to a close analysis of their deduction. It is 
clear that the determinations of reflection, or essentialities, are not the fundamental 
elements making up the ontological landscape (the elaboration of the basic 
“furniture” of actuality is the task most directly undertaken in the Doctrine of Being). 
Instead, they are the most basic formal functions guiding the activity that generates 
this landscape. In other words, identity, difference, diversity, etc., are not primarily 
the constituent parts found in the world and represented by the mind, but the basic 
functions of activity that generate determinate content of these entities. The 
essentialities are the formal features that guide the process of the generation of 
empirical concepts, and therefore also of the entities individuated through them. 
The self-identity of any determination, its difference from another, etc., are not the 
properties that these determinations have in themselves as independent of process 
of reflection, but the most elementary forms involved in the process of their 
formation. They can surely be “discovered” when one reflects on the entities and 
their relations to one another, but not because they originate somewhere outside of 
the domain of reflection, but because they have been ingrained within the 
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determinations that serve as the condition of the possibility of individuation of these 
entities. 
What is taking place in the Essentialities chapter is a deduction of these 
interrelated functions of thought, identity and difference, diversity and 
contradiction, etc., which are the basics forms of the operation of the determination-
generating process that are connected to one another with necessity. The point is 
that when something is comprehended as self-identical, it is also implicitly 
comprehended as different from something else, and vice versa. What is not taking 
place in this chapter is the articulation of qualities that each entity taken by itself or 
together with others has, independently of thought and merely represented in 
thought. Hence, the well-known criticism of Hegel, as having maintained that 
everything is self-contradictory and contradiction is the feature of every single 
entity encountered in the world, completely misses the point. Contradiction, just as 
other determinations of reflection, is a feature not of the self-sufficient independent 
entities given to the mind, but of the process of the generation of the conditions of 
individuation of these entities. I shall return to this point after giving a close 
treatment of this and other determinations of reflection.  
 
6) Identity 
The first determination of reflection is Identity. Hegel describes it as “the 
immediacy of reflection. It is not that equality-with-self that being or even nothing is, 
but the equality-with-self that has brought itself to unity … pure origination from 
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and within itself, essential identity” (WL 411.4). The first thing that needs to be 
noted here is both clear surface-level similarity and the radical difference between 
Identity and Pure Being with which the entire The Science of Logic commences. Both 
are pure indeterminate immediacies, still not yet touched with the mediation that is 
about to ensue and bind them with other determinations. Thus, in that sense the 
identity is the totality of reflection and not merely its one determination, just like 
Pure Being is Being as such prior to any differentiation; “so far, then, identity is still 
in general the same as essence” (WL 412.1) or “the identity is, in the first instance, 
essence itself, not yet a determination of it, reflection in its entirety, not a distinct 
moment of it” (412.3). But there is also a fundamental difference between the 
opening determinations of the Doctrine of Being and Identity; as Hegel puts it, if the 
former merely “is,” the latter “has brought itself to unity.” Identity is essentially 
activity of self-relation: the “equality-with-self” that is continuously reconstituted, 
the reflection that “brings itself to unity.”  
Clearly we are dealing here not with a property possessed by something in 
the world independently of any act of reflection, but with a key feature of any act of 
thinking that “brings itself to unity.” This dynamic nature of the first determination 
of reflection is what Hegel wants to bring to the fore when describing it as “pure 
movement of reflection” (416.2). The fact that Hegel does not take identity to be an 
“unmoved simple” property, but an act of identification becomes apparent with the 
example he offers to demonstrate that the identity implies difference.  
Instead of being the unmoved simple, it surpasses itself 
into the dissolution of itself. More is entailed, therefore, 
110 
 
in the form of the proposition expressing identity than 
simple, abstract identity; entailed by it is this pure 
movement of reflection in the course of which there 
emerges the other, but only as reflective shine, as 
immediate disappearing; “A is” is a beginning that 
envisages a something different before it to which the 
“A is” would proceed; but the “A is” never gets to it. “A 
is...A”: the difference is only a disappearing and the 
movement goes back into itself. (WL 360.1-2) 
The point is that identity as a form of reflection implies difference because it is not 
an “unmoved simple” property that is discerned within an object of thought, but an 
active principle of self-relation that in order to return to itself has to introduce 
difference, but only as “reflective shine.” Hence, Hegel’s determinations of reflection 
are not the most fundamental elements of actuality along the lines of the 
Aristotelian categories as the most universal characteristics of what is out there in 
the world. For the latter presupposed the representationalist picture of the 
universal features of the world expressed in the determination of thought as the 
categories. Instead, they are the necessary conditions that any process of reflection 
engaged in determination of content has to fulfill.  
Identity is the dynamic principle of unification that is present in any action of 
thought, for even the other determinations that will be derived from it shortly by 
Hegel have to be parts of the unified whole in order to be comprehended as 
difference, diversity, etc. For only within a unified whole can difference be thought; if 
there is no act of relating one determination with another one as distinct from it and 
taking them up together into a self-identical act of reflection, differentiation cannot 
be accomplished. This is even clearer in the case of diversity, contradiction, etc. 
Hence, identity can be described as the minimal requirement of thought, the 
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principal element of any determination. As with Kant, here also we are dealing with 
carving out a self-identical domain of determination. In the former case, it was the 
identity of plurality of apprehended individuals in regard to the presence of certain 
schema of apprehension in all of them, hence the identical acts of unity that all of 
them have in common. In the latter case, we have the very same formal structure of 
act of identification presented in a more minimalistic vocabulary. 
 
7) Difference 
If identity is the moment of reflection that represents the continuous effort 
toward reconstitution of unity, difference is the negating force that reshapes existing 
determinations and generates new ones: “Difference is the negativity that reflection 
possesses in itself” (WL 361). In order to constitute unity, reflective activity has to 
integrate determinations within a whole, thus negating their apparent self-
sufficiency and rendering them into the elements of an interrelated unified whole. 
Any process of negation, on the other hand, also implies a drive toward unification 
as what is negated is taken up within the process of reflection that includes other 
determinations. This mutual relatedness is one of the key features of difference and 
identity as the essential moments of any act of reflection: “Difference is the whole 
and its own moment, just as identity equally is its whole and its moment. – This is to 
be regarded as the essential nature of reflection and as the determined primordial 
origin of all activity and self-movement. – Both difference and identity make 
themselves into moment or positedness because, as reflection, they are negative 
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self-reference” (WL 362). Hence, the process of the generation of determinations of 
thought for Hegel, on the most fundamental level, is differentiation and 
identification. We shall see that this thesis will be restated in the Concept chapter of 
the Subjective Logic and specifically in regard to the universal moment of the 
concept that Hegel sees as “the creative power” that generates conceptual content.  
Here again, just like with identity, Hegel is explicit in arguing that we should 
not confuse difference with a feature of the self-sufficient actuality. This is what he is 
after when juxtaposing and contrasting difference with otherness. The former is a 
feature of the process of reflection, while the latter that of determinate being.  
It is the difference of reflection, not the otherness of 
existence. One existence and another existence are 
posited as lying outside each other; each of the two 
existences thus determined over against each other has 
an immediate being for itself. The other of essence, by 
contrast, is the other in and for itself, not the other of 
some other which is to be found outside it; it is simple 
determinateness in itself. Also in the sphere of existence 
did otherness and determinateness prove to be of this 
nature, simple determinateness, identical opposition; 
but this identity showed itself only as the transition of a 
determinateness into the other. Here, in the sphere of 
reflection, difference comes in as reflected, so posited as 
it is in itself. (WL 361) 
Difference here is the negative moment of thought that deals not with some external, 
given determination, but instead is the basic negative function of the act of 
reflection. It therefore ought not to be confused with otherness of determinate being. 
The latter implies givenness of distinct determinations between which reflection 
can move back and forth. Difference on the other hand is the aspect of the process of 
reflection that generates empirical determinations and together with identity 
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constitutes the most fundamental functions on which the radical plasticity of 
empirical determinations rests. Hence, together with identity, difference is the basic 
function of determinateness; it is through these two forms, differentiation and 
identification, that carving out of the boundaries between determinations is 
accomplished. As in Kant, here as well identity and difference are the most basic 
functions through which determination is accomplished.     
 
8) Diversity 
The subsequent determination of reflection is the unity of identity and 
difference, or the application of the latter on the former: “Identity internally breaks 
apart into diversity because, as absolute difference in itself, it posits itself as the 
negative of itself and these, its two moments (itself and the negative of itself), are 
reflections into themselves, are identical with themselves; or precisely because it 
itself immediately sublates its negating and is in its determination reflected into 
itself” (WL 362). Hence, the differentiated elements are “reflected into” themselves 
qua self-identical unities. Indeed, clearly, the minimal condition of any 
determination is some form of self-unity; and therefore the determinations that are 
generated through the “identity [that] internally breaks apart” is not merely 
differentiated determinations but also self-identical ones. And on the other hand, 
these determinations can be self-identical only through differentiating from what is 
not identical to them. Diversity is, as such, the first immediate result of the unity of 
identity and difference. At this stage we can see quite clearly the correspondence 
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with the Kantian concepts of reflection. In both cases, the determination of the 
domain or extension of diverse concepts is the task accomplished by identification 
and differentiation.   
With the posited determinations in the picture, we no longer have the 
complete transparency of reflection that was there with identity and difference. The 
posited determinations stand outside of the complete self-transparency of reflection 
and its positive (identity) and negative (difference) moments: “Diversity constitutes 
the otherness as such of reflection” (WL 362). But this does not mean that diversity 
is a determination of being, something absolutely external to thought; it instead is 
the otherness of reflection generated from the process of reflection itself. “The other 
of existence has immediate being, where negativity resides, for its foundation. But in 
reflection it is self-identity, the reflected immediacy, that constitutes the subsistence 
of the negative and its indifference” (WL 362). 
With the introduction of the diversity that is the internally posited 
differentiated content, differentiation and identification acquire new functions, 
namely, as determining likeness and unlikeness amongst the posited determinations; 
“this external identity is likeness, and external difference is unlikeness” (WL 363). 
What were the positive and the negative moments of activity of reflection in general 
are now functions relating the determinations that have been generated through it. 
Identity and difference operate within the diversified content as likeness and 
unlikeness. Just like in their pure form, however, they mutually implied each other; 
unlikeness can only be determined on the background of likeness and vice versa—
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two determinations can be likened to each other as long as they are also unlike, or in 
some respect different from, each other. Without this difference they would simply 
not be two distinct determinations.  
This last point brings us to the complex relation that Hegel stands to 
Leibniz’s theory of identity of indiscernibles. On the face of it, he sides with Leibniz 
and goes against Kant when stating that numerical distinctness implies difference in 
determinations of thought, hence not on the level of sensible given but on the level 
of conceptual content.  
That everything is different from everything else is an 
altogether superfluous proposition, for in the plural of 
things there is already implied a multitude and totally 
indeterminate diversity. – The principle, however, 
“There are no two perfectly like things,” expresses more 
than that, for it expresses determinate difference. Two 
things are not merely two (numerical multiplicity is 
only the repetition of one) but are rather differentiated 
by a determination. (WL 366) 
Hence, the necessary condition for distinctness, according to Hegel, is determinate 
difference. Hegel indeed agrees with Leibniz that all difference is reducible to 
conceptual difference, and there are hence no other conditions (such as sensible, as 
Kant would have it) that could serve as the ground of numerical distinctness. But on 
the other hand, Hegel also sides with Kant against Leibniz in his rejection of the 
conception of cognition as a mere perception of content. The world is given to it in 
the form of ideas that are preprogrammed to arise in it as perceptions. “The 
Leibnizian monad develops its representations from itself but is not their generating 
and controlling force; they rise up in it as a froth, indifferent, immediately present to 
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each other and to the monad as well” (WL 343). For Hegel, then, what is lacking in 
Leibniz is the process of mediation, the activity of generation of the conceptual 
content; the Leibnizian ideas, instead of being products of reflection, merely pop up 
in the mind like bubbles. Kant, on the other hand, introduces the role of active 
reflection as the source of the generation of determinations. The problem with his 
stance, according to Hegel, is in setting limits to the active reflection as the source of 
determinations and retaining the passive reception of sensations as another source 
or determinations. Therefore, ultimately the problem with Kant, according to Hegel, 
is that he retains too much of Leibniz by allowing immediately received content as 
the ground of differentiation between entities. That is, Kant has rejected the 
Leibnizian immediacy or determinate content by placing spontaneity as the source 
of generation of the conceptual content, but he does not go far enough for Hegel to 
completely eliminate the passive reception content as the immediately given source 
of determinations.  
 
9) Opposition 
Hegel introduces opposition as “the determinate reflection” in which 
difference “finds its completion.” If with diversity, determinations produced through 
the process of reflection were related to one another and therefore the question of 
their groundedness on the activity of thought was set aside, here it occupies the 
center stage of the discussion. The determinations that are related as opposite to one 
another are here taken as elements of “the one mediation of the opposition as such, 
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in which they are simply only posited moments” (WL 425.3). Hence, instead of 
likeness and unlikeness as the modalities of relating diverse determinations, now 
we are attending to the unified process of mediation thought, which distinct 
determinations as such are posited. From a perspective that looks at diversity of 
determinations as if from an external point of view, we transition to the one that 
approaches the generation of these determinations, having been accomplished 
through the process of reflection, that opposes them to one another. In other words, 
the generation of determinate conceptual content on the most fundamental level 
involves the identification and differentiation of the pairs of determinations that are 
opposed to one another. One element of the pair is positive, the other negative, but at 
the same time each side can be either positive or negative. 
The two sides are thus merely diverse, and because 
their determinateness – that they are positive or 
negative – constitutes their positedness as against each 
other, each is not specifically so determined internally 
but is only determinateness in general; to each side, 
therefore, there belongs indeed one of the two 
determinacies, the positive or the negative; but the two 
can be interchanged, and each side is such as can be 
taken equally as positive or negative. (WL 369)  
Negative and positive are the simultaneously posited sides of the act of the 
generation of mutually opposing determinations, and neither side is intrinsically 
positive or negative. They are the basic functions of the process of differentiation, 





Given the foregoing, the process of reflection that generates conceptual 
content proceeds with positing a determination and in the same breath excluding its 
otherness. Not only is the diversity of determinations generated thought this process 
of reflection, but the determinations as opposing one another are determined 
through negation of the other, and as such they are only through one another or 
constituted through reciprocal opposition. But having laid out these basic functions 
involved in the formation of conceptual content, we can also discern one more 
formal relation that is necessarily involved within the process that is guided with 
this constellation of functions. This formal function is contradiction. 
Each act of determination has two necessary aspects that correspond to the 
two main functions from the determinations of reflection, identity, and difference. 
The first aspect is that it is self-identical, and the second, that it is what it is through 
differentiation from what it is not. The former can be seen as the positive, and the 
latter as the negative moment of the determination. When closely analyzed, 
however, each one of the sides will lead to necessary transition into their opposites 
(433.3). 
The positive is contradiction – in that, as the positing of 
self-identity by the excluding of the negative, it makes 
itself into a negative, hence into the other which it 
excludes from itself. This last, as excluded, is posited 
free of the one that excludes; hence, as reflected into 
itself and itself as excluding. The reflection that excludes 
is thus the positing of the positive as excluding the 
other, so that this positing immediately is the positing of 
its other which excludes it. (WL 375)  
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The claim that Hegel is making here is that any act of positive determinations is also 
an immediate determination of what it excludes, thus of the negative. The positing of 
a determination is possible only through the exclusion of what does not belonging to 
it, hence simultaneously determining what is excluded. Thus the act of positing a 
determination is always at the same time the act of determining what is excluded 
from it. Therefore, when we are dealing with a complex system of interrelated 
determinations, the generation of any new determination is not merely related to 
the specifically posited content but at the same time with the totality that is 
excluded from it.  
This is only one side of what Hegel calls “absolute contradiction,” its positive 
aspect. In addition to this, it also has the negative component: contradiction 
discerned from the opposite side of the act of determination, or “the absolute 
contradiction of the negative” (WL 432). At first, the very same schema as we have 
seen from the positive side—the determination as simultaneously posited (thus 
reflected) in what it excludes—can be discerned: “Considered in itself as against the 
positive, the negative is positedness as reflected into unlikeness to itself, the 
negative as negative” (WL 375). But in this case, we have an additional aspect that 
needs to be factored in, namely, that we are dealing not with positive but negative 
determination, which immediately implies the negation of the opposite: “But the 
negative is itself the unlike, the non-being of another; consequently, reflection is in 
its unlikeness its reference rather to itself” (WL 375). Hence, the relation that we 
had to explicate in the case of the positive, which is still there and can be explicated 
in the negative, is in addition to that which is also immediately present on this side 
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of determination. This is what Hegel is claiming in this passage, “This is therefore 
the same contradiction which the positive is, namely positedness or negation as self-
reference. But the positive is only implicitly this contradiction, is contradiction only 
in itself; the negative, on the contrary, is the posited contradiction” (WL 375). 
Having delineated the basic relational structure involved in any act of 
determination, we can conclude that the contradiction is the relational function 
immanent to the process of the generation of conceptual content and that it emerges 
from the opposition between the positive and the negative moments of any act of 
determination. Hence, contradiction is the element ingrained in the relational 
structure that is necessarily present with any process of generation of determinate 
content. It is the tension between seeming self-subsistence of what is posited and its 
constitutedness by the system of relations that are left external to it.  
My analysis of Hegel’s essentialities or the determinations of reflection that 
was carried out in this chapter on the background of the Kantian concepts of 
comparison aimed at shedding light on the role they play in the generation of 
empirical determinations. These basic functions of unity are the forms of relating 
determinations to one another through which the formation of empirical concepts 
takes place. Our investigation into the details of how the functions identical to the 
Hegelian essentialities are operating in the generation of empirical determinations 
within the Kantian system has shed light on the functioning of essentialities in the 
empirical concept generating process. As it has also been apparent, the analysis 
undertaken in this chapter should be understood as a detailed exploration within 
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the immanent structure of the universal moment of the concept—the moment that 
Hegel associates with the generation of conceptual content. The two remaining 
chapters will be dedicated to a close analysis of this fundamental ontological 




CHAPTER 4: The Logical Structure of the Concept  
 
 
1) The Concept as the Centerpiece of Hegel’s 
Transcendental Ontology  
In the previous chapter, I presented a detailed account of Hegel’s vision of the 
process of generating conceptual content and the meta-concepts that function as the 
basic forms that carry it out. I argued that the determinations of reflection 
presented by Hegel in the Doctrine of Essence were the normative authority-
conferring basic schemata, through the application of which empirical concepts and 
their determinate content were generated. It has also become apparent that these 
basic determinations of reflection can be traced back to the Kantian logical functions 
of judgment, which on their part were also basic forms of the activity of the mind 
through which both empirical and a priori concepts were generated. This Kantian 
thread, however, does not end there on the level of the Doctrine of Essence—as we 
shall see, it weaves its way all the way to the foundations of the Hegelian system. If 
the determinations of reflection are the results of Hegel’s appropriation of the 
Kantian logical functions of judgment, the Doctrine of the Concept can be seen as an 
extended commentary on the central thesis of Kant’s transcendental deduction: 
“object is that in the concept of which manifold is united”  
The animating idea of Hegel’s Logic, and thus the central thesis of his 
transcendental ontology, is that reality properly comprehended is the concept—“the 
123 
 
cognition that truly comprehends the object is the cognition of it as it is in and for 
itself, and that the Concept is its very objectivity” (WL 590.2) The present and the 
following chapters will be dedicated to the task of spelling out what exactly Hegel 
means by the term concept, what the assumptions and implications are of such a 
conception of reality, and where this thesis positions Hegel in relation to alternative 
ontological theories. As we shall see, what Hegel means by the concept is very 
different from the ordinary understanding of the term as a certain kind of mental 
representations or abstract universals that refer to the things in the mind-external 
world. The more deeply we descend in analyzing his theory of the concept, the more 
apparent it shall become that what Hegel is doing in this crucial part of the Logic is 
laying the ground for a fundamentally new ontological vision that directly emerges 
from the Kantian transcendental philosophy, putting behind many deeply rooted 
(and still often encountered) dogmas of the hitherto dominant tradition.  
The term concept for Hegel stands for a complex ontological structure that 
consists of three elements (or, in his words, moments), as well as the schema of 
relations between them. This separation into relations and relata, however, is 
somewhat artificial, as the moments of the concept and the schemata of mediation 
between them are mutually dependent and can be adequately grasped only in 
unison. Hence, merely dissecting the concept into its components is not going to give 
us a comprehensive account of what the concept means. It is also crucial to describe 
the way in which the moments of the concept are related to one another. The 
detailed analysis of the nature of the three moments of the concept and the schema 
of their relation is presented by Hegel in the first section of The Doctrine of the 
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Concept, specifically in its first and third chapters, The Concept and The Syllogism. 
While The Concept chapter focuses on the moments, The Syllogism presents several 
different schemas of mediation between them. These schemas, which constitute 
different ontological models as I shall show shortly, are arranged in an ascending 
degree of proximity to the Hegelian vision of actuality that on the one hand serves as 
the final element of this set, and on the other presents the fully mediated structure 
of the concept.  
Hegel describes the relation between the concept and the syllogism in the 
following words: “the syllogism is the completely posited Concept” (WL 664) and “in 
the syllogism … their [moments of the concept] determinate unity is posited” (WL 
664). The technical term posited for Hegel implies “made explicit” or “manifest”; 
therefore, the development from the Concept chapter to the Syllogism chapter is a 
process of self-manifestation of the concept. Although it is only at the end of this 
process that the successful model of the unified inner structure of the concept will 
emerge, it is still of crucial importance to closely examine the entire development, 
because an adequate understanding of each new stage of mediation assumes 
familiarity with what has previously taken place. The three moments of the 
concept—universality, particularity, and individuality—undergo significant 
transformation as they traverse the stages of mediation via syllogistic structures, at 
each stage leaving its footprint in the moments of the concept. As we shall see, by 
the end of Hegel’s Syllogism chapter, all three terms will have acquired meaning 
quite different from what they had at its beginning.  
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While examining the details of the development in the Doctrine of the 
Concept, it is important to keep in mind its significant difference from what has been 
covered in the previous parts of the Logic: “The progression of the Concept is no 
longer either passing-over or shining into another, but development; for the 
[moments] that are distinguished are immediately posited at the same time as 
identical with one another and with the whole , and [each] determinacy is as a free 
being of the whole Concept” (EL, par 161, pg 237). Hence, if prior to this point in the 
text, the development involved changing of the subject–matter, or as Hegel puts it, 
“passing-over” from one area within the onto-logical space to another, in the 
Doctrine of the Concept the different stages of development are “posited … as 
identical with one another” The last form of syllogistic mediation is describing the 
very same actuality as the first one but more adequately comprehended. Thus, what 
Hegel calls “development” is a gradual deepening of understanding of the logical 
structure of the concept; every new form of mediation between its elements is a 
more adequate depiction of their fundamental unity. The third part of the Logic 
therefore can be described as an account of the epigenesis of the Hegelian 
Concept—the centerpiece of his transcendental ontological system.  
1.1) The Kantian Origins 
Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept is the most direct testimony of the Kantian 
origins of his system. It draws on the task undertaken in the Doctrine of Essence, 
where the basic functions employed in the empirical concept generating activity, 
which includes reflection as a form of activity but is not limited to it, as it also 
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includes non-mental activity—or, rather, rejects the distinction between the two as 
a part of overall paradigm shift that leaves behind the dualistic ontology altogether. 
The Doctrine of the Concept also presents an account of the relational structure that 
includes this empirical concept generating activity together with the determinations 
that it produces as the integral parts of the larger whole, which Hegel calls actuality. 
In other words, if the determinations of reflection are meta-concepts that exhibit the 
functions guiding the process of generating empirical concepts, the subject matter of 
the doctrine of the concept can be described as the meta-meta-concept that presents 
the architectonics of the relation between the concept-generating process, the 
totality of empirical concepts, and actuality.  
1.1.1) Self-Relationality 
As we shall see, amongst several other crucial similarities with Kant, one of 
the defining features of Hegel’s basic ontological structure is its self-relationality, 
which is a clear evidence of its Kantian origins. One advantage of my treatment of 
the much-contested issue of the Kant-Hegel relation is that it located the central 
thesis of Kant’s transcendental idealism in the very heart of Hegel’s ontology—his 
theory of the concept. This brings to light the limitations of the alternative 
approaches on the issue. For example, it shall become clear that Brady Bowman’s 
reading of the self-relational structure of the Hegelian ontology that focuses on the 
doctrine of essence clearly cannot do justice to the issue under consideration, 
because neither is the doctrine of essence where the most fundamental layer of 
Hegel’s transcendental ontology is presented, nor is it the deepest point in the text 
where the self-relational structure can be discerned. In fact, this mistake might be 
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the key reason for Bowman’s and Robert Stern’s misreading of Hegel as abandoning 
the Kantian project—they did not deny the presence of the Kantian influence on 
Hegel, but their lack of the appreciation of the all-pervasiveness of this influence led 
them to their mistaken conclusions. Indeed, if the self-relationality is the central 
characteristic of Hegel’s transcendental ontology, it has to be—and as the analysis to 
follow shall make clear, it indeed is—present at the epicenter of the system, i.e., the 
theory of the concept.  
While the first two parts of the Logic, the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of 
Essence, are concerned with the traditional categories (although as the earlier 
chapters have demonstrated, they are integrated into the overall paradigm shift that 
is taking place in the transition from the traditional to the Hegelian ontology), the 
third part, the Doctrine of the Concept, is where Hegel breaks new ground and the 
extent of his departure from the tradition comes to the fore. The project of 
substituting traditional ontology with the transcendental logic initiated by Kant 
attains its completion in this last part of Hegel’s Logic. The basic relational schemata 
that makes up the structure of the Concept is of both logical and of onto-logical 
import on which rests the correspondence between the laws of logic and the 
structure of reality.  
Instead of merely presupposing or postulating this correspondence like in 
Plato, traditional metaphysics, or early Russell, Hegel gives a detailed account of 
their unity. The mysterious claim of the tradition about the acquaintance of the 
mind through the determinations of thought, the laws of logic, with the 
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determinations of the world is substituted by a complex but powerful argument that 
takes its inspiration from Kant’s revolutionary insight. The Concept is the systematic 
structure of the basic conditions on which both the determination of being and 
thought are grounded: “Being and Essence are so far the moments of its [the 
Concept’s] becoming; but it is their foundation and truth as the identity in which 
they are submerged and contained” (WL 577). For Hegel, the inadequacy of the 
categories of traditional ontology and logic lies not in their complete lack of the 
capacity to grasp reality, but in that they can neither do this on the most 
fundamental level, nor explain what their confidence in the accessibility of reality 
rests on. Instead of having comprehended the basic elements or the conditions, they 
remain on the surface level of the conditioned. In fact, had the tradition understood 
the nature of the grounding of its basic ontological categories, it would have been in 
the position to meet Hegel’s challenge presented in Chapter 2—namely, how 
traditional metaphysics justifies the applicability of the categories to reality. This is 
essentially the question that triggered Kant’s Copernican revolution, and as Hegel 
sees it, it is adequately answered only in his ontological theory and more 
specifically, in the theory of the concept. It is only when the categories are grounded 
on the very same fundamental structure that also underlies the reality properly 
understood can one legitimize their application. 
1.2) Acknowledgment of the Kantian Origins 
Hegel begins the Doctrine of the Concept with a lengthy introductory 
discussion that aims to orient the reader to how much has been covered and what 
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still remains to be done in order to arrive at his fully fledged philosophical vision. 
The fact that most of this introductory discussion is dedicated to the analysis of Kant 
reveals much about the position Hegel is setting the stage to articulate. Moreover, 
even a cursory look at these pages makes evident that the central part of Hegel’s 
ontological theory, which he is preparing his reader for, directly emerges from the 
Kantian transcendental philosophy. For example, the thesis of the concept being the 
underlying ground of actuality is explicitly acknowledged to originate from Kant, 
who, according to Hegel, described “the object as that in which the manifold of 
intuition is unified…. Here… the objectivity of thought is specifically enunciated, an 
identity of Concept and thing, which is truth” (WL 590). Thus, Hegel begins the 
presentation of the theory of the concept as the ground of actuality with the 
extensive analysis of the Kantian original insight about the concept underlying and 
conditioning empirical objects. Even if there were no more deeply running currents 
that tie these two projects together, this open declaration of the Kantian origins of 
the crucial element of his project right from the outset of the discussion of this 
element is conclusive evidence of how much Hegel is tracing Kant’s footsteps in 
what is to follow. But as will be made clear later in this Chapter, this is only the tip of 
the iceberg of both acknowledged and unacknowledged convergences between 
these two outlooks.  
The introductory remarks to the Doctrine of the Concept demonstrate Hegel’s 
recognition of Kant as the transitional figure from traditional metaphysics to his 
own position. Hegel begins with introducing the concept as the underlying truth of 
the determinations of Being and Essence and by maintaining that the concept is the 
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truth of the substance as “the real essence” (WL 577). Hence, the subject matter of 
the last part of the Logic, the theory of the concept, is the same as the preceding 
parts but grasped on a more fundamental level. Hegel sees both of these 
perspectives—the outlook that grasps reality on the level of the substance and the 
one that inaugurates the perspective that sees reality as grounded on the concept—
as actualized in the history of philosophy, proclaiming that “The philosophy which 
adopts the standpoint of substance and stops there is the system of Spinoza” (580). 
After dwelling for a while on the strengths and weaknesses of Spinoza’s position, 
Hegel moves onto a much lengthier analysis of Kant’s doctrine, associating it with 
the theme of the concept as the ground of reality: “It is one of the profoundest and 
truest insights to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which 
constitutes the nature of the Concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness” (WL 584). He further 
adds that this insight “goes beyond the mere representation of the relation in which 
… concept stands to a thing and its properties and accidents and advances to the 
thoughts of that relation” (WL 584).  
It is clear that in Hegel’s eye, the Logic can be divided roughly into two parts: 
firstly, the one that expresses the standpoint that precedes Kant (clearly not in 
merely temporal sense of the term), the traditional metaphysics, and secondly the 
other part that is post-Kantian in spirit through and through, i.e., his own 
philosophical system. In this, Kant is the watershed figure setting apart the two 
sides—the traditional metaphysics, which he brings to the end, and the Hegelian 
transcendental ontology for which Hegel furnishes the grounds. The Kantian origins 
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of Hegel’s project are made manifest by the structure of his Logic and the way Hegel 
understands the correspondence of its different parts to the central figures in the 
history of philosophy. Hence, one can say that Hegel’s Kantianism is built into the 
structure of his Logic.   
2) Hegel’s Kantianism and Stern’s Position 
The interpretations of Hegel that place him within the tradition of pre-critical 
metaphysics tend to focus on the objective logic and pay little attention to the theory 
of the concept. But Hegel is explicit about the centrality of the subjective logic for his 
ontology, as is evident in his claim that “the concept is the truth of substance” (WL 
577) and many other similar ones. Moreover, that Hegel is discussing the traditional 
categories in the objective logic and does not shy away from the vocabulary 
associated with the pre-critical metaphysics is not reason enough for us to ignore 
the new meanings he gives to these terms and to relegate him to the tradition that 
he described as naïve and the overcoming of which he saw as the central task of his 
philosophy.  
The strongest defense of the metaphysical reading of Hegel is perhaps 
Stern’s. Its advantage over other similar interpretations is that rather than turning a 
blind eye to the Kantian dimension of Hegel’s system, which would have rendered 
his reading simply implausible, Stern explicitly acknowledges it. But having done 
that, Stern still maintains that Hegelian philosophy belongs to the category of the 
pre-critical metaphysical systems. Stern believes Hegel found the Kantian system 
wanting, “while Kant recognized that thought was required in order to grasp the 
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world as more than the ‘fleeting and transient’ objects of experience, he did not 
accept that this thought gave us access to the world as such” (Stern, 2009, 73). Stern 
concludes that, although Hegel had appropriated some Kantian insights, he came to 
recognize Kant’s limitations and acknowledged the superiority of traditional 
metaphysics over transcendental philosophy,  
Hegel would claim that in finding something in the 
classical tradition that still needs to be taken seriously, 
he was building on the real lesson to be learned from 
Kant (even if it was not learned by Kant himself). This is 
that there can be no workable distinction between 
“immediate” experience and “mediated” thought, as 
conceptualization runs through all cognitive relevant 
levels, making it impossible for the empiricist to 
question our faith in thinking without ending up in total 
skepticism. (Stern 2009, 74)  
Hence, Stern emphasizes Hegel’s disappointment with the Kantian retention of the 
thing-in-itself as a part of his system, while the crucial lesson learned from him was 
the necessarily mediated nature of all experience.  
2.1) Thing-in-itself criticism 
While both of the points emphasized by Stern are correct, using them as the 
thread that connects Hegel with Kant is misleading. Hegel never tires of criticizing 
the Kantian thing-in-itself; however, this is a sign of not the gap between the two but 
the deeply running continuity between them—only on the basis of the shared 
background that the refutation of one of the elements of Kant’s system could have 
become such a pressing issue for Hegel. At the same time, it is important to note that 
thing-in-itself is a peripheral aspect of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and the main 
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motivation for Kant to keep it in his system was specific to his practical philosophy 
and related to the need of curving out the conceptual space free of the cause-effect 
relational schema in which the self-determining free subjectivity could be 
articulated. Hegel is very well aware of this motive of Kant, and this is the very 
reason that, together with rejecting the thing-in-itself, he explicitly upheld Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy over the practical one.  
Moreover, thing-in-itself is clearly a remnant of the old metaphysical systems 
as it postulated a being radically external to thought. Hence, when Hegel considers 
this to be the weakest aspect of Kant’s philosophy and attacks it, he is criticizing not 
Kant’s original insight, i.e., his transcendental turn, but the remnants of the 
traditional metaphysics still lingering in his system. As such, if notwithstanding the 
whole array of deeply running themes of continuity between the two philosophers, 
one still decides to look at the Kant-Hegel relation through the lens of the latter’s 
criticism of the thing-in-itself, then at least one has to go beyond the surface level 
and uncover the real motivations of the criticism. Had Stern done that, he would 
have seen that the ultimate force behind this specific criticism is not the difference 
but the shared background between the two, and this could have helped him draw a 
more precise picture of what exactly is common between Kant and Hegel and where 
their paths diverge.  
2.2) The Similarity Stern Focuses on  
“The real lesson” that Hegel learned from Kant, according to Stern, is that 
“there can be no workable distinction between ‘immediate’ experience and 
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‘mediated’ thought, as conceptualization runs through all cognitive relevant levels” 
(Stern 2009, 74), maintaining that this ought to be seen as the main thread 
connecting the two systems. There being no immanent boundary for 
conceptualization for both Kant and Hegel is certainly a correct as well as an 
important observation, but the problem is that Stern focuses exclusively on this 
point and disregards the other equally significant (and perhaps even more so) 
points of convergence between the Kantian critical system and the Hegelian 
transcendental ontology.  
The peculiarity of this point of connection that sets it apart from the others is 
that Hegel completely assimilates this Kantian insight into his system at an early 
stage in the presentation of his system, in the Doctrine of Essence. As I have shown in 
Chapter 3, in this middle part of the Logic, Hegel argues that determinations of 
reflection are the basic functions that need to be involved in the process of 
generating of any content, cutting across the conceptual vs. sensible divide. Hence, 
in this specific case, the question of continuity between the Kantian and the 
Hegelian stances is resolved prior to entering the fundamental layer of the Hegelian 
transcendental ontology: the doctrine of the concept. Mediatedness of both sensible 
and conceptual manifold is the task carried out by the process of reflection that 
Hegel looks at in the Doctrine of Essence, the part of the Logic that has not left the 
themes and concerns of traditional metaphysics fully behind. In fact, as I have 
shown, at that point in the text we stand at the very epicenter of integrating the 
Kantian Copernican turn within Hegel’s system, and until this is brought to 
completion and its implications are properly fleshed out (which will take place in 
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the subjective logic), we cannot appreciate the extent of Hegel’s departure from the 
tradition. Thus, the specific similarity between the Kantian and the Hegelian 
systems that Stern decides to focus on cannot do justice to how far-reaching Hegel’s 
rejection of the traditional metaphysics is.  
 
2.3) Unacknowledged Similarities 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of Stern’s reading is its failure to 
acknowledge explicitly what constitutes the most fundamental link between the two 
systems—the thesis that the concept conditions actuality. Stern wants to describe 
Kant’s project as primarily epistemological, concerned with the structure of 
appearances rather than of being; hence, if the concept grounds anything, it 
concerns with not how things are but how they appear. He writes, “Kant may 
therefore be seen as proposing a dilemma to the traditional ontologist: Either he can 
proceeded by abstracting from the spatio-temporal appearances of things in an 
attempt to speculate about things as they are in themselves…; or he … must accept 
that he is no longer inquiring into being qua being” (Stern 2009, 15).  
As I have already mentioned and as the forthcoming discussion shall 
demonstrate, the entire Doctrine of the Concept can be read as an extended analysis 
of this central thesis of Kant’s transcendental deduction. Hegel makes no secret of 
his indebtedness to Kant on what is to follow in the theory of the concept. In the 
opening passages of the subjective logic, after having introduced the concept as the 
“substance raised to freedom” and having briefly outlined the three moments of its 
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immanent structure (universality, particularity, and individuality), Hegel directly 
associates the concept with the “I,” or pure self-consciousness: “the concept, when 
developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I or 
pure self-consciousness” (WL 583). Moreover, as if this was not enough as an open 
declaration of his indebtedness to Kant, Hegel continues with a lengthy summary of 
the argument of transcendental deduction (WL 584-85) and concludes it with the 
following statement: “thus we are justified by a cardinal principle of the Kantian 
philosophy in referring to the nature of the I in order to learn what the concept is” 
(WL 585). Such an introduction of the centerpiece of his ontological theory—the 
concept—and directly drawing on its structural identities with the transcendental 
apperception leave no doubt about the origins of the defining characteristics of this 
pivotal element of Hegel’s system.  
 
2.4) The Kantian Origins of the Notion of the Concept as 
Relational Schema  
Another important theme binding Hegel to Kant that is brought to the fore in 
the introduction to the subjective logic is the rejection of the notion that the concept 
is an abstract universal and its replacement with a theory of the concept as a 
relational schema. While criticizing the tradition for working with a fundamentally 
flawed understanding of the concept, Hegel argues that “the superficial conception 
of what the Concept is, leaves all manifoldness outside the concept and attributes to 
the latter only the forms of abstract universality or the empty identity of 
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reflection…. If one would but reflect attentively on the meaning of this fact, one 
would see that differentiation must be regarded as an equally essential moment of 
the Concept” (WL 589). Differentiation for Hegel means the generation of 
determinations or formation of conceptual content. That is, for Hegel the concept is 
not merely an abstract universal, or the determination of the mind that is externally 
related to all manifold; instead, the concept is immanent to the manifold and 
possesses the capacity for differentiation that is positing a content of its own. One of 
the central tasks of the chapter that Hegel is introducing here will be the 
presentation of the account of this self-differentiation of the concept and 
examination of different models of relation between this process of self-
differentiation, the products of this process and the manifold that it is declared to be 
immanent to in the passage just cited.  
Immediately after voicing his criticism of the traditional notion of the 
concept and offering his alternative to it, Hegel points out the sources he is drawing 
on in taking this step. The just cited passage continues, “Kant has introduced this 
consideration by the extremely important thought that there are synthetic 
judgments a priori. This original synthesis of apperception is one of the most 
profound principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a true 
apprehension of the nature of the Concept” (WL 589). In other words, the self-
differentiation of the concept that is one of the central themes of the third part of the 
Logic is traced back to the Kantian insight about the synthetic a priori judgments. 
This claim has several important implications for us. First, it brings forth the deeply 
running Kantian current of Hegel’s transcendental ontology to its very epicenter. As 
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the central element of the theory of the concept, its generation of the conceptual 
content is explicitly acknowledged to originate from Kant’s “most profound 
principles.” Secondly, it helps us see clearly the role of the determinations of 
reflection, which were demonstrated to be the Hegelian adaptation of Kant’s logical 
functions of judgment, in the overall architectonics laid out in the theory of the 
concept. By the explicit association of the “nature of the concept”—and specifically 
its “self-differentiating” or content-generating aspect—with the “synthetic 
judgments a priori,” Hegel is indicating that the determinations of reflection are the 
elementary functions that guide the process of self-differentiation of the concept, 
which, as we shall see shortly, is identified by Hegel with one of the three moments 
of the concept: the basics element of his transcendental ontology.  
Hegel sees his theory of the concept as the ultimate grounds from which his 
alternative to the abstract formality of traditional logic emerges, “the abstract view 
that logic is only formal and, in fact, abstract from all content; we then have a one-
sided cognition which is not to contain any object, an empty blank form which 
therefore is no more an agreement—for an agreement requires essentially two 
terms—than it is truth” (WL 594.1). The gap between the form and content, the 
abstract universals and the determinateness, renders traditional logic an inadequate 
medium for accessing reality as it operates exclusively on one side of the bifurcated 
ontological background structure. If the form of logical relations can be articulated 
in complete abstraction from the content, no matter whether logic is understood as 
the thought’s form or that of the world’s form, it can give us no substantial 
knowledge of reality. Hegel claims that this ontological and epistemological gap can 
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be bridged by rejecting the traditional conception of logic as merely formal and 
advancing an alternative to it within which the form is inseparable from content. But 
if a conception of logic is put forth that is no longer merely formal and generates 
content of its own, thereby positing determinations that have the same degree of 
normative authority as the principles of logic themselves, then we end up with a 
conception of logic that is radically transformed. This, no longer merely logic, opens 
up the possibility of a new conception of logic that encapsulates its own ontological 
commitments.   
In light of this, advancing an alternative to the traditional conception of logic 
is one possible way to interpret Hegel’s entire philosophical undertaking. And here 
again we encounter an explicit acknowledgment of the Kantian influence. Hegel is 
pointing to the Kantian transcendental logic as the point of origin of his own project: 
“In the a priori synthesis of the concept, Kant possesses a higher principle in which a 
duality in a unity could be cognized” (WL 594). But even without this explicit 
acknowledgement, it would be clear that the idea of logic as not merely formal ought 
to come from the Kantian distinction between general logic “abstracts from all 
content of cognition” (A55/B79) vs. transcendental logic, “the science of pure 
understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think 
objects completely a priori” (A57/B81). It is there that the seed was planted of 
cognizing something not merely formal about objective actuality based on the 
merely formal principles of logic. In Hegel’s hand, the a priori act of synthesis will 
become a process or activity through which determinate conceptual content is 
generated and a detailed account will be given of the basic forms guiding this 
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process, as well as the architectonics of the systematic whole that is generated for it. 
But the basic method applied in both cases is identical—the bifurcation is overcome 
based on tracing the role of the formal principle of logic in the generation of 
determinations that immanently structure reality. The “unity of duality” mentioned 
in the above-cited passage is accomplished by Hegel within the structure of the 
concept and in terms of the relation between its universal and particular moments. 
The schemata of relation between the moments of the concept that are presented in 
the Syllogism section of the Logic are different models through which the mediation 
between the abstract and the concrete sides of the formally bifurcated ontological 
model can be established.   
Hegel’s transcendental ontology arises out of the potential immanent to the 
Kantian transcendental logic. Once the thesis of the possibility of cognition of the 
specific determinations of reality based on the principles of logic is in the picture, 
and a system of such a priori determinations is put forth, also opened up is a whole 
new horizon of drawing further conclusions about the overall structure of such 
reality and enriching this a priori content. Hegel takes up this very task, and in 
addition to enriching the system of a priori determinations, he adds a whole new 
dimension to the Kantian project—namely, he asks what conclusions can be drawn 
about the totality of conceptual content, the process of its generation and their 
interrelation, as well as the relation to empirical reality, granted that we accept the 
Kantian story of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. This meta-account is 
the task taken up in the theory of the concept. Universality, particularity, and 
individuality are the three elements that make up the moments of this meta-
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structure, and their analysis will allow Hegel to explore not only the question of 
what are the a priori determinations through which actuality is mediated to us (this 
was done in the previous parts of the Logic), but on a higher level what are the 
structural features of the world within which the generation of empirical conceptual 
content is carried out through the application of the given set of a priori functions.  
 
2.4.1) An Example of Ontological Assumptions 
In order to prepare his readers for the upcoming task, Hegel considers a case 
of ordinary assertoric proposition and points out the presence of implicit 
ontological assumptions therein. The claim is that when we make assertions of the 
kind “the individual is a universal,” we are implicitly presupposing certain formal 
schema being present in and immanently structuring reality.  
Thus, for example, the form of the positive judgment is 
accepted as something perfectly correct in itself, the 
question whether such a judgment is true depending on 
the content. Whether this form is in its own self a form 
of truth, whether the proposition it enunciates, the 
individual is a universal, is not inherently dialectical, is 
a question that no one thinks of investigating. (WL 594)  
Here Hegel makes clear what he is after. He criticizes traditional ontology for 
overlooking its most essential task, and for simply importing the basic 
determinations of reality from external sources like language instead of critically 
examining them. The tradition simply assumes that the relational schema expressed 
in the judgment “the individual is universal” is also to be found within reality as its 
immanent structure. Therefore, the only question for the tradition that remains to 
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be dealt with is whether the specific content that is placed in this form does justice 
to reality.  
But what if the schematic structure of reality is such that the given form 
cannot do justice to it?—asks Hegel. He argues that the Kantian insight about the 
possibility of synthetic a priori cognition gives us a powerful principle through 
which we can carry out a critical investigate of the formal architectonic structure of 
actuality. This is the task taken up by him in the Doctrine of the Concept, where he 
looks at the different schemas of relation between the universal, particular, and 
individual moments of the concept, and therefore of the world. But this enquiry into 
the onto-logical structure of actuality is a further development of the Kantian 
distinction between the general (or formal) and transcendental logic. The lengthy 
analysis of Kant and criticism of the merely formal nature of traditional logic with 
which Hegel introduces his theory of the concept is a clear testimony that we are 
standing not at the threshold of an ontological theory of a traditional kind, but of the 
transcendental ontology the conditions of the possibility of which lie in Kant’s 
transcendental logic.  
 
2.5) Hegel’s criticism of “Kant” 
Perhaps the most interesting evidence of the deeply running continuity 
between the two projects is Hegel’s criticism of Kant. A close investigation of what 
appears on the surface as Hegel’s attack will reveal that the genuine Kantian stance 
is expressed not by the position that is being criticized but by the one from which 
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this criticism is voiced. Thus, when Hegel attacks Kant on siding with empiricism on 
the issue of reality being composed of the manifold of intuitions as the empirical 
material from which universals are to be abstracted, he is clearly attacking not Kant 
but a possible (and unfortunately widespread) misinterpretation of Kant’s position. 
Hegel writes, 
The conception of this relation both in ordinary 
psychology and in the Kantian transcendental 
philosophy is that the empirical material, the manifold 
of intuitions and representations, first exists on its own 
account, and that then the understanding approaches it, 
brings unity into it and by abstraction raises it to the 
form of universality  …. The concept is not the 
independent factor, not the essential and true element 
of the prior given material; on the contrary, it is the 
material that is regarded as the absolute reality, which 
cannot be extracted from the Concept. (WL 587) 
As was shown in Chapter 3, Kant’s stance is very far from the position sketched and 
criticized here by Hegel. He attacks a variation of the view that is often mistakenly 
attributed to Kant, which maintains that two elements are needed for cognition to 
take place. The first is the sensible input supplied to the mind by external reality, 
and the second is the forms of synthesis as that can ultimately be traced to the 
cognitive constitution of the mind.  
If this were really Kant’s position, the criticism would have been fair. But 
Kant actually stands much closer to the position from which Hegel’s criticism is 
voiced than to the one that is being criticized. The point of Hegel’s criticism is that 
the concept should be acknowledged as the “the essential and true element of the 
prior given material” instead of postulating the sensible material as “the absolute 
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reality.” And indeed, for Kant also the concept is the rule-guided act of synthesis 
within which the logical functions of judgment have been ingrained, thereby 
constituting the grounds for actuality—or the “essential and true element.” 
Sensation, on the other hand and contrary to the above-presented misinterpretation 
of Kant’s position, is a mere subtype of representation, the “inner determination of 
the mind,” which has no objective reference. Hence, what is presented as a criticism 
of Kant would have been better described as an attempt to defend Kant from his 
“followers” who radically misinterpret his position.   
 
2.6) Hegel Closer to Aristotle than to Kant? 
 
By now, it should be clear that Stern’s positioning of Hegel closer to Aristotle 
than to Kant arises out of a highly selective reading that fails to do justice to both 
Hegel and Kant. Stern claims, “Hegel is closer to Aristotle than Kant in conducting 
his inquiry ontologically, as a metaphysica generalis, for which ‘the categories 
analyzed in the Logic are all forms or ways of being … they are not merely concepts 
in terms of which we have to understand what is’” (Stern 2009, 50). Here again, 
Stern correctly describes Hegel’s position that categories are not merely concepts but 
also forms of being, but this is one of those correct assertions that completely miss 
the point. Stern’s thesis fails to represent the root of the matter from its lack of 
appreciation of the fact that Hegel’s claim of the identity of concept and being is not 
a bare assumption but an outcome of his entire undertaking in the Logic. Moreover, 
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Hegel speaks of arriving at this result from his lifelong effort to find the solution to 
the problem first clearly identified by Kant, in his famous letter to Herz:   
What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we 
call ‘representation’ to the object? … the pure concepts 
of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense 
perceptions, nor must they express the reception of 
representations through the senses; but though they 
must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are 
neither caused by the object nor do they bring the 
object itself into being. In my dissertation I was content 
to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a 
merely negative way, namely, to state that they were 
not modifications of the soul brought about by the 
object. However, I silently passed over the further 
question of how a representation that refers to an 
object without being in any way affected by it can be 
possible. (KCR 10:130 ) 
In Hegel’s eye, a preliminary solution to the problem was offered (although not a 
satisfactory one) by Kant himself. With traditional metaphysics and Aristotle, we are 
dealing not only with the absence of addressing the issue, as it had not even been 
posed as a problem for them; they took the identity of the categories and being for 
granted. Hegel clearly saw this gulf dividing him from the tradition and described its 
stance as naïve in the Introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic. As such, not only is 
Hegel closer to Kant, but without the Kantian backdrop his entire undertaking in the 
Logic would not have been possible, because a solution to the problem can be 
offered only after the problem itself is clearly conceived.  
What Kant did that Hegel considered to be the fundamental breakthrough in 
the history of philosophy is that he raised the question of the conditions of the 
possibility of agreement between thought and being, and gave an account of why 
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reality had to correspond to certain determinations of thought. On the other hand, 
Aristotle, according to Hegel, carried out an important task as “he was the first to 
undertake [the] description” of “the natural history of the phenomena of thinking 
just as they occur” (WL 595). However, while this is an important undertaking, it is 
not the problem that Hegel sees as central to philosophy and tries to solve in the 
Logic.  
The pressing problem for Hegel is to identify the grounds of attributing the 
structure of the determinations of thought to the determinations of being, as well as 
to come up with a full account of the consequences one can draw from the 
possibility of such grounds. Hegel believes that Kant addressed the first prong of the 
problem (although not to Hegel’s full satisfaction), while almost completely 
neglecting the second one. Kant’s greatest contribution, therefore, was the clear 
identification of the problem, making it possible to look for a solution to it. Hence, 
Kant stands at the epicenter of the transformation of the perspective, which Hegel 
sees as having taken place between his and the traditional approaches as described 
in the above-cited passage. 
Thus for example, the forms of the positive judgment is 
accepted as something perfectly correct in itself, the 
question whether such a judgment is true depending 
solely on the content. Whether this form is in its own 
self a form of truth, whether the proposition it 
enunciates, the individual is universal is not inherently 
dialectical, is a question that no one thinks of 
investigating. … A logic that does not perform this task 
can at most claim the values of a descriptive natural 
history. (WL 594) 
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The latter perspective is clearly the one Hegel associates with Aristotle, while the 
earlier is the one that Hegel himself upholds. The stance from which the question is 
posed, “Whether this form is in its own self a form of truth,” is obviously made 
possible after Kant’s identification of the problem of correspondence between the 
categories (hence logical forms of judgment) and reality, making it the guiding 
thread of his transcendental philosophy. Hence, Stern’s Aristotelian interpretation 
arises not only from a selective reading of Hegel, but perhaps even more from 
merely surface-level interpretation of the claims and passages based on which he is 
advancing such reading. 
 
2.7) Series of Self-relational Models  
The bottom line is that the relational schema laid out by Hegel in the Doctrine 
of The Concept presents the account of actuality in which the Kantian insight about 
the possibility of synthetic a priory cognition is brought to its logical conclusion. It 
presents the onto-logical space in which the standard division between the subject 
and the object, cognition and reality, has been overcome and hence the promise 
made in the phenomenology of spirit about grasping substance as a subject is 
brought to its fulfillment. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the basic ontological 
structure, the concept, that Hegel presents in this culminating part of the Logic 




This self-relationality is presented in the theory of the concept as the self-
relationality of the immanent structure of the concept. That is to say, the structure 
of unity between the dynamic and the static moments that takes roots in the Kantian 
notion of the transcendental apperception is emerging here as a unity and mutual 
dependence of the moments of the concept: universality, particularity, and 
individuality. As we shall see, each one of these moments, and not only the idea of 
their unity, has its precursors in Kant’s system. But the Hegelian account of the 
concept, unlike the corresponding elements in Kant, has often been seen as 
particularly murky and resisting any coherent interpretation. One reason for this is 
that Hegel presents not one but a whole series of different models of unity of the 
moments of the concept. Granted that these models are arranged in the ascending 
order of adequacy for the full mediation between the three moments, the natural 
question to ask is why Hegel does not directly go to the last—the fully mediated—
model, but instead picks the torturous road of twists and turns of the previous 
stages. In answering this question, what comes first to mind is Hegel’s well-known 
claim from the Preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit: 
Truth and falsehood as commonly understood belong to 
those sharply defined ideas which claim a completely 
fixed nature of their own, one standing in solid isolation 
on this side, the other on that, without any community 
between them. Against that view it must be pointed out, 
that truth is not like stamped coin that is issued ready 
from the mint and so can be taken up and used…. Just in 
the interest of their real meaning, precisely because we 
want to designate the aspect or moment of complete 
otherness, the terms true and false must no longer be 
used where their otherness has been cancelled and 
superseded. Just as the expressions ‘unity of subject and 
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object’, of ‘finite and infinite’, of ‘being and thought’, etc., 
are clumsy when subject and object, etc., are taken to 
mean what they are outside their unity, and are thus in 
that unity not meant to be what its very expression 
conveys. (Phenomenology, Par 39) 
Considering that the Preface to Phenomenology was written by Hegel for his system 
as a whole, one of the reasons behind his strategy is, instead of forcing the 
ontological vision foreign to the readers onto them, to gradually guide them from 
their standpoint to his vision of actuality, in order to allow the immanent necessity 
of the commitments they are already upholding to guide them through the stages of 
development and ultimately arrive at the properly comprehended vision of 
actuality.   
Hence, as we shall see, our understanding of the moments of the concept—
universality, particularity, and individuality—are undergoing continuous 
transformation as we make our way through the stages of mediations in the 
Syllogism chapter. Their final form—that is, the most adequately comprehended 
one—that makes possible the self-relational structure of the concept to be clearly 
perceived is a product of the process of mediation that has taken place through the 
previous stages of the Syllogism chapter. This can be described as the internal 
reason for choosing the complex option as each stage of mediation is pointing to the 
moments of the concept engaged in the subsequent stage. There is another angle 
from which we can look at the issue. The different phases of mediation are not only 
developmental stages in the education of consciousness itself, but they also express 
ontological models. We shall see that each inadequate schema of mediation 
presented by Hegel in the Syllogism chapter is a model that stands for a major 
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alternative ontological vision. By presenting them in this specific hierarchical order, 
starting with the most impoverished model and culminating with Hegel’s own 
stance, he highlights the superiority of his own vision over the alternatives.  
 
 
3) The Three Moments of the Concept   
 
From the very beginning of his articulation of the structure of the concept, 
Hegel emphasizes its self-relational character. Indeed, as will be made clear in the 
following paragraphs, a very strong sense of unity between its elements plays a key 
role in the inner architectonics of the concept. To begin with, the unity under 
discussion cannot be reduced to the mere idea of compositionality. We are dealing 
instead with a deeper sense of unity between the elements, each internally related 
and in a certain sense even encapsulating the others. Here, just as in many other 
crucial points of Hegel’s system, his Kantian heritage proves to be the best segue 
into the topic. The unity that Hegel describes as the defining feature of the concept is 
easily traceable back to the Kantian transcendental apperception, acknowledged by 
Hegel as “one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of 
Pure Reason” (WL 584).  
In Hegel’s hand, however, this idea of unity undergoes a significant 
reorientation; if for Kant the transcendental apperception is the most fundamental 
151 
 
element, the source of the logical functions of judgment and hence of all conceptual 
content, Hegel is positing the basic structure of the concept as the grounding 
principle. This is a turn away from the psychologism of Kant’s critical philosophy 
and its substitution with the ontological vision, according to which neither the 
subject nor the object is seen as the grounding principle of reality. Instead, the 
fundamental ontological schema is articulated in the logical space within which the 
standard bifurcated model is left behind. For Hegel it is this basic schema making up 
the architectonic structure of the concept that lies at the foundation of the I, not vice 
versa—“The Concept, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself 
free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness” (WL 583). Hegel’s strategy 
in the Logic is to demonstrate that the fundamental self-relational ontological 
structure emerges as a necessary ground for the most basic determinations of first 
Being and later of Essence, once the meanings and implications of these 
determinations are set in motion via reflective thought.   
 
3.1) Locus of Intentionality and Hegel’s Fundamental Shift   
In light of this, although with Hegel, as with Kant, the identity of the subject, 
the concept, and the objectivity is a very important point, he is nevertheless not 
merely reducing the concept and objectivity to the subject. Hegel is rather aiming to 
uncover the basic structure that all three sides have in common. While Kant first 
reduced objectivity to the concept—“an object is that in the concept of which the 
manifold of a given intuition is united” (CPR 137) —and ultimately traced the basic 
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conceptual structure back to the subject, Hegel wants to shift the center of gravity 
from the subject to the concept. For him it is the subject that is an actualization of 
the schema immanent to the concept, the concept that is “developed into a concrete 
existence.” Thus on the one hand, Hegel is following Kant’s footsteps in maintaining 
that the ground of the object, its “foundation and truth,” is the concept; on the other 
hand, he wants to avoid the Kantian reduction of the concept to the realization of the 
subject’s cognitive constitution. Instead, he is arguing that the concept itself has a 
rich inner structure that it does indeed share with the subject but is related to it as 
the condition to the conditioned.  
For proper understanding of the significance of the shift that has taken place 
here, first from the object to the subject as done by Kant and then by Hegel from the 
subject to the concept as the central element of his ontology, it is helpful to take a 
look at Robert Brandom’s description of the related shift in the “fundamental locus 
of intentionality.” Brandom is looking at the issue of the relation between the mental 
realms and linguistic practices regarding the question where should we locate the 
“native and original locus of concept use.” According to the traditional approach, the 
mental realm has the pride of place, as it is in our mind that we form thoughts, 
generate conceptual content, and then communicate them to others. 
Concepts are applied in the realms of language by the 
public use of sentences and other linguistic expressions. 
They are applied in the realm of the mind by the private 
adoption of any rational reliance on beliefs and other 
intentional state. The philosophical tradition from 
Descartes to Kant took for granted a mentalistic order 
of expression that privileged the mind as the native and 
original locus of concept use, relegating language to a 
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secondary. Late-coming, merely instrumental role in 
communicating to others thoughts already full-formed 
in a prior mental arena within the individual. (Brandom 
2000, 5) 
Brandom juxtaposes and contrasts this to two alternative views. One of them 
belongs to Dummett, who wants to reverse the axis of dependency and grant to 
language the function of the original locus of the conceptual: “we have opposed 
throughout the view of assertion as the expression of an interior act of judgment; 
judgment, rather, is the interiorization of the external act of assertion” (Brandom 
2000, 5). The other alternative is advanced by Davidson, for whom “neither 
language nor thinking can be fully explained in terms of the other, and neither has 
conceptual priority. The two are, indeed, linked in the sense that each requires the 
other in order to be understood, but the linkage is not so complete that either 
suffices, even when reasonably reinforced, to explicate the other” (Brandom 2000, 
6).  
Both of these alternatives are undermining the traditional assumption of the 
mental as the original locus of the generation of the conceptual content. What needs 
to be noted is that this assumption is a part of a larger dualistic backdrop that the 
tradition has been taking for granted—the dualism of the mental vs. physical realm 
where the former is the locus of thought, representations, concepts, etc., while the 
latter is that of the extended, inter-subjective, material etc. This deeply rooted 
presupposition stems from the Cartesian metaphysics with its clear-cut distinction 
between the mental vs. physical and their corresponding principle attributes, 
thought vs. extension. When considered against this background, it becomes clear 
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that while both Dummett and Davidson shift the priorities in the standard picture, 
they still remain within the scope of the dualistic framework. Neither by inverting 
the standard picture nor by demonstrating the interdependency between the 
language and thought are we rejecting the Cartesian dualism; all we are doing is 
exploring new possibilities within the conceptual space carved out by it.  
Unlike these contemporary alternatives, Hegel wants to leave behind the 
standard dualistic picture altogether. According to him, both ends of the bifurcated 
model are mere abstractions from the more fundamental background, the 
articulation of which is undertaken in his Doctrine of the Concept. If the Doctrine of 
Being and Doctrine of Essence were concerned with the traditional categories and 
the determination of thought that grounded them, retaining dualistic ontology in the 
picture, the third part of the Logic, the Doctrine of the Concept, presents an account 
within which the division between the inner and the outer realms taken for granted 
by “the philosophical tradition from Descartes to Kant” is completely overcome. 
Whether linguistic, mental, or other kinds of activity, like social, political, etc., that 
involves application of concept and revision of the conceptual content, it is 
grounded on the schema that Hegel is explicating in the doctrine of the concept. 
Both the mind and world, the inner and the outer realms, are best understood not in 
abstraction from one another, nor with grounding one on the other, but through the 
realization that both are abstractions from the more fundamental structure that 
Hegel is proceeding to articulate in this part of the Logic. 
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As in many other key points of his system, here also Hegel is following the 
Kantian footsteps. For although Kant didn’t fully free himself from it, he still in an 
important sense set up the conditions for overcoming dualistic metaphysics. The 
significant step taken in this direction by Kant is his assertion that the very same 
ground underlies and conditions the phenomena of both the inner and the outer 
realm. The activity of the mind for him is the ground of objects both of mental as 
well as physical space. For example, the desk that I’m looking at right now and my 
desire to bring it to order are objects of experience, one outer and the other inner, 
but for Kant both are outcomes of the activity of the mind guided by logical 
functions that constitute the basic structure of what he calls the transcendental 
object or object in general. Hence, the objects—whether belonging to the inner realm 
of the mind, thus occurring only in time but not in space, or to the outer realm that 
in addition to temporal are also spatial—are conditioned by the activity of the mind 
and guided by the logical functions of judgment. By tracing the grounds of both the 
inner and the outer objects to the same source, Kant is taking a significant step 
toward overcoming the dualism with respect to objects of experience. But this is 
clearly only a first step, rather than a full-fledged effort to overcome the bifurcated 
background—while the ontological gap between the realms of the inner and the 
outer objects was significantly shaken, the same was not done with respect to the 
activity, as Kant obviously gives the pride of place to the action of the mind.  
Hence, we can see Hegel’s project as taking a further step by rejecting the 
dualism not only regarding the objects of experience but also regarding the activity 
that makes this objects possible, and elaborating a new type of ontology that leaves 
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the traditional dualistic structure behind. In other words, Kant had overcome the 
ontological gap on the level of the conditioned, but not on the level of the conditions; 
and Hegel is bringing the Kantian revolution to its completion. As such, when we say 
that action for Hegel is an application of concepts, we should not understand this as 
the mental object in the inner realm that guides action taking place either in the 
extra-mental physical world or within the inner space. Neither the inner nor the 
outer space is the privileged locus of action or of conceptual. Both mental and non-
mental are mere abstractions from the basic substructure of Hegel’s transcendental 
ontology that he articulated in the Doctrine of the Concept. It is not the action of the 
mind that grounds phenomena but the fundamental schema that conditions the 
objects as well as the actions both of the mind and in the world.  
We can see how much more thorough Hegel’s rejection of the traditional 
assumption of the mental realm as “the native land” of concepts is, compared to 
Dummett’s and Davidson’s interpretation of him. Whether one replaces judgment 
with assertion as the original locus of the concept application, or maintains that 
neither thought nor language has conceptual priority and each requires the other in 
order to be understood, one is not questioning the fundamental dualistic 
background of the traditional theories. The mental and material still remain as the 
two realms divided by ontological gap. Contrary to this, Hegel leaves the bifurcated 
ontology behind by arguing that both sides of the divide are mere abstraction of the 
more basic schema that grounds them. This is the schema that is outlined in his 
theory of concept as the syllogistic mediational models between the three moments 





The inner structure of the Hegelian concept consists of three moments: 
universality, particularity, and individuality. As has already been mentioned above, 
these are not mutually excluding elements that can be separated from one another, 
but each one of them is internally related to the other two and embraces the totality 
of the concept (WL 600). Hegel begins his presentation of the moments with 
universality and he has good reasons for it. While each one of the three moments 
plays an indispensable role in constituting the concept, universality occupies a 
special place amongst them. Not only does it encompass the whole concept, “The 
universal is thus the totality of the Concept” (WL 604), but it is also described as 
“the pure Concept” or the moment that stands for “the pure identical self-relation” of 
the concept (WL 600). Moreover, as the discussion that follows shall demonstrate, 
universality is associated by Hegel with the pivotal characteristic of the concept—its 
creative potential. Therefore, he is well justified in starting the discussion of the 
moments of the concept with universality.   
 
3.2.1) Not an Abstract Universal  
Hegel’s understanding of universality is very different from its ordinary 
conception that he describes as abstract universal. In fact, if this were not the case, 
his claim about universality comprising the entire structure of the concept, which 
also includes particularity and individuality, would be completely 
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incomprehensible. Were the universal a product of abstraction from the individuals, 
it obviously could not have the elements that it has been abstracted from present 
within it. As we shall see, the ordinary notion of the abstract universal has more in 
common with another moment of the Hegelian concept, particularity. Hence, these 
are the two important questions that have to be addressed at this point: What 
exactly does Hegel mean by genuine universality? And how is it related to the 
ordinary conception of the terms that he calls abstract or impoverished universality 
and sets apart from his own usage of the term? 
 
3.2.2) Universality as a Process and Creative Power vs. Representational 
Model 
Universality is described by Hegel as a “free power,” “the shaper and creator” 
that “takes its other within its embrace … without doing violence to it” (WL 603). He 
also refers to it as a process that posits differences: “the universal is a process in 
which it posits the differences” (WL 605). These might strike readers as very 
puzzling claims, putting forward an utterly extravagant conception of universality 
that has nothing in common with the way the term is traditionally understood. But 
this is only a first impression. Hegel’s position has much in common with such 
prominent figures in the tradition as Aristotle and Kant.  
The apparent perplexity of this notion comes from Hegel’s effort to 
emphasize the contrast with the traditional conception of it—the universal as 
abstract representation standing externally to what it represents. One of the central 
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goals Hegel is pursuing in his Logic is to overcome the representationalist 
presuppositions deeply imbedded in the tradition he inherited, according to which 
reality is cut into two parts, the mental (the domain of the representations) and the 
non-mental (the domain of represented), and the universals belong to the former 
while referring to the latter as a product of abstraction from it. Hegel wants to 
replace this model with the one that grants to universality the function of meaning-
producing activity, a power that gets realized through the process of positing 
differences, similarities, contrasts, identities, etc., and hence generating the 
conceptual content that illuminates instead of representing the determinations of 
the world. It is due to this effort to emphasize the contrast with the traditional 
approach that it is easy to overlook the influential precursors of the Hegelian notion 
of universality, Aristotle being one of them. A good starting point, therefore, to begin 
understanding the Hegelian conception of universality is Aristotle’s notion of the 
form.  
3.2.3) The Aristotelian Connection 
For Aristotle, each thing we find in nature, including organisms, their parts, 
basic elements, etc., has within it the principle of change and rest that determines the 
structure that the given thing has at any stage of its existence; the same principle 
functions as the power that drives the course of its change and governs its 
interaction with other entities. This structuring and development-driving power is 
what Aristotle called the form. We can identify different aspects of the way a form 
determines an individual by looking at an example; let’s take a willow tree. At every 
stage of its development—be it a seed, a small sapling, fully grown willow tree or an 
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already old, dying plant—the state that the thing finds itself in is a product and an 
expression of the principle that determines what it means to be a willow tree, its 
form. This principle is what sets willow apart from oak, pine, and more radically 
from other kinds of things like frog, human, water, etc. Thus, the principle 
determines the structure of the thing, its composition, and nature of functioning at 
different stages of its development.  
Another perspective from which we can approach the determination of the 
individual by the universal is related to the principle that encompasses the whole 
development of the thing. We can talk of the presence of the principle in an object 
not at any specific stage of its development, but as a creative force that encompasses 
the entire lifecycle of a willow tree. The form as the creative power has to determine 
not only certain stages in the development of a willow tree, but its entire lifecycle. 
This points us to the third aspect in which the form governs an individual—as the 
principle determining the transition from one stage to the next one. Hence, we can 
identify three important and interrelated aspects in which the form determines the 
individual’s nature and its development. First, each stage of development is a 
manifestation of the principle. Second, the principle encompasses the totality of the 
thing’s determinations; and third, the principle is in place at each determinate stage 




3.2.3.1) Three Moments Similar in Hegel 
Analogies for each one of these three aspects of the form’s determination of 
the individual can be located in the Hegelian notion of the universality. When Hegel 
claims that the universal is a creative power, which “when posits itself in a 
determination, remains therein what it is” (WL 602), and that “the universal is … 
substance of its determinations” (WL 603), he is describing the relation between 
universality and its particular determinations, which is analogous to the Aristotelian 
thesis that each determination of the given particular is a manifestation of its form 
or the principle of change. Within both the Aristotelian and the Hegelian accounts, 
the structure that the given determination exhibits reveals the nature of the creative 
power at work. This claim of the immanence of the universal in its determinations 
goes beyond the mere assertion of the presence of the characteristics of the genus in 
its species. In other words, the spatial metaphor that Hegel uses here about the 
presence of the universal in the individual stands for the relation in a stronger sense 
than the one that mirrors the presence of the conceptual content of the definition of 
the genus-concept like tree, into that of the species-concepts like willow, pine, oak, 
and etcetera. Hegel sees the latter relation as characteristic of the abstract universal 
and describes it as “outward going” (WL 604), while the genuine universal he 
considers to be “bent back into itself” (WL 604).  
What Hegel means by this is that while the conceptual content of the abstract 
universal is a product of the process of abstraction, throughout which the features 
that differentiate individuals falling under this universal are left out (hence the 
abstract universal can be described by him as “lifted out” of the individuals), the 
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matters are quite different with Hegel’s own conception of universality. The 
Hegelian notion of universal is “bent back” in the sense that it is not a product of 
abstraction from the individual; instead it plays a formative role in its 
determination. If the abstract universal, which Hegel also describes as impoverished 
universal, is stripped off the determinations present in the other moments of the 
concept, the Hegelian universal retains them—or rather, as we shall see, retains the 
principle of their generation. Hence, the spatial metaphor of the immanence of the 
universal to the particular should be understood as the former playing a role in the 
generation of the latter. Here the Aristotelian analogy becomes handy, because in 
Aristotle also the universal can function as the formative principle of particular 
determinations. However, it should also be kept in mind that the two models are not 
completely identical. The relation between universality and the other two moments 
of the concept as the analysis undertaken in this and the following chapter 
demonstrate is of a complex nature, and the Aristotelian analogy only scratches the 
surface without giving us an adequate access to its intricate details. 
Another related aspect of the similarity is that universality encompasses the 
totality of all of its determinations. Hegelian universality is not only expressed in 
each and every one of its determinations, but it also encapsulates them all within 
itself. As Hegel puts it, “it [universality] contains within itself difference and 
determinateness in the highest degree” (WL 601), or, again, “The determinateness… 
is not introduced from outside when we speak of it in connection with the 
universal.… The universal is thus the totality of the Concept; it is concrete and far 
from being empty, it has through its concept a content, and a content in which it not 
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only maintains itself but one which is its own” (WL 603-604). Here again the 
similarity with the Aristotelian doctrine can be a stepping stone into understanding 
Hegel’s position—a form is not merely the animating principle immanent to the 
different stages of development of a natural being, but it also is the totality of the 
determinations that the being goes through. For Aristotle, without comprehending 
the different stages of development of a tree, for example, it is not possible to grasp 
the form of tree. But here again, it should be pointed out right away that 
notwithstanding some similarities, the immanence of the particular determinations 
and the individuality to the universality for Hegel is not quite identical to the 
Aristotelian model. As we shall see soon, for Hegel the spatial metaphor of the 
universality embracing the individuality and particularity should be understood in 
quite a different sense from the immanence of the different determinations to the 
Aristotelian notion of the substance-universal. This should hardly be surprising, as 
Hegel’s claim is a direct consequence of the reformulated notion of the universality 
that leaves behind the fundamental assumptions of the traditional metaphysics, 
while the Aristotelian model is a prime example of the tradition. As such, when 
using Aristotle as a stepping stone into the Hegelian system, we should keep in mind 
that the analogy serves just a heuristic function and ought not to be pushed too far.  
Having looked at the two important similarities between the Hegelian and 
the Aristotelian theories, we can begin to see what Hegel means when describing 
universality as free power. First, freedom for Hegel means being with itself in its 
other, and this is an exact description of the logical structure of the concept when it 
comes to the relation between universality on the one hand and the other two 
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moments on the other hand. Particularity and individuality are the products of the 
self-differentiation of universality; hence, it encounters nothing foreign to itself in 
them. This is what Hegel has in mind in the already cited passage: “The universal is 
therefore free power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without 
doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful 
communion with itself” (WL 603).  
But Hegel describes universality not merely as free but as free power, 
pointing us to the third aspect of the similarity with the Aristotelian notion of the 
form. Universal in both cases functions like a power that determines the course of 
development; it is “the principle of change,” to put in the Aristotelian terms. 
Universality, therefore, not only is expressed by its particular determinations and 
encompasses all determinations within itself, but it also is the principle that drives 
the transformation—or rather, the process—of the formation of these 
determinations. The previous chapter has presented a detailed analysis of the basic 
determinations of reflection that function as the guiding principles of the empirical-
concept-generation process. In the following chapter, I shall look at the details of the 
relation between universality as process of formation of conceptual content and the 
empirical determinations formed thereby.  
 
3.2.4) Stern’s Aristotelian Reading 
Having examined the similarities with the Aristotelian theory of the form, we 
should keep it in mind that the analogy is only a useful entry point in understanding 
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Hegel’s account of the inner structure of the concept and ought not to be pushed too 
far. Reading too much Aristotelianism into Hegel’s notion of universality and the 
concept in general will lead us to ascribe to him an organism-like account of the 
concept, which does not do justice to what Hegel says about this key element of his 
transcendental ontology.  
Robert Stern’s interpretation of the Hegelian notion of universal is a good 
example of positing Hegel too close to Aristotle. While looking at the British 
idealists’ appropriation of Hegel’s notion of the concrete universal, Stern criticizes 
their claim that the universal embraces the individuals that exemplify it and instead 
is advancing a reading akin to Aristotle’s notion of the form as substance-universal. 
Stern claims that the Hegelian notion of the universal should be understood as 
nothing else but the “characteristics of the kind to which the individuals belong 
(men qua men are rational)” (Stern 2009, 156). According to him, then, the British 
idealists, by offering an obscure and extravagant reading of the universal as the 
ultimate ground that embraces individuals, misinterpreted Hegel’s more modest 
and traditional Aristotelian claim about universal consisting of the essential 
characteristics belonging to a given genus. While neither of these readings does full 
justice to Hegel’s position, I think the one upheld by the British idealists is closer to 
Hegel than Stern’s, since while the former readily acknowledges the central function 
of the universal moments in the constitution of the individuals and their 
determinations, the latter effectively reduces it to the Aristotelian position.   
166 
 
The British idealists’ rendering of the Hegelian notion of universality is 
described by Stern in the following exposition. 
‘the universal in the form of a world’, as Bosanquet put 
it, rather than in the form of a class. By ‘the universal in 
the form of a world’, Bosanquet meant that individuals 
which exemplify this universal are thereby related with 
one another in a system of mutual interdependence, 
whereas individuals that merely belong to the same 
class are not. Josiah Royce (not of course, strictly a 
British Idealist, but nonetheless greatly influenced by 
them) puts this idea as follows: This universal is no 
abstraction at all, but a perfectly concrete whole, since 
the facts are, one and all, not mere examples of it, but 
are embraced in it, are brought forth by it as its 
moments, and exist only in relation to one another and 
to it. It is the vine; they, the individuals, are the 
branches. (Stern 2009, 150)  
As is evident in this passage, Stern asserts that the universal is seen by the British 
idealists as the ground of the other two moments of the concept. The claim of the 
universal embracing individuals is understood as the universal being involved in the 
constitution of the determinations of the individuals. This reading clearly resonates 
well with the above-examined claims of Hegel regarding universality being the 
creative force or the process generating conceptual content. It also asserts a high 
degree of interdependency between individuals, due to them being the products of 
the very same process of universalization. The idea is that each individuated entity 
with the totality of its properties is an outcome of the overall process of the 
generation of determinations that includes other entities individuated together with 
it. This renders individuals not only being “embraced” by the universal but also 
existing “only in relation to one another.” This acknowledgment of the robust 
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grounding role that the universal is playing in relation to the individuals and their 
determinations is the strongest aspect of the reading that Stern ascribes to the 
British idealist.  
Stern rejects the British idealist perspective in favor of the interpretation 
that reduces Hegel’s notion of the universality to a set of characteristics of a class. 
Universal is conceived here as a substance-universal comprised of a set of 
determinations that makes up the essential qualities of the given genera or natural 
kind. What binds the individuals belonging to the given universal together, 
according to Stern’s Aristotelian reading, is their shared instantiation of the 
properties included in the given universal. For instance, if the universal man is 
defined as the rational animal, then the determination of the rationality alongside all 
other determinations belonging to the universal animal will be exhibited in the 
individual man, exhausting the sense in which they are related to the universal man. 
Stern writes:  
While the Concept, as the interrelation of universality, 
particularity, and individuality, has a holistic structure, 
in the sense that (as we have seen) each ‘moment’ is 
claimed to be only intelligible in relation to the others 
and through the others, and while the substance 
universal characterizes the individual as a whole in a 
way that unifies its particular properties, there is no 
suggestion here that individuals as such are 
interrelated, in the manner of Bradley’s red-haired men. 
So, when Royce writes that ‘the universal ‘man’ is thus 
konkret in two senses, namely in so far as in it all men 
are together, and in so far as through it all Qualitaten of 
each man are united’ I would accept only the second of 
these senses as being part of Hegel’s conception of the 
concrete universal, and not the first. (Stern 2009, 158) 
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Now Stern’s reading stands in obvious contradiction with the passages cited above, 
where Hegel is explicit about the universal moment’s formative role for particularity 
as well as individuality, and describes it as a process that grounds and embraces the 
other moments of the concept. The weakest aspect of his reading is its inability to do 
justice to the dynamic character of the Hegelian concept, its key and most essential 
elements, which are repeatedly described by Hegel as a process and a creative power. 
The substance universals are the static sets of determinations that the cognitive 
process find in the world and extracts from it; while the Hegelian universal is the 
source of dynamism, it is the process that furnishes these static determinations.  
There is a dynamic moment in the Aristotelian model as well (and this is the 
reason that we can use it as a stepping stone into the Hegelian system), but Stern 
ignores it, instead focusing on its static aspect. Moreover, even if Stern had used it to 
argue for similarity with Hegel, he could have not gone beyond mere surface 
resemblance, since the dynamic moment in the Aristotelian conception of universal 
is present there on a different level than in the Hegelian one. For Aristotle, form as 
an already actualized static set of determinations serves as the propagator of 
development of individuals, while for Hegel these very sets of determinations are 
the products of the creative power at work. For Aristotle, the substance universal 
with its complete set of determinations is out there in the world, immanently 
structuring reality. Cognitive processes are related to the substance universal 
externally without playing any role in determination of the elements and the 
structural relations found in the substance-universal.  
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The Hegelian notion of the universal, on the other hand, exhibits a very 
different relation to the process of reflection. As we shall see shortly, Hegel 
identifies universality with the determination-generating processes. Universality 
qua creative power is the self-relational process of reflection that posits all 
determinations and embraces them. Aristotle and Hegel therefore conceive radically 
differently the relation between thought and the determinations of universals. While 
in the case of the former, thought is external to the already existing universals and 
its determinations, and all it can do is to grasp or mirror them, with the latter case 
we have thought as the process identical to universality that functions as the ground 
of all determinacy. As such, to identify the Hegelian notion of universal with the 
Aristotelian substance-universal is to fail to appreciate even the first stage of the 
revolutionary aspect of Hegel’s theory—the relation between thought and reality—
not to mention its full extent where the dualistic traditional metaphysics is fully left 
behind together with its collateral assumption. Therefore, notwithstanding some 
degree of similarities, Hegel’s stance cannot be simply identified with the 
Aristotelian position as Stern attempts to do.  
 
3.2.5) Kantian Connection 
Aristotle is not the only, or even the most direct precursor, of the Hegelian 
notion of the concept and its moments. Hegel’s notion of universal as a creative 
power is more closely related to Kant, who maintained that the logical functions of 
judgment are the most basic forms of the activity of the mind on which both pure 
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and empirical concepts are grounded. The pure concepts of the understanding or 
the categories are the general representations of the synthesis of intuitions carried 
out by these logical functions, as Kant states in the famous passage from the 
Metaphysical deduction:  
The same function that gives unity to the different 
representations in a judgment also gives unity to the 
mere synthesis of different representations in an 
intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure 
concept of understanding. The same understanding, 
therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions 
through which it brings the logical form of a judgment 
into concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings 
a transcendental content into its representations by 
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition 
in general. (A79/B105) 
The very same functions of synthesis are guiding the process of formation of 
empirical concepts. According to Kant, we form new empirical concept through the 
operation of the mind that is guided by the concepts of comparison, which 
correspond one to one to the logical functions of judgment (identity and difference 
to quantitative, agreement and conflict to qualitative, inner and outer to relational). 
To be more specific, we can apply these concepts of comparison—or, ultimately, 
logical functions of judgment—to the process of our apprehension of empirical 
objects. Thus, new empirical concepts are generated from the process of sifting 
through the rule-guided apprehension of phenomena and forming new 
determinations through this process. The logical functions are involved on both 
levels of this activity. They guide the process of comparison of apprehension of 
empirical phenomena, and they are also already ingrained in the rules of 
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apprehension as the latter are nothing but the previously formed empirical 
concepts. Thus, for Kant, the activity of the mind guided by the logical functions of 
judgment is the basic formative process that posits all determinations.  
The first thing to note here is that Kant is rejecting the representationalist 
model according to which the cognitive purport of conceptual content is a function 
of the adequacy of its representation of the mind-external reality. The source of 
determinations in the traditional model, including the Aristotelian one, is external to 
the mind, and the justification of cognitive contentfulness of our concepts rests on 
their representational correctness of the mind-external world. With Kant, contrary 
to this, the normative authority of the determinations is traced to the objectifying 
capacities of the minds itself, more specifically, to the logical functions of judgment 
that confer cognitive purport to determinations posited by the creative activity of 
the mind. Hence, Hegel is following Kant’s footsteps when claiming that the 
universal is a determination-positing creative power, “thinking as activity is the 
active universal, and indeed the self-activating universal” (§ 20, EL). Hegel further 
notes, 
It [universal] differentiates itself internally, and this is a 
determining, because the differentiation is one with the 
universality. Accordingly, the universal is a process in 
which it posits the differences themselves as universal 
and self-related. They thereby become fixed, isolated 
differences. … Herein consists the creative power of the 
Concept, a power which is to be comprehended only in 
this, the Concept’s innermost core. (WL 605.2) 
Hence, instead of the traditional representational model, according to which a 
concept and its determinations were supposed to mirror the determinate features of 
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the mind-external world, Hegel takes up the Kantian approach—the mind as the 
source of the cognitive purport of determinations. Universal moment of the concept 
is that creative, cognitive content conferring power that is responsible for generating 
the conceptual content and is describes by Hegel as the concepts “innermost core.”   
Another important aspect that needs to be noted in the above-quoted 
passage is that Hegel describes universality as the difference positing process, clearly 
pointing us to the determinations of reflection presented in the Doctrine of Essence. 
He sees the universality as the creative process, the activity of thinking through 
which the conceptual content is generated; it is the very same process of thinking 
that he has discussed in the Doctrine of Essence where an interrelated system of 
determinations of reflection is laid out. Universal, that is, the “self-identical” 
moment of the concept, is differentiating itself, argues Hegel, mirroring the 
sequence of identity and difference that we have seen in the doctrine of essence—
the two pivotal determinations that the process of reflection and generation of 
ordinary conceptual content proceeds with. Here is another key passage where 
Hegel explains the nature of relation between the determinations posited by the 
universal moment of the concept and the process of reflection he investigated in the 
doctrine of essence.  
Difference, as it shows itself here, is in its Concept and 
therefore in its truth. All previous difference has this 
unity in principle (im begriffe). As immediate difference 
in the sphere of being, it is limit of an other; in reflection 
it is relative and posited as essentially relating itself to 
its other; here therefore the unity of the Concept begins 
to be posited, but at first it is only illusory being in 
another. The true meaning and resolution of these 
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determinations is just this, that they attain to their 
Concept, their truth; being, determinate being, 
something, or whole and parts, etc. substance and 
accidents, cause and effect, are grasped as determinate 
concepts when each is cognized in unity with its other 
or opposite determination. (WL 607.2) 
The empirical concept generating process of reflection that Hegel has 
presented in the Doctrine of Essence attains its truth in the Doctrine of the Concept, 
claims Hegel. Hence, in the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel returns to the very same 
ground that was covered in the Doctrine of Essence, but this time from a more 
developed standpoint that allows us to locate the function that the activity of 
reflection and its basic forms have within the larger account of reality. In other 
words, if in the doctrine of essence the process of generation of determinate content 
and the basic formal vocabulary by means of which this content is generated was 
investigated in greater detail, now Hegel steps back and allows us to see where that 
account fits in the most comprehensive account of his transcendental ontology. The 
activity of positing differences, and identities, diversities, and oppositions that I 
have discussed in Chapter 3 is now revealed to be one of the three essential aspects 
of the ontological structure that Hegel calls the concept—its universal moment (the 
other two being particularity and individuality).  
Moreover, in a certain sense, this process is supposed to grasp the totality of 
actuality since, as we were told, each moment of the concept embraces it fully (WL 
600). Therefore, one way we can regard reality, according to Hegel, is through 
conceiving it as essentially grounded on the conceptual-content-generating activity. 
In other words, he wants to maintain that there is nothing to reality that could claim 
174 
 
complete independence from this determination-positing process. But obviously, 
this is only a part of a larger picture, and we still need to look at the other two 
moments of the concept, as well as their relation to one another, to gain a 
comprehensive account of Hegel’s transcendental ontology. The account of the 
dynamic aspect of the concept has to be complemented with the account of the 
totality of determinate conceptual content and the specific relation of their unity. As 
we shall see, Hegel will be presenting different models of relation between the 
moments of the concept in the Syllogism chapter and will culminate his account with 
what he takes to be the genuine nature of their unity.  
Hence, the Kantian insight that the synthetic activity guided by the logical 
functions of judgment and serving as the most basic determinations of all 
conceptual content, whether related to the combination of the sensible or the 
conceptual manifold, is the main precursors of the Hegelian notion of the universal 
as the creative process that generates and embraces all determination. This is the 
reason that Hegel hails the transcendental unity of apperception that is identical for 
Kant to the logical functions of judgment as the highest point of Kant’s philosophy. 
Hegel’s description of the universality as the “pure identical self-relation” (SL, 601) 
is a reflection of the Kantian identification of the apperception with the logical 
functions of judgment. But as at many other critical points, here Hegel also does not 
merely follow the Kantian footsteps but develops them further and brings them to 
what he sees as their logical conclusion. The important difference here is that while 
Hegel picks up the Kantian thread and integrates the activity of the mind guided by 
the determinations of reflection within his theory of the concept, he is not confining 
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the universal as the active power to merely mental processes. The determinations of 
reflection as the basic functions of the content-generating process of thinking were 
considered by Hegel at a different stage of development of his system from the one 
we see in the Doctrine of the Concept. In the Doctrine of Essence, he was still dealing 
with the issue of grounding being on essence or developing the notion of being qua 
thought; he was at the epicenter of bringing Kant’s Copernican revolution to its 
completion.  
Now on the other hand, in the Doctrine of the Concept, that task has already 
been accomplished and the schism between thought and being is overcome. Thus 
the determinations of reflection as the activity-guiding functions no longer belong to 
reflection exclusively—they are the basic functions of action in general. This is the 
reason Hegel is claiming that “thinking as activity is the active universal” instead of 
merely asserting that “thinking is active universal, …the self-activating universal.” In 
other words, the activity as such is the universal moment of the concept in action 
and reflection is only one modality in which this activity can be carried out. The 
activity that furnish determinate content—the second moment of the Hegelian 
notion of concept that Hegel calls particularity—is not limited to the mental but also 
includes inter-subjective activities, social, historical, and etcetera, which are 
processes through which different conceptions get applied, tested, and modified. 
Hence, the formal schemata that Hegel presents in the theory of the concept, 
judgments, syllogisms, is not merely a series of determinations related to different 
kinds of mental representations, but different models of actuality that includes the 





While Hegel’s notion of universality can be traced back to the Kantian 
understanding of the cognitive activity and hence one of the ways that Kant uses the 
term concept (i.e., the consciousness of the unity of the act of synthesis), the second 
moment of the Hegelian concept, particularity, is related to the other meaning that 
Kant has for the same term, “universal or reflected representation.” As such, the 
overall structure of Hegel’s concept can be argued to have already existed in an 
incipient form in Kant: the act of synthesis as the universal moment; universal and 
reflected representation as the particular that is the product of self-differentiation of 
the first moment; and the third moment, individuality, which for Hegel is the unity 
of the previous two.  
According to Hegel, the second moment of the concept—particularity—
captures the totality of the concept, just like the first moment, but it does so in its 
own way. Hegel describes it as the outcome of the first negation of the universal. “As 
negativity in general or in accordance with the first, immediate negation, the 
universal contains determinateness generally as particularity” (WL 603). The 
universal, as the creative, dynamic power, generates an interrelated system of 
determinations and this system is what Hegel calls the particular moment of the 
concept. Instead of the dynamic process (i.e., the nature of universality), now we 
have the static determinations that the process has produced; instead of the 
mediation, the mediated. This first negation of the universal is a self-
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externalization—the splitting of the concept into two moments: universality and 
particularity.  
 
3.3.1) Particularity as Determination of Universality  
The particular moment of the concept is a product of the universal moment’s 
self-differentiation.  
The universal determines itself, and so is itself the 
particular; the determinateness is its difference; it is 
only differentiated from itself. Its species are therefore 
only (a) the universal itself and (b) the particular. The 
universal is as concept itself and its opposite, and this 
opposite is in turn the universal itself as its posited 
determinateness; the universal overreaches it and, in it, 
it is with itself. Thus it is the totality and the principle of 
its diversity, which is determined wholly and solely 
through itself. (WL 606) 
Hegel makes three important claims in this passage that I would like to take a closer 
look at. First, he clearly describes particularity as generated from universality and 
sees it as an outcome of its self-differentiation or positing determinations immanent 
to itself. Second, Hegel describes the universal as containing the principle of 
diversity of the content by which it generates the particular moment of the concept. 





3.3.2) Particular as self-differentiated universal  
I shall start with the first point; the universal, as we have seen, is the process 
of reflection or the activity of thinking through which the determinate conceptual 
content is generated. Hence, granted that Hegel describes the particularity as being 
generated from the universality through its self-differentiation and positing of 
determinations, the particularity is the product of the conceptual content generating 
process guided by the formal schema presented by Hegel as the determinations of 
reflection. What Hegel means by the technical term particularity is a holistic system 
of inferentially interrelated determinations that make up the totality of its 
conceptual content. The constellation of the empirical concepts is generated through 
the process of thinking in Hegel’s technical meaning of the term, which includes 
reflection along the lines of the ordinary meaning of the term, as well as the 
application of the concepts through activity carried out in the inter-subjectively 
shared space that includes social and political institutions. Hegel describes the 
determinations that comprise the particularity moment of the concept as abstract 
universals: 
This universality, with which the determinate clothes 
itself, is abstract universality. The particular has this 
universality in it as its essence; but in so far as the 
determinateness of the difference is posited and 
thereby has being, the universality is form in it, and the 
determinateness as such is its content. Universality 
becomes form inasmuch as the difference is something 
essential, just as in the pure universal it is, on the 
contrary, only absolute negativity and not a difference 
posited as such. (WL 608) 
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In this way, the particular moment of the concept is made up of the determinations 
we call empirical or the ordinary concepts. These have the form of abstract 
universality and have been generated through the process of discerning differences, 
similarities, and identities in experience, and forming new determinations on this 
basis. The Hegelian, the genuine, notion of universality, on the other hand, is 
described here as the “absolute negation,” related to the abstract universality as the 
ground to the grounded.  
The particular moment of the concepts is the outcome of the self-
differentiation of the universal that is the process of the generation on inferentially 
interrelated empirical concepts; hence, the particular moment of the ontological 
structure that Hegel calls concept is a system of the determinate conceptual content 
through which we relate to the world, including to our own selves as parts of this 
world. The claim of this content being the outcome of the self-differentiation of the 
universality should be understood as pointing to the relation that this system of 
empirical concepts stands to the process of thinking in the Hegelian understanding 
of the term. Thought, for Hegel at the stage of his transcendental ontological system 
we have reached in the Doctrine of the Concept, is no longer confined to merely 
mental phenomena; universality as the process of thinking that generates 
determinate conceptual content includes not merely mental activity taking place in 
the subject, but also the activity in the inter-subjectively shared reality. Social and 
political institutions, the whole normative landscape that guides our activity as a 
member of a given community are the actualizations or applications of the 
conceptual content that guide the process of further revision and transformation of 
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the process of generation and piecemeal revision of the conceptual content. 
Application of a concept in judgment and action are both activities that are included 
in the process that Hegel calls universality. This assimilation of the concepts and 
institution is a part of the overall rejection of the dualistic, mental vs. non-mental, 
bifurcated traditional ontology. Institutions cannot function without a certain set of 
empirical concepts, neither can the subjective states of the mind that have nothing 
in common with the determination in the inter-subjectively shared sphere qualify as 
concepts.  
The chief example of such a concept that is actualized in social and political 
institutions and plays a crucial role in the development of history the way Hegel 
sees it is that of Freedom. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel outlines the basic schema he 
considers to be the reasonable social institutions culminating in the modern state 
that he sees as the actuality of concrete freedom (PR, par 260). Hegel’s lectures on 
the philosophy of history are also a detailed examination of the formative process of 
this concept and the institutions and processes associated with it. The determinate 
meaning of the concept freedom is formed through complex historical processes that 
involve individual reflection, formation and functioning of political and social 
institutions, their downfalls and transformations, revision of the meaning of these 
determinations and their application through the actions of individuals and 
institutions.    
In the above-cited passage, Hegel describes abstract universality as the form 
of the determinations of the particular: “the universality is form in it, and the 
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determinateness as such is its content. Universality becomes form” (WL 608). This is 
one more direct evidence of the Kantian roots of Hegel’s ontology, as for Kant, 
universality is the form of all concepts both empirical and a priori. Moreover, Kant 
explicitly associates the form of the concepts, their universality, with the process of 
their generation, “the form of the concept [its universality] as discursive 
representation is always made” (Longuenesse 1998, 119) as an outcome of the 
process of comparison, reflection, abstraction. Further, as we have seen in Chapter 
3, the basic forms of operation of this process through which, according to Kant, the 
form of the concept is generated correspond to the determinations of reflection 
presented by Hegel in the Logic of Essence. Forms of all three subcategories of the 
concepts—empirical, mathematical, and the categories—are made, according to 
Kant; they are the products of the activity of the mind. In other words, universality 
in all three cases is associated with the determination-generating activity.  
With the matter or the content of these three types of the concepts, however, 
the situation is quite different. In the case of the mathematical concepts, the matter 
is also made; just like the form, it is generated by the activity of the mind. This is 
what Kant means when, on numerous occasions in the Critique of Pure Reason, he 
claims that mathematical concepts can be exhibited in pure intuition. Both empirical 
and a priori concepts are different from the mathematical ones in this respect, as 
their matter instead of being, generated by the effort of the mind, is given, but given 
in different ways. With the empirical concepts, the matter is given via experience, 
while with the categories it is given a priori—that is, prior to experience. Hence, 
universality as the form of the Kantian notion of the concept is generated through 
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the activity of the mind, and this applies to both a priori and empirical concepts. 
Moreover, this activity of “comparison, reflection, abstraction” is guided by the very 
same forms as the determinations of reflection in Hegel’s account of it in the 
doctrine of essence. As such, down to the most intricate details, the most 
fundamental element of the Hegelian transcendental ontology—his theory of the 
concept—has Kantian themes ingrained in it; this makes it self-evident that Hegel’s 
system is Kantian through and through.   
 
3.3.3) Abstract Universals Lack the Principle of difference  
One way in which Hegel sets apart the genuine from the abstract universality 
is the lack of principle of difference in the latter. Abstract universals is empty 
concept; “since its determinateness is not the principle of its difference; a principle 
contains the beginning and the essential nature of its development and realization” 
(WL 610.1). What Hegel means by this claim becomes clear when considered 
together with another important distinction he makes between his own conception 
of the universality (tied with the concrete universal) and the abstract universal, in 
his description of the former self-contained and turned-towards-itself, with abstract 
universal being outward-going.  
But in regard to the other side, in which the genus is 
limited by its specific character, it has been observed 
that this as a lower genus, has its resolution in a higher 
universal. The latter, in its turn, can also be grasped as 
genus but as a more abstract one; but it always pertains 
only to that side of the determinate Concept which has a 
reference outwards. The truly higher universal is that in 
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which this outward-going side is taken back into the 
universality, the second negation, in which the 
determinateness is present simply as posited or as 
illusory being. Life, ego, spirit, absolute Concept, are not 
universal merely in the sense of higher genera, but are 
concretes whose determinateness, too, are not species 
or lower genera but genera which, in their reality, are 
absolutely self-contained and self-fulfilled. (WL 604-
605) 
Now, as we have seen, the Hegelian notion of the universality is the process guided 
by the functions presented as determination of reflection—identity, difference, 
contradiction, etc. —through which the revision and generation of new empirical 
concepts takes place. The claim of the presence of the principle of differentiation in 
the genuine universality is directly related to the claim of it being “turned toward 
itself,” instead of being “outward-going” as the abstract universals are. The idea is 
that the process of generation and the revision of conceptual content of a set of 
empirical concepts go hand in hand with them comprising a self-enclosed system of 
interrelated determinations. If we are not dealing with such a totality, but only with 
an isolated determination or even with a limited subset of a system of 
determinations, the conditions for the process of revising and generation of the 
conceptual content do not obtain. The key role in the process of revision of a given 
system of empirical concepts is played by contradiction that obtains between its 
elements tied to one another via the inferential relations, which in turn originate 
from the conceptual content generating process guided by the determinations of 
reflection (identity, difference etc.). But if the given set of determinations does not 
comprise a self-enclosed autonomous system, but is instead “outwards-going,” then 
what appears as a contradiction when a given subset of determinations is 
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considered in isolation does not necessitate the process of revision and generation 
of new determinations, as the apparent contradiction might be resolved by merely 
bringing a larger context in the picture. In other words, the necessary conditions for 
the process of revision and generation of the new content are present only within 
the constellation of empirical concept that are linked to one another by inferential 
relations and form a holistic system.  
The key point here is that the contradiction and, therefore, the need for 
revision of the conceptual content have different consequences in the holistic self-
enclosed system vs. in a none-self-enclosed set of abstract determinations. When 
Hegel calls the former “bent inwards” and the latter “pointing outside,” he speaks 
with the language of spatial metaphors about the nature of the inferential relations 
that will ultimately determine the developments necessitated by the emergence of 
contradiction. If in the holistic system, the revision of the existing conceptual 
content is the only way of resolving the contradictory state with the outward-
pointing set of determinations, resolution can be located in the domain external to 
the given set of determinations.  
Here we can see how the two kinds of systems will exhibit radically different 
patterns of “behavior.” When confronted with cases of contradiction, the former will 
be directed inwardly on the revision of the existing determinations, generating new 
conceptual content through the process of thinking (in Hegel’s technical meaning of 
the term), guided by the formal schema of determinations of reflect. With the latter, 
no such necessity arises. This absence of the condition for the process of generation 
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and revision of the determinate conceptual content is what Hegel has in mind when 
claiming that the abstract universals lack the principle of difference. In other words, 
the principle of differentiation is the key element that conditions the process of 
generation of conceptual content that comprise the schemata of the determinations 
of reflection, and it is realized within the given domain of articulated and yet still 
further articulable holistic system of empirical concepts. Hence, abstract universals 
lack this critical feature that is present in the Hegelian notion of universality, 
rendering the latter—not the former—into a dynamic content-generating process. 
 
3.3.3.1) “Fixity” as a Problem of Abstract Universal 
The unavailability of the principle of differentiation in abstract universals is 
closely tied with their “fixity,” which Hegel sees as a major reason of their 
inadequacy. “Here we have the circumstance that explains why the understanding is 
nowadays held in such a low repute and is so much discredited when measured 
against reason; it is the fixity which it imparts to determinacies and consequently to 
anything finite. This fixity consists in the form of the abstract universality just 
considered that makes them unalterable” (WL 610, gio538). What Hegel is pointing 
to here is the inadequacy of the perspective that takes the particular moment of the 
concept in its isolation without contextualizing it in the larger picture with the other 
two moments of the basic transcendental ontological structure of his system. If we 
abstract from the conceptual content generating process that we have looked at 
above and exclusively focus on its product, i.e., the constellation of the empirical 
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concepts as abstract universals, we end up with an inadequate account. This is the 
case because the dynamic aspect that plays the fundamental role in the generation 
of the conceptual content is left out of the picture. The point is that we are not 
dealing merely with an incomplete account with the universal moments omitted 
from it, but the particular moment itself is misconstrued, as due to the removal of all 
dynamism it is taken as consisting of the “fixed” or “unalterable” determinations.  
The misconstrual of the abstract universals as rigid and unalterable 
determinations invites the semantic atomist perspective, according to which the 
conceptual content of the empirical concepts are taken to be not the outcome of the 
process of continuous formation and revision that is taking place through their 
application in cognition claims and in action, but antecedent and semantically 
independent of these processes. This semantic indifference can be of a variety of 
kinds. It can take the form of the Aristotelian-representationalist model, according 
to which the world and the minds are divided by the ontological gap, and when it 
come to the epistemological and semantic concerns, the content of the former 
determines the content of the latter. In other words, the fixed determinations are 
antecedent in the sense that their content precedes any cognitive effort on the part 
of the mind; the locus of their origin is the mind-independent realm. An alternative 
form this semantic indifference can take is the rationalist-Leibnizian approach, 
according to which the determinations are pre-given not in the mind-external world 
but in the mental realm itself. This is why Hegel compares the Leibnizian approach 
to the generation of the conceptual content with formation of bubbles in the mind 
(WL, II, 10, WL 396). 
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What both of these alternatives lack is the appreciation of the role that the 
process of application of the systematically related empirical concepts plays in 
furnishing their conceptual content. This is what Hegel is pointing out when 
maintaining that once the universal moment of the concept is included in the 
picture, the fixity is dissolved and the dynamic character of the transcendental 
ontological substructure, the Concepts, comes to the fore:  
The fixity of the determinacies which the understanding 
appears to run up against, the form of the imperishable, 
is that of self-referring universality. But this universality 
belongs to the concept as its own, and for this reason 
what is found expressed in it, infinitely close at hand, is 
the dissolution of the finite. This universality directly 
contradicts the determinateness of the finite and makes 
explicit its disproportion with respect to it. … the 
abstract determinate is posited … as the unity of itself 
and the universal, that is, as concept. (WL 611-12; 
gio540) 
 
3.3.4) Identity of Content 
The third aspect of the relation between the universal and the particular 
moments of the concept concerns the identity of their respective conceptual space. 
Hegel describes this identity in the above-cited passage as the universal, being the 
totality of its diversity. By diversity is obviously meant the particular moment of the 
concept. In the same passage Hegel also maintains that universality is with itself in 
this diversity. Here we are dealing with the explicit assertion of what has been 
implied by Hegel’s earlier claim of each moment of the concept being not merely a 
part of the concept but embracing it in its entirety. But the question is how we ought 
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to think of the identity of the dynamic (the universal) and the static (the particular) 
moments. It certainly does not mean that there are no characteristics present in 
either one of these moments that is absent in the other one, as we have just pointed 
out significant differences between the two. What Hegel has in mind here, rather, is 
the specific relation between the process through which the determinations are 
generated on the one hand, and the conceptual content that we end up with as an 
outcome of this activity. He claims that there is nothing to the conceptual content 
that has not been originated from the process of its production. This is what has 
been described by Wilfrid Sellars and his followers as the rejection of the myth of 
the given.  
 
3.3.4.1) Intension identical 
According to the traditional conception, every concept can be analyzed 
regarding its extensional and intensional aspects. Extension of a concept basically 
means the domain that is carved out by the concept, thus it includes all other 
concepts that can be subsumed under it or stand in species-genus relation with the 
given concept. The intension of a concept, on the other hand, includes the complete 
set of concepts that are parts of its determination. For example, the extension of the 
concept of polygon includes concepts like triangle, square, rectangle, pentagon, etc. 
The intension, on the other hand, includes such concepts as line, angle, extension, 
etc. One way we can think of this distinction is that extension is geared to the 
ontological import of the concept, while intension to its semantic aspect. Now, when 
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Hegel claims that the universal moment exhausts the totality of determinations that 
makes up the particular moment of the concept, what he has in mind is that both the 
intension and the extension of the conceptual content that make up the particular 
moment originate from the determination-generating process of reflection that he 
calls universality.  
I shall start with the intensional aspect. In this respect, it is important to 
recall that the principle of self-differentiation of the universal into the plurality of 
determinations of the particularity, according to Hegel, is immanent to the universal 
itself. The “universality … contains within itself the standard by which this form of 
self-identity … [is] pervading and embracing all the moments” (WL 600). As we have 
seen, the principle under consideration is the principle of differentiation that 
consists of the basic determinations of reflection that guide the process of 
generation of conceptual content. Hence, when Hegel claims that the universal 
determines the nature of its diversification into the determinations that comprise 
the particular, he is pointing to the grounding role of the basic function of 
differentiation, identification, diversification, etc. and particularly, as we have seen, 
contradiction, in the process of generation of the empirical concepts. Hegel’s point 
here is that no matter at which level of analyzing the given empirical content we 
start, we will be proceeding with the basic rules of reflection that characterize the 
universal moment of the concept and will be arriving at the conceptual content that 
is a product of the application of these very functions. In other words, no matter 
how far such spelling out of the intensional content is pursued, there is no point at 
which we arrive at the elements that are given to the universality from a source 
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external to it. The totality of the particular moment of the concept is mediated by its 
universal moment through and through. This is what Hegel means in the claims such 
as these: “particularity has universality within it as its essential being” (WL 608), or 
“a principle contains the beginning and the essential nature of its development and 
realization” (WL610). The complete conceptual content of each specific 
determination and their totality taken together originate from the principle present 
in universality.  
 
3.3.4.2) Extension identical 
The identity of the extension of the two moments of the concept is the other 
side of the same coin; “by virtue of the identity of the particulars with the universal, 
their diversity is, as such, universal; it is totality. The particular, therefore, not only 
contains the universal but through its determinateness also exhibits it; 
consequently, the universality constitutes the sphere that must exhaust the 
particular” (WL 606). The process of the generation of the conceptual content, 
claims Hegel, carves out the onto-logical space within which the products of the 
particularization of the universal are exhibited. In other words, there is no extra-
conceptual content that serves as an external boundary to the determination-
generating process. The onto-logical space that is carved out by self-differentiation 
of the universal is the domain to which the particulars with the totality of their 




3.3.5) Primacy of universal  
Both intension and extension of the two moments are identical; universality 
and particularity are two different moments of the very same ontological structure, 
the totality of which is present in each one of these moments; “each of these 
moments is no less the whole Concept” (WL 600). Notwithstanding this important 
aspect of co-extensiveness and the identity of content of the two moments, it should 
be kept in mind that there is an important difference between them, which shows 
why Hegel gives the pride of place to the universal moment. While particularity is 
the only means by which universality actualizes itself as a creative power and hence 
an indispensable moment of the concept, nevertheless as we have already seen, it is 
universality that has the principle of particularization through which it posits 
particular determinations. It is also the creative potential of universality that 
particularity represents, not vice versa.  
 
3.3.6) Bowman on two moments of the concept and the limitations of his 
position 
Having looked at the relation between the universal and the particular 
moments of the concept, we can see that the overall framework on which the 
dynamic and the static elements are unified in a self-relational unity at the most 
fundamental level of Hegel’s transcendental ontological system. A more detailed 
account of this unity will be taken up in the following chapter, but the basic picture 
should already be clear: the unity between the dynamic and the static aspects of the 
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Hegelian transcendental ontology rests on the unified structure of the concept, and 
specifically on the identity between its universal and particular moments.  
Brady Bowman in his Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity 
advances a somewhat similar claim. Drawing on the works of Dieter Henrich and 
Rolf Peter Horstmann, he claims that “Henrich’s analysis of the dynamic logic of 
Hegel’s grundoperation turns out to correspond exactly to Horstmann’s relational 
account of the Hegelian Concept and the structure of subjectivity. The two are at 
bottom one and the same, considered first from the dynamic perspective, then from 
the static or structural perspective” (Bowman 2013, 54). Henrich’s analysis of the 
reflective activity as the autonomous negation that takes the Doctrine of Essence as 
the fundamental kernel of the dynamic account of the Hegelian system is argued by 
Bowman to have a structure identical to what he sees as Hegel’s notion of the 
concept. Both exhibit the three-partite structure of the “relation-to-self – relation-to-
other – relation-to-other-as-relation-to-self” (Bowman 2013, 41). The dynamic 
manifestation of this structure is presented by Bowman from the Logic of Reflection:  
Reflection is at first the movement of the nothing to the 
nothing, and thus negation coinciding with itself. This 
self-coinciding is in general simple equality with itself, 
immediacy. But this falling together is not the transition 
of negation into equality as into a being other than it; 
reflection is transition rather as the sublating of 
transition, for it is the immediate falling together of the 
negative with itself. And so this coinciding is, first, self-
equality or immediacy; but, second, this immediacy is 
the self-equality of the negative, and hence self-negating 
equality, immediacy which is in itself the negative, the 
negative of itself: its being is to be what it is not. The 
self-reference of the negative is therefore its turning 
back into itself; it is immediacy as the sublating of the 
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negative, but immediacy simply and solely as this 
reference or as turning back from a one, and hence as 
self-sublating immediacy. – This is positedness, 
immediacy purely as determinateness or as self-
reflecting. This immediacy, which is only as the turning 
back of the negative into itself, is the immediacy which 
constitutes the determinateness of shine, and from 
which the previous reflective movement seemed to 
begin. But, far from being able to begin with this 
immediacy, the latter first is rather as the turning back 
or as the reflection itself. Reflection is therefore the 
movement which, since it is the turning back, only in 
this turning is that which starts out or returns. 
(Bowman 2013, 53;  WL 11.250-51; G 347) 
The identical structure is to be found in Hegel’s theory of the concept, Bowman 
argues, and presents as an example of this the relation between identity, difference, 
and ground.  
While Bowman is right about the dualistic aspect (dynamic and static) of the 
basic ontological substructure of the Hegelian system, as well as about the identity 
of these moments, the specific interpretation of these moments and their unity he is 
advancing is clearly problematic. First, the manifestation of the static structure, 
relation-to-self – relation-to-other – relation-to-other-as-relation-to-self, that 
Bowman is looking at (identity, difference, ground) is taken from the determinations 
of reflection, not from the doctrine of the concept. Hence, what is presented as the 
static structure of the concept that corresponds to the identical dynamic structure of 
the process of reflection as autonomous negativity is borrowed from the 
determinations of reflection or the dynamic moment itself. In other words, Bowman 
uses the schema borrowed from the dynamic moment, interprets it as a static 
structure, and then tries to prove on this basis the parallelism between the two 
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sides. Unfortunately, Bowman has no choice but to revert to this or some other 
similar tactics as he is hardly going into the analysis of the Doctrine of the Concept, 
confining his attention to the Doctrine of Essence. For sure the Doctrine of Essence is 
important for understanding some of the key aspects of Hegel’s transcendental 
ontology, and as my analysis in Chapter 3 has shown, it is essential for the proper 
comprehension of the mechanism involved in process of generation of empirical 
concepts. But at the same time, it is certainly not the place where the thesis of the 
self-relational unity between the most basic elements of Hegel’s ontology (i.e., 
universality, particularity, individuality) is advanced. Had he paid more careful 
attention to the pivotal third part of the Logic, Bowman would have uncovered the 
most fundamental ground on which the identity of the dynamic and the static 
moments in the Hegelian system rests. 
As we have seen from the above analysis of the basic structure of the 
Hegelian transcendental ontology, his theory of the concept, the dynamic aspect of 
the system is associated with the universal moment, which is the activity of the 
generation and continuous revision of the conceptual content of the empirical 
determinations. Moreover, as we have seen, this activity is not confined merely to 
the mental sphere, but also includes the interaction of the individuals in the inter-
subjective, socially shared space within which the action has no other meaning but 
the application of concepts. The determinations of reflection that Hegel presents in 
the doctrine of the essence are the basic formal structures that guide this content-
generating activity. Discerning identities, differences, diversity, etc., in the 
experience that is already mediated by the existing empirical concepts is the most 
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fundamental operational move in the process through which the revision of the 
existing and formation of the new empirical determinations are carried out. The 
static aspect of the concept, on the other hand, is the totality of this systematically 
interrelated empirical concept that Hegel calls the particular. The identity of the 
dynamic and the static aspects, that is, the universal and particular moment with the 
static the particular one that I have shown has the Kantian origins, will be the topic 
of our discussion in the following chapter where I take a close look at the Syllogism 
section of the doctrine of the concept.    
 
3.4) Individuality  
Hegel introduces the third moment of the fundamental structure of his 
transcendental ontological system, individuality, as determinate universality: 
“Individuality, as we have seen, is already posited through particularity; this is 
determinate universality and hence self-referring determinateness, the determinate 
determinate” (WL 618.2; G 546), and again, “The particular, for the same reason that 
makes it only a determinate universal, is also an individual, and conversely, because 
the individual is a determinate universal, it is equally a particular” (WL 620.2; G 
547). These passages make it clear that what he means by individuality should not 
be identified with the pre-conceptual, brute given, something that is out there in the 
world individuated prior to any reflection. Instead, individuality stands for 
something “posited through particularity.” It is, in other words, the outcome of the 
process of reflection that generates determinate conceptual content. Instead of 
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being a thing given to the reflection from some external sources, it is individuated 
by the conceptual content generating process. Individuality, therefore, is the fully 
mediated totality of relations. This is what Hegel means when he claims that 
through individuality, concept re-asserts its unity by returning to itself after positing 
diverse determinations. 
in this reflection universality is in and for itself, 
individuality is essentially the negativity of the 
determinations of the concept, but not merely as if it 
stood as a third something distinct from them, but 
because what is now posited is that positedness is 
being-in-and-for-itself; that is, what is posited is that 
each of the distinct determinations is the totality. The 
turning back of the determinate concept into itself 
means that its determination is to be in its 
determinateness the whole concept. (WL 621.1; G548) 
Individuality is the totality of determinations that make up a systematically 
related whole—not any set of determinate conceptual content will qualify for the 
term. This is why Hegel introduces the example of the already familiar concrete 
universals, “Life, spirit, God, as well as the pure concept” when describing 
individuality. What is capable of being individuated is not a singular object 
confronting consciousness externally, but a totality of objects internally related to 
one another due to the systematic relations present in the conceptual content on 
which they are grounded. Hence, a finite object enters a given onto-logical space as a 
part of a totality of objects with which it shares the basic conceptual content, and it 
is this totality that is individuated. Only certain systematically related totalities can 
be considered fully individuated, that is, to present an articulated system of 
conceptual content related by inferential commitments and doxastic claims about 
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the reality that can be described as autonomous that is not depending on any 
external conditions. In this passage, Hegel clearly specifies the problem with the 
traditional take on individuality.  
Universality, when referred to these individuals as 
indifferent ones – and it must be referred to them, for 
they are a moment of the concept of individuality – is 
only their commonality. If by the universal one 
understands that which is common to several 
individuals, the indifferent subsistence of these 
individuals is then taken as the starting point, thus 
mixing in the immediacy of being into the 
determination of the concept. The lowest conception 
one can have of the universal as connected with the 
individual is this external relation that it has to the 
latter as a mere commonality. (WL 621.4; G 549) 
The independent subsistence of the individuals is the illusion that is associated with 
the matching conception of the abstract universality, which Hegel describes as its 
“lowest conception.” In other words, the conception of individual objects as existing 
indifferently from one another as well as from the universal is a fundamentally 
flowed one; objects are individuated together and via the conceptual content 
posited through the process of universalization. 
As such, individuality is inseparable from concrete universality and this is 
what sets apart the latter from the abstract universality, which is related to the 
individuality externally:  
The universal is for itself because it is absolute 
mediation in itself, self-reference only as absolute 
negativity. It is an abstract universal inasmuch as this 
sublating is an external act and so a dropping off of the 
determinateness. This negativity, therefore, attaches 
indeed to the abstract universal, but it remains outside 
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it, as a mere condition of it; it is the abstraction itself 
that holds its universal opposite it, and so the universal 
does not have singularity in itself and remains void of 
concept. – Life, spirit, God, as well as the pure concept, 
are for this reason beyond the grasp of abstraction, for 
abstraction keeps singularity away from its products, 
and singularity is the principle of individuality and 
personality. And so it comes to nothing but lifeless 
universalities, void of spirit, color, and content. (WL 
619.2) 
In other words, what makes the abstract universal “lifeless” is not its externality to 
the immediate sensible given, but its externality to the totality of determinations, its 
“dropping off of the determinateness” thereby becoming “void of … content.”   
 
3.5) Against Representationalist Model 
Hegel associates the approach that takes the moments of the concept in 
isolation from one another with representational thinking. On the one hand, the 
representational model itself sets apart the concept and the object on the opposite 
ends of the epistemological and ontological gap, abstract universality on the one 
hand and the individuality on the other. But for Hegel, all three moments of the 
concept taken in isolation from the rest of the concept are abstractions. Hence, not 
only can the universal and the particular be abstract, but so can the individual. 
Representational thinking is working with such an abstract notion of individuality 
when postulating it as a singular standing outside of reflection, as something that is 
given to thought. This way of thinking can be captured by a certain inadequate 
ontological model:  
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each of the determinations established in the preceding 
exposition of the concept has immediately dissolved 
itself and has lost itself in its other. Each distinction is 
confounded in the course of the very reflection that 
should isolate it and hold it fixed. Only a way of thinking 
that is merely representational, for which abstraction 
has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, 
the particular, and the singular rigidly apart. Then they 
can be counted; and for a further distinction this 
representation relies on one which is entirely external 
to being, on their quantity, and nowhere is such a 
distinction as inappropriate as here. (WL 620.4; G 548) 
The representationalist stance therefore implies an ontological model that 
conceives the three moments of the concept as self-sufficient determinations 
persisting in isolation from one another. We shall see that this stands quite close to 
one of the alternative ontological models that Hegel will consider and reject in the 
Syllogism chapter. 
Hegel describes two alternative options available to us for relating the 
particular and the universal moments in order to restore the unified structure of the 
concept; he calls these “return of the concept into itself” (WL 621.1). The first option 
is based on abstraction, “which lets drop the particular and rises to the higher and 
higher genus.” This option uses the impoverished conception of universality that 
operates within the representationalist framework, keeping and widening the gap 
between the universal on the one hand and the individual on the other. It is “the 
lowest conception one can have of the universal in its connexion with the individual 
is this external relation” (WL 621).  
The alternative option is via “descent” into individuality (WL 619). This 
descending of the universal into individuality does not mean putting aside the 
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particular moment and delving into the non-conceptual given. Rather, it means the 
drive toward exhaustive determination of totality through generation of an 
interdependent system of conceptual content. It is through this drive toward full 
determination that the totality of the content individuates itself or enters actuality: 
“But the individuality is not only the return of the Concept into itself, but 
immediately its loss. Through individuality, where the Concept is internal to itself, it 





CHAPTER 5: Syllogism as the Basic Ontological Schema of 
Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology 
 
 
1)  The Syllogism 
 
The main goal of the present chapter is to give an account of the inner 
structure of the concept, which Hegel sees as the fundamental ontological schema of 
reality. Up to this point in describing this structure, I have outlined the basic 
features of the three moments that the concept is made up of: universality, 
particularity, and individuality. But this is insufficient for the proper understanding 
of the Hegelian notion of the concept. What is needed in addition to the account of 
the moments is to spell out the exact character of their relation to one another. In 
examining the moments in isolation, we tend to regard them as self-subsistent 
elements and thus downplay their key characteristic of being integral parts of the 
holistic structure within which all three moments are completely mediated with one 
another. One way to appreciate the extent of originality of Hegel’s position is to 
attend to the fact that, if in the traditional view only universals are the products of 
abstraction from actuality, for Hegel taking particularity and individuality in 
isolation are abstractions as well. To regard actuality as consisting of merely 
individual entities (or any given system of particular determinations) is to uphold 
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just as impoverished a view of actuality as with ignoring the individuality 
altogether.   
The section of the text where Hegel investigates the splitting of the concept 
into its three components is the Judgment chapter, in which he states that “the 
judgment is the self-diremption of the Concept” (WL 625). The Syllogism chapter, on 
the other hand, is dedicated to the reconstitution of its unity. This reconstitution, 
however, does not cancel the difference between the separate moments of the 
concept; rather, it is a sublation of the difference, not an abolition of it. In other 
words, it is not the difference between the moments of the concept that is 
undermined in the Syllogism chapter, but the opposition between the difference and 
the unity. A close study of the Syllogism chapter is important not only for exposing 
the nature of unity between the constitutive parts of the concept, but also for 
clarifying the meaning of each one of the three elements. For example, as we shall 
see, the notion of universality with which the Syllogism chapter commences is a 
mere abstract universality, hence very different from the Hegelian meaning of the 
term as the conceptual content generating process guided by the determinations of 
reflection we have looked at in Chapter 3. Universality is also not an exception; each 
one of the three moments undergoes transformation as we make our way through 
the stages of mediation presented by Hegel as syllogistic structures. 
Thus, the Syllogism chapter includes not one but a whole series of different 
schemata of mediation between the moments of the concept, and each model is 
distinct from others not only in the specific manner of unity of universality, 
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particularity, and individuality, but also in the very nature of the moments that are 
being mediated. The progression is from a less adequate model to increasingly more 
successful ones, ultimately culminating in Hegel’s own vision of the immanently 
mediated structure of the concept—the fundamental schema of his transcendental 
ontology. But before arriving there, he takes us through the complex twists and 
turns of different stages of syllogistic mediation, examining and leaving behind 
alternative ontological outlooks. As we make our way through these models, I will 
be pointing out the key features of the basic ontological assumption lying in the 
background of each major stage of the development. This should serve a double 
function: on the one hand, it will clarify the trajectory of the overall progression 
taking place in the Syllogism chapter by mapping Hegel's complex technical 
vocabulary onto more easily accessible and familiar theories; and on the other hand, 
it will help in understanding what Hegel sees as the most philosophically significant 
differences between his ontological view and the available alternatives, as well as 
the superiority of the former over the latter ones. 
 
1.1) Self-relational Structure as the Criterion and Pippin’s 
Epistemological Reading 
The criterion that drives the development of the Syllogism chapter is the self-
relational unity of the immanent structure of the concept. The moments of the 
concept, as we shall see, ought to be not merely related to one another, but their 
relation should have the nature of self-relation. This is the norm Hegel uses to 
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evaluate the ontological models he investigates in the Syllogism chapter, the norm 
that each one of the alternative models will fail to meet, rendering Hegel's own 
stance superior to them in his own eyes. The fact that Hegel is using this criterion 
reveals how thoroughly Kantian his undertaking is, as it is Kant who identified the 
objective purport conferring functions with the self-relationality when in the 
Transcendental Deduction identified the logical functions of judgment with the 
transcendental apperception. Hence, the self-relational structure under 
consideration is clearly the Kantian transcendental apperception recast into Hegel’s 
own technical vocabulary and integrated into his ontological system.  
Hence, when Hegel makes claims like “everything actual is syllogism” or 
“syllogism is the truth of being,” he has in mind not the entire Syllogism chapter, 
where a whole series of ontological models is presented and analyzed, but the fully 
mediated syllogistic schema that is attained at the end of the chapter—the stage at 
which the Kantian self-relationality criterion is fulfilled. While emphasizing this 
deeply running Kantian current at the epicenter of Hegel’s project, it is important to 
keep in mind that we are dealing here not with an epistemological project, but with 
a transcendental ontology—a theory of actuality, the fundamental schema or reality. 
The Kantian idea of the transcendental unity of apperception as the source of 
objective purport-conferring determinations is fundamentally reworked and 
reinstated on a new ontological ground that is free of the psychological implications 
that Hegel saw as problematic. The self-relational unity is still the source of 
objective purport, but the epistemological account is replaced by the Hegelian 
transcendental ontology.  
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As I have argued in Chapter 1, the Kantian origins of the project, instead of 
precluding its reading as an ontological theory, sets us on the path of advancing a 
new kind of ontology that constitutes a kind of paradigm shift from its traditional 
precursors. This emphasis on the ontological nature of the theory under 
consideration is what sets my reading apart from Robert Pippin’s position. While 
discussing the Concept chapter of Hegel’s logic, Pippin draws a line between the 
“good” Kantian current in Hegel’s position from a “waxing Platonic” theme that he 
considers to be peripheral to it.  
When he wants to talk like a Kantian, Hegel claims that 
‘the Notion’ comprises the major categories of the Logic 
itself, being and essence (e.g. at EL, 307; EnL 223). This 
is, as we have seen, the major line of attack in SL.  
Following it means that the basic claim is: For there to 
be any possible judgment about objects, there must be 
possible an original determinacy, a pure discrimination 
presupposed prior to any empirical or specific 
judgmental discrimination…. All of this leads to Hegel’s 
basic claim that the originally required qualitative 
determinacy itself ultimately depends on (in some 
sense) subjectively projected theories … This is the 
basic, stripped down version of Hegel’s idealist case for 
the required Notion interdependence of being and 
essence. (Pippin 1989, 241-242). 
Pippin traces the Kantian thread in Hegel through the need of contextualization of 
the categories of being and essence within the theory of the concept. Here Pippin is 
putting his finger on the central nerve of the Kant–Hegel relation, but I’m skeptical 
of whether this necessarily commits us to the thesis of the “subjectively projected” 
content onto reality. Does not Pippin’s thesis assert the dependence of the 
categories of being on essence and ultimately on the concept? And if this is the case, 
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does not this thesis contradict with his claim about the subjective projection, which 
assumes the bipolar picture of the subject and actuality on which the subjective 
content is being projected? If the concept grounds the categories of being, then there 
is no being independent of concept onto which the “subjective projection” would 
have been possible.  
Pippin continues to expose what he sees as a darker side of Hegel’s position:  
 
But as just noted, Hegel is happy to go far beyond what 
is, in essence, his own reconstitution of the Kantian 
categories of quality, quantity, relation, and modality. 
And he is often also given to waxing Platonic about such 
Notions. He claims that "man" is a Notion in the relevant 
technical sense, and he praises Christianity for first 
treating man in terms of his Notion…. It would indeed 
be odd if the transcendental-logical requirements for a 
conceptual scheme could develop in a way that would 
not only have consequences for how man might be 
defined, or accounted for, but could actually provide the 
definition. (Pippin 1989, 242) 
 
Pippin is absolutely right in drawing the line between Kant and Plato and positing 
“the good Hegel” on the Kant side of the divide. Where I disagree with him is 
confining the domain of ontology to the Plato side of the divide. Hegel is indeed 
advancing a theory of transcendental-logical schema about how man or any 
particular determination can be defined, but this does not limit his project to merely 
an epistemological one. And going beyond this does not imply that he is advocating 
for any specific definition of man or any other particular determination. Hegel’s 
transcendental ontology is not concerned with producing definitions of essences 
along the lines of Platonic forms, but with the ontological implication of the very 
same transcendental-logical schema that Pippin so exemplarily outlines in his book. 
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Having given up the traditional idea of the transcendent being and the 
corresponding representation in thought, Hegel is advancing a theory of being as 
thought and thought as being that is grounded on the ontological schema elaborated 
in the theory of the concept. In other words, “the active universal,” as a creative 
power that Pippin acknowledges as the key element of Hegel’s position 
(Pippin1989, 237-239), is not merely a process of reflection with strictly 
epistemological function, or a meaning-generating power with merely semantic 
purport, but a determination-furnishing process within which the identity of being 
and thought is actualized.  
 
 
2) The Syllogism of Existence  
 
2.1) The Qualitative Syllogism 
Hegel presents three groups of syllogistic mediational models: the Syllogism 
of Existence, the Syllogism of Reflection, and the Syllogism of Necessity. The first 
model in the Syllogism of Existence, i.e., the Qualitative Syllogism, has the following 
structure: Individual — Particular — Universal. The defining feature of this initial 
form of mediation is that “each [moment] is present in its immediate 
determinateness” (WL 667). Immediate determinateness for Hegel means 
endogenous content—being determined without reference to anything else. 
However, this is a problematic notion because, for him, conferral of a content is 
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possible only by simultaneously excluding some other possible content, and any 
determination for Hegel implies negation. Therefore, immediate determination is a 
mere illusion of determination and each one of the three moments of the syllogistic 
structure under consideration is fundamentally misconstrued. “The individuality is 
any immediate concrete object; particularity a single one of its determinatenesses, 
properties or relationships; universality again a still more abstract, more individual 
determinateness in the particular” (WL 670). Each one of the three definitions is 
problematic. As we have already seen, individuality, conceived as “any immediate 
concrete object,” ignores the role of the universal as the determination-conferring 
power that makes individuation of entities possible. In the present syllogism, the 
individuality is taken to be as given prior to conceptualization—the paradigm 
example of the myth of the given.  
The particular and the universal moments are just as misconstrued. They are 
taken to be as merely different degrees of abstraction from the individuality—the 
“immediate concrete object.” This for Hegel means regarding the entire mediational 
structure of the concept as standing on its head and his verdict for the first 
Syllogism of Existence is complete failure to mediate between the moments of the 
concept, which stems from misunderstanding of their nature.  
In the first syllogism, the syllogism’s objective 
significance is only superficially present, since in it the 
determinations are not yet posited as the unity which 
constitutes the essence of the syllogism. It is still 
subjective in so far as the abstract significance 
possessed by its terms is not thus isolated in and for 
itself but only in subjective consciousness. (WL 667). 
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Thus, the ontological model presented in the first syllogism is inadequate to do 
justice to Hegel’s Kantian criterion of self-relational unity. Not only does it fail to 
present an account of the structure of the concepts in which each moment is related 
to itself within the other two moments, but it cannot even present any account of 
unity between them requiring an external element—subjective reflection—for it. 
The mediation is accomplished not within the logical space of the concept but 
through the subjective reflection standing external to it. Hegel concludes that the 
first schema of mediation fails to function as a genuine syllogism, as ”its ground and 
seat” is not the determinate middle term “which is pregnant with content” but “only 
subjective reflection” (WL 668-669).  
 
2.2) The Second Syllogism 
The principle that governs the emergence of each new stage in the series of 
syllogistic mediation after the downfall of the preceding one is determinate negation. 
The idea behind this important conceptual tool is that the culminating point of a 
given model is a determinate indicator of the form that its successor model will 
have. In the specific case of transition from the first to the second Syllogism of 
Existence, the key role is played by the realization of the individuality as the locus of 
the mediation under consideration: “the truth of the first qualitative syllogism is 
that something is united with a qualitative determinateness as a universal, not in 
and for itself but through a contingency or in an individuality” (WL 674). The model 
of mediation that emerges from the downfall of the first syllogism ought to do 
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justice to the truth of the first syllogism, hence it has to grant the key role in 
mediation to the individuality: “In such a quality, the subject of the syllogism has not 
returned into its Concept, but is apprehended only in its externality; immediacy 
constitutes the ground of the relation and consequently the mediation; thus the 
individuality is in truth the middle term” (WL 674). 
 
2.2.1) Middle Term’s Special Function and the Problems of the 
Second Syllogism  
Before looking closely at the second syllogistic model, it is important to note 
that the middle term plays a special role not only for the present model, but also for 
the ontological structures presented by Hegel in the Syllogism chapter in general: 
“The essential feature of the syllogism is the unity of the extremes, the middle term 
which unites them, and the ground which supports them” (WL 665). The middle 
term at each stage of development of the syllogistic mediational models stands for 
the element through which the purported unity between the moments is attained; it 
is the ground of mediation. But clearly, as we progress through the series of models, 
this ground does not remain the same. It undergoes transformation that reflects not 
only the modification of the formal structure of the syllogism, but also the change 
taking place in the extremes. Thus, the middle term is the key element of each stage 
of mediation where the developments taken place in the preceding mediational 
models get cemented.  
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Thus, if the truth of the first syllogism was that mediation was accomplished 
via the individuality, as Hegel claims in the above-cited passage, and granted his 
principle of determinate negation and the centrality of the middle term for 
mediational models, in the second Syllogism of Existence we should have the 
individuality as the middle term. The new syllogism, therefore, has the following 
form: Universality — Individuality — Particularity. However, the progress it makes, 
compared to the previous model in successfully mediating the moments of the 
concept, is quite modest. The reasons for this failure are several. To begin with, both 
major and minor premises of the new syllogistic model are insufficiently mediated. 
The former (Universality — Individuality) is an outcome of the first Syllogism of 
Existence that, as we know, was an unsuccessful attempt at unifying the terms, 
basing the mediation on a mere subjective, external reflection. Due to this 
insufficient form of mediation, the universality and the individuality are still 
abstract determinations posited as independent of each other, as well as of the 
particularity. The latter, the minor premise ( Individuality — Particularity ), stands 
on an even more shallow ground than the former, as it lacks even that inadequate 
form of mediation that has been attempted in the case of the major premise. In other 
words, the subjective-consciousness-based, and thus defective, form of mediation 
that was in place between the terms of the major premise is lacking here. Also, 
clearly the mere abstract determinateness of the terms is still not overcome yet—
while particularity has already acquired some content (although an externally 
imposed one) due to it having served as the middle term of the previous syllogism, 
individuality still remains a completely abstract determination. Therefore, the 
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second model of the Syllogism of Existence also fails to carry out an adequate 
mediation and posit the unified logical structure of the concept.  
While relating the first Syllogism of Existence to the second one, Hegel 
writes: “the mediation of the first syllogism was in itself a contingent one; in the 
second syllogism this contingency is posited” (WL 677). This “in itself” contingency is 
certainly related to basic ontological assumptions of the first syllogistic model. As all 
three moments were declared to be self-sufficient, there was no presence of an 
immanent mediation between them. In other words, the particular moment related 
to the given individual via external reflection (which, as we have seen, is the ground 
of mediation) was not immanent to the individual itself. The particular was just as 
self-sufficient as the individual, or as Hegel would put it, they are indifferent to one 
another. Therefore, the particular abstract determination that was associated with 
the given individuality was in principle not determined by the individuality, hence 
contingent. Moreover, since the universality in the first mediational model was 
conceived (or rather misconceived) as “a still more abstract” determination, the 
same indifferent relation obtains between it and the particular moment. Therefore, 
we end up with the possibility of attributing to the individuality not only the 
determinations that didn’t belong to it, but even mutually contradictory properties. 
Depending on which middle term was used (and due to the logical distance between 
it and the other two terms, any determination that is externally relatable to the 
extremes could be used here), we would end up with attributing contradictory 
properties to the very same individual. 
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It appears that all the elements of contingency of mediation were already 
there in the first syllogism. If that is indeed the case, why is Hegel describing it as 
contingent only “in itself”? What makes this contingency “posited” in the second and 
not in the first mediational model? The answer here lies in the corresponding formal 
structures of the syllogisms. The first mediation, I—P—U, as far as its formal 
structure is concerned, does not reveal the contingency at hand. Individuality is 
subsumed under general determination, which is further subsumed under 
determination of even more higher order of generality. In the second syllogism, on 
the other hand, contingency is already posited in the formal structure of mediation 
itself as the ground of mediation there is individuality. The middle term, 
individuality, is subsumed in both the major and the minor premises (WL676), 
hence the two arbitrarily picked determinations that external reflection related to 
the given individual will end up being linked to each other. As Hegel laconically puts 
it, “If the conclusion in the second figure … is correct, then it is so because it is so on 
its own account, not because it is the conclusion of this syllogism” (WL 676).  
Since the middle term is the ground of mediation in the syllogistic models, it 
also reflects the level of development achieved at each stage. Here is how Hegel 
describes the ground of mediation of the present syllogistic model: “Immediate 
individuality is determined in an infinitely manifold and external manner. In it, 
therefore, is rather posited the self-external mediation” (WL 677). The claim that the 
immediate individuality relates extreme terms through “self-external” mediation 
refers to the above-mentioned point by Hegel about mediation via subjective 
consciousness. The idea is that the particular moment on the one hand and the 
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universal on the other are determining the middle terms “in an infinitely manifold 
and external manner;” they are the abstract determination under which the 
subjective reflection subsumes the individual. While individuality is still immediate, 
determination will necessarily be both external and infinitely manifold, since the 
lack of self-mediation dictates that the external-subjective reflection be required for 
determination and this external perspective brings along with it infinite variability 
of the features that can be ascribed to the individual. Therefore, neither this specific 
model of mediation nor any other one that is grounded on an inadequately 
determined middle term can present a successful account of unified structure of the 
concept.  
The externality of the mediation we encounter in the present model results 
in its ultimate failure, but at the same time just with the previous stage it shows the 
way forward. Since the real ground for the mediation in the second syllogism has 
been revealed to be external to the middle term, and as Hegel reminds us at this 
stage of development that “the externality of the individuality is the universality” 
(WL 677), it is the universal moment that comes to the fore as the new ground for 
mediation. This realization of the central role that universality has to play this 
function is one of the most important developments that have taken place up to this 
point in the Syllogism chapter. There is a long way to go before we reach the point of 
sufficiently developed ontological model wherein the role of universality as a “free 
creative power” establishing unity within the logical structure of the concept by 
mediating its different elements fully manifests itself, but the first step toward it is 
already taken here. And even though universality itself at this stage is still the 
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abstract universal, hence incapable of fulfilling its function, the very fact of it being 
placed at the epicenter of mediating is already a significant step forward.  
 
2.3) The Third Syllogism  
The third Syllogism of Existence in which individuality is mediated with 
particularity through universality (I—U—P) has a significant advantage over the 
previous two forms of mediation: both premises, Particularity—Universality and 
Individuality—Universality, have already been mediated in the previous syllogisms. 
Hence, the third syllogism, in some sense, carries out a successful mediation of the 
three moments of the concept, as both premises have already been established. 
Having said this, we should keep in mind that all three moments are still 
inadequately developed and the unity between them is based on “self-external” 
“mere subjective reflection.” In other words, neither in the case of the particular, nor 
in the case of the individual, has universality been mediated in its own right. As 
Hegel puts it, “the extremes are not contained in the middle term according to their 
essential determinateness” (WL 678). As such, although formally both premises 
have already been established, they have been established on proper grounds and 
we are still dealing with mere abstractions that require external reflection to be 
related to one another.  
At this point, it has become clear that the fundamental ontological 
commitment that frames the entire development of the Syllogism of Existence is the 
existence of two types of entities: on the one hand, individuals or the spatiotemporal 
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objects that can be described as concrete particulars (obviously in non-Hegelian 
understanding of the term) that we encounter through experience; and on the other 
hand, the abstract entities that are often understood as including such things as 
properties, numbers, relations, laws of nature, etc. These two kinds of entities 
within the given ontological model are declared to be “self-sufficient,” not 
depending for their existence on each other. There is of course also the third 
element that plays the key role in mediating between the individuals and abstract 
entities—subjective reflection or external reflection. But this third moment is more 
an external element problem than an integral part of the ontological model under 
consideration. Without the subjective reflection, you cannot have the mediation 
between the elements of the given ontological model; but with the subjective 
element in it, you no longer have the ontological model in its pure form, as it cannot 
be described as belonging to either one of the moments. This is the reason Hegel 
describes the mediation carried out through it as “self-external.”  
2.3.1) Plato and Stern 
The dualistic model with abstract-universal vs. individual-spatiotemporal 
entities, which frames the entire development of the Syllogism of Existence, clearly 
has much in common with Platonic metaphysics. The realm of forms, or that of being 
vs. the realms of sensible entities, or that of becoming is mirrored in the opposition 
between the abstract determination, on the one hand, and sensible individuality on 
the other hand in the Syllogism of Existence. The two domains are juxtaposed and 
contrasted as existing independently from one another. It is not only that the model 
under consideration is upholding the one-over-many conception of the relation 
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between the universal and the individual, but it also grants to them ontological “self-
sufficiency.” Hegel’s own conception of universality, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter (and which will be realized at the end of the Syllogism chapter), rejects both 
of these aspects of the view under consideration. Hence, I agree with Stern when he 
claims that for Hegel “the substance universals which constitute the nature of the 
individual qua individual do not exist in the abstract, but only as particularized 
through property universals, and thus as instantiated in the form of individuals.” So 
Stern is right in his conclusion that, according to Hegel, “Plato is false” (Stern 2009, 
157), but he is following Hegel only halfway.  
While acknowledging the rejection of the ontological self-sufficiency of the 
universals, Stern does not do justice to the extent to which Hegel departs from Plato. 
He wants to ascribe to Hegel a conception of the universal, which, while no longer 
ontologically independent from the individuals in which it is instantiated, still 
stands in one-to-many relation to them as their substance which constitutes their 
nature. He ultimately ascribes to Hegel an Aristotelian position by internalizing the 
very same rigid Platonic universal within the individual and rendering the latter 
into manifestation of these “concrete,” immanent universals. “A rose is not an 
individual rose by virtue of exemplifying the abstract universal ‘red,' whereas it is 
an individual rose by virtue of exemplifying the concrete universal ‘rose’” (Stern 
2009, 156). This way, Hegel’s distinction between the abstract and genuine 
conceptions of universality is reduced by Stern to a trivial distinction between mere 
property of a thing vs. its essential nature, along the lines of the Aristotelian 
distinction between accidents vs. substantial form. But as we have seen in the 
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previous chapter and as the further development of the Syllogism chapter shall 
confirm, the Hegelian conception of universality is much more interesting and 
unorthodox than this. The universal moment of the concept, instead of being 
reduced to any determinateness (in Stern’s interpretation this is determination of 
essential abstract universal that stands in one-to-many relation to its individuations 
internally structuring them), is the process of generations of determinations. 
Instead of being an abstract universal internalized into individual as its immanent 
but still abstract universal structure, it is the activity that produces the 
determinations and the condition for individuation of entities through them. Stern 
even cites the passages in which Hegel is explicit about this: “the universality here is 
no longer a form external to the content, but the true form which produces the 
content from itself” (Stern 2009, 154 from SL603-604). But Stern clearly thinks of 
Hegel’s stance as too far off from common sense, and he ultimately sticks to a 
domesticated version of Hegel’s position that is closer to Plato’s student Aristotle’s 
conception of the universality than to Hegel’s own. 
Rejecting conceptual Platonism does not necessitate committing oneself to 
conceptual Aristotelianism, and neither is Aristotle’s substantial form the only 
option in making Hegel’s technical vocabulary accessible to contemporary readers. 
Hegel, together with rejecting Plato, is also leaving Aristotle behind. Both Platonic 
and Aristotelian positions have one fundamental thing in common: the order of 
reality is given. In the former case, the order of reality is given as the rational 
structure of the world that can be grasped directly independently of the experience, 
while in the latter it is given both as the immanent structure of the experienced 
219 
 
world and the formal logico-rational principles of the mind (and somehow these 
two are supposed to be in harmony with each other). Now Hegel takes a 
fundamentally different stance from both of them; for him, the order, instead of 
being given, is generated. This of course does not mean that individual subjects 
somehow construct the world as it pleases them. Instead, it is a collective activity of 
social practices which includes applications of concepts, social institutions, and 
guiding individuals’ actions, acquiring doxastic claims from experiences and 
drawing inferences from them, attempting to reconcile these newly acquired claims 
with the ones already upheld, and through this process generating the content 
through which we relate to the world. This is what Hegel means when claiming in 
the passage cited by Stern that “the universality here is no longer a form external to 
the content, but the true form which produces the content from itself” (Stern 2009, 
154; SL603-604).  
While the exteriority of the moments to one another modeled after Platonic 
metaphysics is the defining feature of the Syllogism of Existence, the development 
that has taken place through the three forms of mediation we examined sets the 
stage for the reduction of the onto-logical gap between the moments of the concept. 
As has been pointed out, the third syllogism offers a flawed (since it is based on 
external reflection) but still a formally complete mediation of the moments, granted 
the two earlier mediations are presupposed. But the same can be said about the 
earlier syllogisms. “It[the third syllogism] presupposes the first two syllogisms; but 
conversely, they both presuppose it, and in general each presupposes the other two” 
(WL 678). Thus, each one of the three syllogisms considered so far can be regarded 
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as presupposing the other two, and all three together form a full circle of purely 
formal mediation. This brings us to the point where the qualitative differences 
between the three Syllogisms of Existence and, more importantly, the terms 
themselves, lose their significance—as long as the other two terms have also been 
the grounds of mediations and these mediations are presupposed, it does not make 
much difference which moment of the concept is presently the middle term. Hence, 
we are standing at the threshold of a new important development where the 
qualitative differences between the moments are put aside (the next model has the 
form U-U-U) and the first step is taken toward building up of their shared content.   
 
2.4) The Fourth Syllogism of Existence: the Mathematical 
Syllogism  
The last form of mediation in the Syllogisms of Existence is the Mathematical 
Syllogism: Universal-Universal-Universal. It has a somewhat paradoxical character. 
On the one hand, abstraction has reached its highest point, as the mathematical 
syllogism abstracts from all qualitative distinctions between the terms. This also 
transforms the modality of relation between the terms, which as we shall see will 
have far-reaching consequences, as it can no longer be inherence or subsumption, 
instead it is equality (WL 679). The kind of mediation that the mathematical 
syllogism offers is possible only on the basis of complete abstraction from the 
specific determination of each one of the three terms. “Lines, figures, posited as 
equal to one another, are understood only in terms of their magnitude; a triangle is 
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affirmed to be equal to a square, but not as triangle to square, but only in regard to 
magnitude, etcetera”(WL 680). Abstractness that has been the main problem of the 
moments of the concept in the Syllogism of Existence, when pushed to its limits, 
breaks down the given framework and takes us to a new stage of mediation. 
Although minimal, shared content is nevertheless established between the term: 
“abstract determinateness has had its other posited in it and thereby has become 
concrete” (WL 680). The quantitative equality between the three terms is attained 
through pushing abstraction from the qualitative element to its limit and although 
minimal, genuine unity between the terms of the syllogism is attained for the first 
time. The content that is equal in each of the three terms is posited internally with 
each term’s own resources—the area of triangle that equals the area of square has 
this and such area independent of square or any other shape that it is united with—
hence the ground of unity between the terms is internal to each term. We have “the 
positive reflection of one [term] into the other” (WL 681).  
What lies ahead in the subsequent mediational models is that the minimal 
shared content between the terms that has been attained so far will be further 
developed to the point of embracing the terms completely. If the central principle of 
the first phase (Syllogisms of Existence) of mediation was the self-sufficiency of the 
moments of the concept, the second phase (Syllogisms of Reflection) is driven by a 
new principle—generation by each moment the content of the other two moments 
internally to itself. Hence, if in the Syllogisms of Existence the two basic ontological 
categories (abstract universals and the sensible individuals) were posited as self-
sufficient entities with content autonomous from one another, the new development 
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is geared to overcoming the ontological gap between the content immanent to the 
universal and individuals. This is a first significant step of the overall development 
taking place in the Syllogism chapter that can be described as rejecting the Platonic 
theory of the origin of conceptual content. The thesis of equality of the three 
moments brings forth a qualitatively new model of mediation between them. 
Universal determination is no longer completely external to the individual and what 
transpires within the individual is also relevant for the universal. An important part 
of the Platonic presupposition of the externality of the universal was the 
immutability of its content, but if now they are equated to and put in place of the 
other moments of the concept, their immutability is also undermined. Ultimately, 
pursuing this strategy will lead us to the incorporation of the conceptual content of 
the universals within the practices of their application. Hegel is leaving behind the 
Platonic account of the conceptual content and heading toward a dynamic theory of 
generation of the determinate content, within which the process of application of 
concepts, drawing inferences from this application, added new bits of inferential 
content via experience. These are the processes thorough which this very content is 







3) The Syllogism of Reflection 
 
3.1) The Syllogism of Allness 
The first form of mediation in the Syllogism of Reflection is the Syllogism of 
Allness. It has the same formal structure as the initial model of the Syllogism of 
Existence, I—P—U. However, as we shall see, the formal similarity is far outweighed 
by the differences found in the content of the terms. While in the first Syllogism of 
Existence the middle term was a mere abstract determination, in the present form 
of mediation it is the totality of the individuals falling under the given particular: 
“it[the middle term] contains (1) individuality, but (2) individuality extended to 
universality as all” (WL 687). Hegel brings the following inference in order to 
demonstrate the ontological model under consideration: “All men are mortal / Gaius 
is a man / therefore Gaius is mortal.” Instead of an arbitrary determination as the 
middle term of the syllogistic structure, now we have the particular (in this case, 
“men”) under which all individual men are subsumed. The externality between the 
terms is replaced by the inclusion of one moment within another.  
This inclusion of the other two moments of the concept within the middle 
term is a step taken toward the generation of determinate content internally to the 
middle term. Hegel writes, “The syllogism of allness is the syllogism of 
understanding in its perfection, but is as yet no more than that. That the middle term 
in it is not abstract particularity but developed into its moments and is therefore an 
essential requirement for the Concept” (WL 687). As we know, Hegel distinguishes 
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between understanding and reason as between fixed and mechanical way of thinking 
vs. fluid and dynamic power that remolds and redefines the fixed determinations 
that the understanding confines itself to. Hence, the claim that the Syllogism of 
Allness is “the syllogism of understanding in its perfection” is pointing us to the 
nature of determination that is in place in the present model of mediation and 
allows us to see its limitations.  
The major advantage of the Syllogism of Allness over the Syllogisms of 
Existence is that the complete abstractness of the moments of the concept is left 
behind, but the determinate content we have in the present stage is still in 
rudimentary form. The power of universal as the fluid determination generating 
force has not been integrated in the mediation yet. Thus, although the middle 
term—the particular moment of the concepts—is “not abstract,” it has content of its 
own and through this content is related to the individuals on the one hand and to 
the universal (as to a determination of a higher abstraction) on the other; the 
immanent content generated is still underdeveloped. At the same time, even this 
rudimentary form of determination overcomes the difficulties we have encountered 
in the Syllogism of Existence; for instance, the problem of attributing contradictory 
universals to an individual that haunted the Syllogism of Existence is no longer 
there. In the first Syllogism of Existence, we were dealing with the problem of 
contingency because the middle term there was a mere abstract quality, hence 
mutually contradictory abstract universals could be related to the same individual 
depending on which abstract determination was chosen as the mediating term. In 
the present mediational model this is no longer possible, as Hegel explains: “since 
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the middle term has the determination of allness, it contains the greenness or 
regularity as a concrete, which just for that reason is not the abstraction of 
something merely green or merely regular; with this concrete then only those 
predicates can be connected which confirm to the totality of the concrete thing” (WL 
688). 
In the present ontological model, the process of reciprocal infiltration of the 
moments of the concept is well on its way, but the method that is used for it is still 
inadequate: “the single determinations still form the bases of the universality of 
reflection that embraces them within itself; in other words, allness is still not the 
universality of the Concept but the external universality of reflection” (WL 687). The 
unification that is attained in the middle term is still only an externally imposed 
unity of a set of abstract individuals and an abstract universal. The nature of 
unification we are dealing with here can be extrapolated from Hegel’s use of the 
terms “reflection” (in the passage just quoted) and “understanding” (in an earlier 
cited passage) when referring to the present form of mediation. As already 
mentioned, Hegel distinguished understanding from reason and associated the 
former with Kant’s position. What rendered the Kantian stance problematic in 
Hegel’s eye was its inability to go beyond the rigid determinations of thought, 
whether it referred to the systematization of the empirical knowledge in the 
inferentially related rational structure (the Kantian reason within the theoretical 
domain) or the practical reason’s alleged capacity to determine the will, that is, to 
give it a determinate content (the Kantian reason within the practical domain). This 
rigidity can be exhibited both in the form of relating given abstract determination to 
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other abstract determinations or in applying the given determination to individuals 
aiming at subsuming them and thus unifying them under it. In the former case, we 
have a fixed interrelation of abstract determinations, in the latter case the rigid 
structure is imposed on empirical realm. For Hegel this form of mediation is flawed, 
as it takes the determination present in the middle term and projected to the 
extremes as the only ground of unity between them.  
What is needed is a better grounded unity between the mediated terms, a 
unity that stems from within them, rather than one that is an externally imposed. 
Therefore, the next form of syllogism will be geared to establishing immanent unity 
between individuality and universality. The middle term of the second Syllogism of 
Reflection will have individuality as a collective individuality, comprised of the 
complete set of individuals falling under the given universal. Since universality will 
have the key function in the formation of the middle term as a collective 
individuality, there is a sense in which universality becomes immanent to 
individuality.  
 
3.2) The Syllogism of Induction   
In the Syllogism of Induction, which has the form of Universality — 
Individuality — Particularity, the middle term is “individuality as complete,” and the 
individual term is a collectivity of entities that share the given universal in common. 
The other extreme is the “immediate genus as it is found in the middle term of the 
preceding syllogism or in the subject of the universal judgment, and which is 
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exhausted in all the individuals or species collectively of the middle term” (WL 689). 
As the middle term is the essential part of syllogistic mediation in general, it is 
important to note a significant transformation that has taken place here compared 
to the previous syllogisms, specifically regarding the way the middle term integrates 
different moments of the concept. If in the Syllogism of Allness we had as the middle 
term the particular determination, conjoining multiplicity of individuals under itself, 
now we have an individuality so crafted that it encapsulates universality instead of 
being merely externally related to it. This relation between the moments of the 
concept already has some resemblance with Hegel’s overall vision of the ontological 
structure of the concept and the nature of its elements’ mediated unity. The 
universality is made into an immanent, structuring element of the individuality, and 
as we shall see, this development will further deepen in the subsequent forms of 
mediation.  
The Syllogism of Induction occupies a special place in the second stage 
mediational models presented as the Syllogisms of Reflection, as it is here that the 
key role of reflection for relating the three moments of the concept is most self-
evident. The middle term that is itself the unity of individuality and universality is 
not only the ground of mediation, but also implicitly the product of reflective 
activity itself. The individuality as “the complete, namely, posited with its opposite 
determination, universality” is an outcome of reflection that combines the given 
complete set of individuals together. When contrasting the present form of 
mediation with the corresponding one from the Syllogism of Existence, Hegel 
describes it as the “syllogism of experience,” while the earlier syllogism is referred 
228 
 
to as the “syllogism of mere perception or contingent existence” (WL690). By 
experience Hegel here means “subjective taking together of the individuals into the 
genus and of the conjoining of the genus with a universal determinateness” (WL 
690). In other words, if the second mediational model in the Syllogism of Existence 
we had a mere “perception” of a specific determination of an individual, which was 
related to an abstract universal, now we are dealing with a complex process of 
comparison, reflection, abstraction in order to determine the complete set of 
individuals related to the universal property under consideration. Without this 
reflection, the middle term of the Syllogism of Induction—and thus the entire 
mediational structure—would not be possible. This is what renders the present 
model of mediation the canonical form of the Syllogism of Reflection.   
By calling the given mediational model “Syllogism of Experience” and 
describing it as “subjective taking together of the individuals,” Hegel is clearly 
implying that the outlook under consideration is akin to Empiricism. But it is an 
empiricist model approached from the Hegelian perspective. On the one hand, we 
have the middle term as the syllogism that is composed of the externally conjoined 
individuals “indifferent” to one another. And on the other hand, we have the 
development of internalization of the universal moment within the individual. The 
former is the empiricist aspect of the model, and the latter indicates the direction 
toward Hegel’s own version of transcendental ontology. Clearly, the second aspect, 
the immanence of the universal to the individual, is artificial in the way it is 
presented in the present model. The reason is that the ontological presuppositions 
based on which the model is framed is not Hegelian but empiricist. The theme of 
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immanence of the universal to the individual moment is just an indication of the 
direction in which the Syllogism chapter will develop. Given the way things stand at 
this stage, the immanence of the universal to the individuals is attained only through 
coming up with a highly unusual conception of individual as a totality of entities 
sharing relatedness to the same abstract universal, while each individual entity by 
itself is only externally related to the universal, as well as to other individuals.  
For a better understanding of the ontological model Hegel is presenting in 
the Syllogism of Induction, it is helpful to look at James Kreines’s examination of the 
Hegelian notion of the immanent concept in counter-distinction to the empiricist 
stance. The position that Kreines in his Reason in the World associates with Hume 
(although acknowledging that it might not do full justice to the complexity of 
Hume’s position and thus refers to it as “humean,” with a lower-case ‘h’) and a 
contemporary metaphysician David Lewis is quite similar to the model discussed in 
the Syllogism of Reflection in general and the Syllogism of Induction in particular:  
a ‘humean’ holds that all reality is composed of ‘loose 
and separate’ particulars or (now in Hegel’s terms) 
mutually ‘indiferent’ particulars. There are no necessary 
connections, for example. …. So there are in particular 
nothing like immanent concepts in virtue of which 
certain effects must follow. Terminology from David 
Lewis’ more recent humeanism provides a powerful 
image: ‘humean supervenience’ is ‘the doctrine that all 
there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of 
particular fact, just one little thing and then another.’ 
(Kreines 2014, 70) 
The individuality of the Syllogism of Induction, taken not as the collective 
individuality as presented in the middle term of the syllogism, but rather the 
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individual entities from which the middle term is composed of, is much like 
“individual tile” of Lewis’ humean account, the totality of which is making up a 
specific mosaic that could have been arranged in any other order. In both the Lewis-
humean, as well as the Syllogism of Induction, models, the immanent connection 
between the individuals is lacking “nothing else is ever a reason in the world for 
anything else” (Kreines 2014, 70). The reason is externally imposed by “subjective 
taking together of the individuals … with a universal determinateness” (WL 690).  
At the same time, the peculiar kind of individuality presented as the middle 
term in the Syllogism of Induction introduces the key element that Kreines identifies 
as the Hegelian alternative to the empiricist approach.  
What distinguishes anti-humeans, in general, is that 
they hold that the statement of a law does not refer to a 
pattern or regularity, and so to a great many 
particulars; it refers rather to something else that 
governs those particulars, and that is reason for any 
pattern or regularity in them. Generally this ‘something 
else’ will be something like universals, natural kinds, or 
Hegel’s immanent concept. (Kreines 2014, 72) 
The immanence of the universal moment to the individual that is actualized for the 
first time at this stage in the syllogistic models is what Kreines correctly identifies as 
Hegel’s response to the empiricism. The notion of the universals that internally 
structure or “govern,” and thus “is the reason for any pattern of regularity” we 
observe in individuals, is the key Hegelian theme that will be developing further in 
the subsequent syllogisms. At this stage, the immanence is forced as it is not the 
individuals that are internally governed by the universal, but the very peculiar kind 
of the middle term that is construed as individuality comprised of complete set of 
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actual individual entities. The reason for this, again, is that the ontological model 
that the Syllogism of Induction stands for is that of empiricism, hence Hegel’s 
description of it as “Syllogism of Experience.”  
The empiricist background assumption is another problematic aspect of the 
present mediational model, and specifically the conception of universality in place. 
Hegel points out this flaw by describing it as “universality [as] only completeness” 
The idea is that the empiricist commitment to experience as the only source of 
knowledge renders generation of genuine universality impossible. As Kant had 
already pointed out in the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, universality 
should not be mistaken for generality; the latter can be originating from experience 
but the former cannot:  
experience never gives its judgments true or strict but 
only assumed and comparative universality (through 
induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have 
perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. 
Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., 
in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be 
possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is 
rather valid absolutely a priori. (CPR137) 
The middle term of the Syllogism of Induction that is aimed at embracing 
universality within itself through grouping of the totality of individuals will be able 
to furnish only generality, but not universality. This is what Hegel has in mind when 
claiming that no matter how exhaustive our set of individuals in the middle term is, 
in relation to universality it remains “only a perennial ought-to-be” (WL691). As we 
shall see, the universal moment of the concept is one that shall undergo the most 
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fundamental transformation as we progress through the syllogistic mediational 
models. 
 
3.3) The Syllogism of Analogy 
The next mediation mediational model, the Syllogism of Analogy, is a 
transitional point that sets the ground for the third stage of mediations, the 
Syllogisms of Necessity. Due to the nature of its middle term—the “universality that 
is the reflection-into-self of a concrete” (WL 692) —the Syllogism of Analogy takes 
one step further the internalization of the universal to the individual moment of the 
concept. Universality here is presented in the form of an individuality grasped 
through its essential nature. Hegel’s example of the present form of mediation is 
“The earth is inhabited / the moon is an earth, / therefore the moon is inhabited” 
(WL 692). Hence, although on the face of it the middle term is an individual entity, 
the earth here is taken as “a concrete-reflected-into-self” as universality. The 
universal under consideration—the heavenly body—is the essential nature of the 
earth and is functioning here as the middle term or the ground for mediation. The 
key development that takes place in this model is the complete internalization of the 
universal to the individual, and in this respect we are dealing with an important step 
taken toward the Hegelian transcendental ontology. At the same time, the 
internalization of the universal is only an initial stage. There remains much to be 
done in order to arrive at Hegel’s standpoint, and the key direction is the further 
development and transformation of the nature of internalized universality.  
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Internalization of the universal to the individual at the point of transition 
from the empiricist standpoint to his own ontological model is an interesting topic 
to explore in light of the Kantian origins of Hegel’s position. The key aspect of the 
Syllogism of Analogy that sheds light on the complex relation between the two 
philosophers’ positions is the unity of the individual and the universal moments that 
is central to this model of mediation. The middle term of the syllogism is the 
individuality (the earth) taken as universality (heavenly body), and the entire 
mediation rests on the issue of unity between these two moments. A particular 
determination, in this case—being inhabited—that belongs to the middle term, is 
also attributed to the other extreme term—the moon as a result of the inferential 
mediation. Now, if the particular determination belongs to the earth due to its 
essential nature (granted that the essential nature is the heavenly body), then the 
conclusion will be valid. But the mediation fails since “the earth is inhabited [not] as 
a heavenly body in general” but “as this particular heavenly body” (WL 694). The 
key issue here is clearly the unity of the universal and the individual moments in the 
middle term and how exhaustively the former immanently determines the latter. 
The theme of the relation between universality and individuality is also one of the 
central threads of Hegel’s critical appropriation of Kant’s insights.   
Kant in the Critique of Judgment presents the notion of an intuitive 
understanding as an alternative kind of intellect, in contrast to which he is 
highlighting the key characteristics of our discursive understanding. What make this 
distinction relevant for our discussion is that Kant outlines the differences between 
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these two types of intellect in terms of the distinct ways in which they relate 
universality, particularity, and individuality:  
Our understanding is a power of concepts, i.e., a 
discursive understanding, so that it must indeed be 
contingent for it as to what the character and all the 
variety of the particular may be that can be given to it in 
nature and that can be brought under its concept. Now 
all cognition requires not only understanding but also 
intuition; and a power of complete spontaneity [as 
opposed to receptivity] of intuition would be a cognitive 
power different from, and wholly independent of 
sensibility: thus a power of complete spontaneity of 
intuition would be an understanding in the most 
general sense of the term. Hence we can conceive of an 
intuitive understanding as well (negatively, merely as 
one that is not discursive), which, [unlike ours,] does 
not (by means of concepts) proceed from the universal 
to the particular, and thus to the individual. For such an 
understanding there would not be that contingency in 
the way nature’s products harmonize with the 
understanding in terms of particular laws. (KU , 406)  
The point here is that our understanding, being discursive, is capable of cognition 
only through concepts—universal and reflected representations. In other words, 
our understanding can only think, that is, relate to individuals mediately via 
concepts (as well as relate concept to one another), but not intuit, that is, grasp the 
individual immediately (only our receptive faculty of sensibility is able to afford us 
direct relations to individuals). In other words, our discursive understanding is 
incapable with its own resources of proceeding from the universal to the particular 
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and the individual; it needs receptivity that presents sensible intuitions in order to 
“proceed from the universal to the particular and thus to the individual” (KU 406).1    
In both Hegel’s Syllogism of Analogy and Kant’s discursive understanding, 
the mediation between the universal, the particular, and the individual moments is 
unsuccessful and the nature of failure is identical. The key problem in both cases is 
the lack of mediated unity between the universal and the individual. In the Syllogism 
of Analogy, the unity of the universal and the individual moments found in the 
middle term is a mere “immediate unity” —only postulated but not grounded. Were 
we able to “proceed,” as Kant puts it, from the universal to the individual via the 
particular, the syllogistic mediation would be successful. The evidence of the 
similarity with the situation in the Kantian discursive understanding is that Kant’s 
explanation for the limitation of the discursive understanding can be directly cited 
here to explain the failure of the Syllogism of Analogy: “When cognition occurs 
through our understanding, the particular is not determined by the universal and 
therefore cannot be derived from it alone” (KU 406). Were the particular 
determinations of the individual middle term (the earth) fully derivable from the 
universal immanent to it (the heavenly body), the mediation would have been 
successful. The property of being inhabited could be validly attributed to the moon. 
But as is the case with the Kantian discursive understanding, so with the ontological 
                                                          
1
 One thing to be noted here is that Kant in these passage is using not merely universal and particular as 
he typically does while referring to different kinds of representations, but the universal, the particular, 
and the individual—all three moments of the Hegelian notion of the concept. Considering these passages 
from the Critique of Judgment were one of the most commonly referred to by Hegel from Kant’s corpus, 
we can speculate that it is here that Hegel’s tripartite notion of the concept originates. 
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model presented in the Syllogism of Analogy, the nature of the failure is the 
universal’s inability for self-particularization.  
Reading the syllogistic mediational models in parallel with the Kantian 
juxtaposition of the discursive vs. intuitive understanding is helpful not only for a 
better comprehension of the nature of the problem at hand, but also for seeing the 
way to the Hegelian solution to it. Hegel thinks that Kant, when discussing the 
limitations of discursive understanding in the Critique of Judgment, had the key to 
the solution in front of his eyes and failed to recognize it. The intuitive 
understanding, which Kant presents as merely a negative example, for Hegel holds 
the potential of overcoming the problem of contingency in the relation between the 
universal and the individual, as Kant himself had suggested in the above-cited 
passage. The key to the solution is a different conception of universality, not the 
analytic but what Kant calls the synthetic universality:  
Our understanding has the peculiarity that when it 
cognizes…it must proceed from the analytically 
universal to the particular (i.e., from concepts to the 
empirical intuition that is given); consequently, in this 
process our understanding determines nothing 
regarding the diversity of the particular. Instead our 
understanding must wait until the subsumption of the 
empirical intuition under the concept provides this 
determination…But we can also conceive of an 
understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but 
intuitive, and hence proceeds from synthetically 
universal (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the 
particular, i.e., from whole to the parts. (KU 407) 
Kant continues: “Hence such an understanding as well as its presentation of the 
whole has no contingency in the combination of the parts in order to make a 
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determinate form of the whole possible. Our understanding, on the other hand, 
requires this contingency” (KU 407). Thus, while the discursive understanding has 
to proceed from parts to the whole and is incapable of doing this without external 
input through sensible intuitions due to the analytic nature of its universality, the 
intuitive understanding that possesses the synthetic universality has no need for 
combining parts into a systematic whole, since qua intuition in it, the whole is given 
prior to the parts (here we arrive at parts by isolating the segments of the whole). At 
the same time, the intuitive understanding operates with synthetic universal and 
universality being the form of a concept for Kant, the synthetic universal of the 
intuitive understanding has the elements of both concepts and intuitions or 
universality and individuality. The synthetic universal thus offers what is lacking in 
the Syllogism of Analogy, i.e., the self-differentiation of the universality, and thus 
successful mediation between the particular and individual moments of the concept. 
And as we shall see, the promise that Hegel saw in this model presented by Kant as a 
merely negative example is the guiding thread of the development that shall take 
place in the third stage of syllogistic mediation: the Syllogism of Necessity.  
Beatrice Longuenesse, while discussing the relevance of the intuitive 
understanding for Kant–Hegel relation, associates the intellectual intuition with the 
Transcendental Ideal from The Critique of Pure Reason:  
In the first Critique, the Transcendental Ideal or the idea 
of a whole of reality, which ultimately becomes 
identified with the idea of an ens realismum as the 
ground of all reality, is described as a concept that has 
not merely ‘under it’ but ‘in it’ the totality of positive 
determinations or realities by limitation of which all 
238 
 
empirical things could be completely determined. In the 
third Critique, intellectual intuition is contrasted with 
our own discursive intellect as thinking (and thus 
generating by its very act of thought) the whole of 
reality from a ‘synthetic universal’… both the idea of a 
whole of reality (CPR) and the ‘synthetic universal’ (KU 
) combine features of representations that has been 
carefully distinguished in the Transcendental Aesthetic 
of the first Critique” (Longuenesse 1998, 261-262)  
The features of the representations that have been distinguished in the 
Transcendental Aesthetics and are re-combined in both the intuitive understanding 
and the Transcendental Ideal are of course concepts and intuitions, or the universal 
and the individual representations. The synthetic universal and the Transcendental 
Ideal as “the ground of all reality” clearly have much in common with the Hegelian 
notion of the universal moment of the concept, which as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, is the central moment of the concept in general. It contains its own 
particular determinations instead of being a product of an external abstraction from 
them; it is synthetic in the sense of generating content, which is not analytically 
extractable from the original determination; and it contains the system of 
determinations through which empirical reality is cognized. Hence, the Syllogism of 
Analogy, both with its model of mediation and the nature of the failure of this 
mediation, serves as a transitional point from the traditional ontological models 
examined in the Syllogism of Existence and the Syllogism of Reflection to the 
Hegelian transcendental ontology that will be emerging in the Syllogism of 
Necessity. Locating Kant’s footprints at this very important transitional point is one 
more testimony of the deeply running continuous current between the Kantian and 
the Hegelian stances.  
239 
 
4) The Syllogism of Necessity  
 
4.1) The Categorical Syllogism  
The next and last set of mediations presented in the Syllogism chapter is the 
Syllogism of Necessity. Here, as Hegel claims, all three terms of the logical structure 
of the concept are pervaded by the same “essential nature” (WL 696.2, 697.2). 
Therefore, the problems of externality and presupposition of the conclusion that 
haunted the previous two sets of syllogisms are no longer present here. There can 
be neither fundamental externality between the moments of the concept, nor is 
there any need for presuppositions in order to relate the terms as each one of the 
terms is declared to be an expression of the same essence, “the terms, in keeping 
with their substantial content, stand in a relation to one another which is in and for 
itself identical; we have here one essential nature pervading the three terms” (WL 
697). The determinate content-generating activity, the complete system of 
particular conceptual content, and objects individuated through them are no longer 
taken as ontologically distinct. For a better understanding of the model under 
discussion and key features, it will be helpful to relate it to some central theses of 
John McDowell’s position that, as he himself acknowledges, has been inspired by his 
reading of Hegel.   
The key difference that sets McDowell’s position apart from the Sellarsian 
one that we have looked at above is his denial of the transcendental function to what 
he calls “the below the line” elements of experience.  
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Below the line in the Sellarsian picture of a visual 
experience, there is a complex or manifold of visual 
sensations, non-concept-involving visual episodes or 
states. Why does Sellars think the picture has to include 
this elements as well as conceptual episodes of the 
relevant kind? … it is for transcendental reasons that we 
need to acknowledge the below-the-line element in the 
picture. The idea is that we are entitled to talk of 
conceptual episodes in which claims are ostensibly 
visually impressed on subjects – the above-the-line 
element in the picture – only because we can see the 
flow of such conceptual representations as guided by 
manifolds of sensations. (McDowell 2009, 23-24)  
In other words, the objective purport of the conceptual content that subjects are 
through experience saddled with rests, according to Sellars, on them being “guided 
by” sensible manifold. It is this transcendental function of sensations that is absent 
from McDowell’s picture, and the reason for this is that the objective purport of the 
conceptual episodes is decoupled from them by McDowell. Hegel’s claim about the 
unity of the three moments, wherein not only the particular and the universal but 
also the individual are stated to be “invaded by the same essential nature,” meaning 
that the schism setting apart the conceptual from the sensory content is overcome, 
corresponds to the move McDowell makes when setting apart the “below-the-line” 
or “non-concept-involving” content from objective purport of determinations of 
thought. The individual that was formerly taken to stand with one leg in the 
conceptual and the other in the sensible is now understood as an actualization of the 
conceptual capacities. This is how we ought to understand Hegel’s claims that all 
three moments are imbued by the same essential nature and that the middle term is 
“not some alien immediate content, but the reflection-into-self of the 
determinateness of the extremes” (WL 695.4).  
241 
 
What McDowell calls the “transcendental” function of the sensible given—
that is, the thesis that in order for thought to pass the master of objective purport or 
to be considered of objective reality its conceptual content has to be guided from the 
without, i.e., from sensible manifold or sheer receptivity—is removed from the 
picture in the Syllogisms of Necessity. This is what McDowell has in mind when 
claiming that Hegelian reason has no need for an external constraint, because it 
itself includes as one of its moments the receptivity that Sellars and Kant (according 
to Sellars’s reading of him) had attributed to sensibility (Having the World in View 
39). The claim of the identical essential nature of the individual to the other two 
moments of the concept means that there is no content in the individuals that is 
heterogeneous to the determinations of understanding that make up the middle 
term of the syllogism.  
At the other extreme, the activity of generation of determinations that carves 
out the logical space under consideration is related to the individual via the 
conceptual makeup of the middle term. The idea is that the relation of thought with 
the empirical realm is concept ladenness—thought relates to the world via the 
conceptual content available to it. This is in place both in apprehension of objects or 
when entities first enter our view, as well as when relating or making judgments 
involving already apprehended objects. As McDowell puts it, perceptual experience 
“contains” claims (HWV 30): “An ostensible seeing that there is a red cube in front of 
one would be an actualization of the same conceptual capacities that would be 
exercised in judging that there is a red cube in front of one” (HWV 30). Hegel 
explicitly connects the objective purport of the determinations of thought with 
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overcoming the schism between the determination of the three moments: “we have 
here one essential nature pervading the three terms, a nature in which the 
determinations of individuality, particularity and universality are merely formal 
moments. To this extent therefore the categorical syllogism is no longer subjective; 
in the above identity, objectivity begins” (WL 697.4). Hence, overcoming the schism 
between the moments of the concept brings the syllogistic structure to a whole new 
level of development; the conceptual content first occupies the center-stage of all 
three mediated moments of the ontological structure. The transcendental function 
of the sensible given is left behind, just like with the transition from the Sellarsian to 
the McDowellian stance, and what remains to be done in the rest of the Syllogisms of 
Necessity is fleshing out the results that have been attained with this move. This 
requires a more detailed examination of the nature of the relation between the 
moments of the concept.    
Hegel does not give an example of the Categorical Syllogism, but he describes 
each one of the three moments in sufficient details to paint an adequate picture of 
the ontological model under consideration. The middle term that he describes as the 
genus stands in relation to one of the extremes—individuality as “the essential 
nature of the individual and not just any of its determinateness or properties” (WL 
697). Hegel further specifies the nature of determinateness of the middle term as 
“the essential nature as content” posited as totality (WL 696). The middle term, 
therefore, should be understood as a systematically related network of 
determinations through which the essential characteristics of the individuated 
entities are conceived. The middle term as the essential nature, however, should not 
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be understood here along the lines of the Aristotelian substantial form, as the latter 
retains the elements of accidentality when mediating between an individual with its 
universal properties. Instead, as Hegel explains, the nature of the relation we have in 
place is that of necessity or concept-determination.  
The categorical syllogism in its substantial significance 
is the first syllogism of necessity, in which a subject is 
united with a predicate through its substance. But 
substance raised into the sphere of the Concept is the 
universal, posited as being in and for itself in such a 
manner that it has for the form or mode of its being, not 
accidentality, which is the relationship peculiar to 
substance but Concept-determination. (WL 696.4) 
This rejection of accidentality is indicative of difference from the Aristotelian 
model according to which, in addition to the determinations inhering in the 
individual through its substantial form, there are others that are mere accidental. 
For example, being mortal belongs to Socrates as belonging to the genus of man, but 
being sentenced to death by his fellow citizens does not. Now the ontological model 
under consideration is different from this due to the absence of the accidental 
element in the relation between the individuality and universality. There is no 
determination related to the individuality via the process of conceptualization that 
the universal moments stands for, which is not related to the web of conceptual 
content making up the middle term. What he calls concept-determination is a 
holistic constellation of inferentially related empirical concepts ever striving but 
never truly attaining full completion.   
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4.1.1) Only the Middle Term is Fully Determined 
While all three moments of the present form of mediation are identical due to 
the shared content of their “essential nature,” Hegel makes it clear that only the 
middle term presents this content in its fully determined form. At this initial stage of 
the Syllogism of Necessity, only the middle term is asserted to be “objective 
universality” (WL 696.3). This special status of the particular moment of the concept 
and the insufficient development of the individual and the universal ones is crucial 
for understanding the ontological model Hegel is examining here, as well as its 
shortcomings due to which he moves onto the subsequent relational structures. The 
systematically related constellation of empirical concepts that make up the middle 
term is placed here at the epicenter of the ontological model as the immanent 
structure of actuality. Both individuated entities that figure in perceptual 
experiences and the determination forming process of reflection are grounded on 
the middle term, which is the “reflection into themselves of the determinations of 
extremes” (695.4). In other words, the conceptual makeup that immanently 
structures reality is the ground of relation to the individual entities, on the one 
hand, and the content that the process of reflective activity operates with, on the 
other. This is another point where the proximity of the position under consideration 
with that of McDowell comes to the fore.  
The basic commitment shared with McDowell is that the structure of 
actuality constrains the structure of thought. Paul Redding sees this as a clear 
evidence of McDowell’s Aristotelianism. Aristotle’s rejection of the Platonic 
ontological model of the two separate realms, one of ideas or true being and the 
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other of sensible finite entities or of becoming, is seen by Redding as mirrored in the 
move McDowell makes in relation to the widespread view amongst the 
contemporary philosophers, which can easily be traced back to Descartes and more 
immediately to Frege. “The Fregean view involved ‘a suspect conception of how 
thought related to reality, and ultimately suspect conception of mind’. On the 
Fregean view, the sense of a term is a possession of the mind that is unaffected by 
the fact that there may be nothing in the world to answer to it” (Redding 2007, 37).  
The position being criticized assumes a “sideway-on” view that only a God 
could have. It postulates the transcendent perspective from which, on the one hand, 
is made possible to accesses the mind and its content, and on the other hand is 
gaining the view of the world directly bypassing the mind altogether. Both Aristotle 
and the McDowell, according to Redding, reject this “trans-realm” conception of 
philosophical vision and reject the decoupling of the mind from the world. The mind 
for them is not the “mythical repository” of autonomous content that stand 
unconstrained from the ultimate structure of experienced reality. Instead, the mind 
is rationally constrained by the world—the defining feature of the ontological model 
presented in the Categorical Syllogism. The middle term that presents the 
systematically related conceptual content as objective universality is the ultimate 
structure of reality that determines the extreme terms—the determination-
generating reflective activity and the perception of individual entities. Hence, the 
ontological model presented in the Categorical Syllogism offers as its key feature the 
immanent structure of the world that has priority over the perceptual individuation 




4.1.2) Universal moment as a principle of difference and mere immediate 
unity 
Hegel makes clear that, unlike the middle term, the other two moments of the 
present syllogistic structure are not full manifestations of the determined totality 
under consideration; moreover, it seems impossible to clearly define what exactly 
such a manifestation by individuality and universality in the present configuration 
would amount to. The insufficient development of the individual and the universal 
moments is the main reason behind the failure of attaining the fully mediated state 
of the concept; “this syllogism still continues to be subjective, in that the said 
identity is still the substantial identity or content, but is still not at the same time 
identity of form” (WL 697), and the middle term only possesses “positive identity, 
but is not equally the negativity of its extremes” (WL 697).  
As such, while the middle term at this stage can already be described as the 
complete self-determination of the given essence that captures the totality of its 
content, the same cannot be said of the extremes. Although both universality and 
individuality are related to the middle term, the relation, however, is not of 
mediated but of merely immediate nature. In other words, there is a lack of 
grounding of the relation between the universal and the particular moment on the 
one hand and the individual and the particular on the other. In order to make sense 
of these claims, it is helpful to consider them on the background of McDowell’s 




The key thesis advanced by McDowell in his influential work Mind and World 
is the direct perception of the conceptually structured world. He sees it as the only 
viable option to avoid the two bad alternatives: the myth of the given (the 
widespread positions amongst philosophers, especially those sympathetic to the 
empiricist tradition) and the frictionless spinning in the void (which is advanced by 
Donald Davidson in his attempt to overcome the problems associates with the myth 
of the given, but which has problems of its own according to McDowell). Instead of 
conferring to the environmental stimulus the causal function, as a result of which we 
acquire observational judgments, McDowell wants to maintain that we have the 
capacity to procure the perceptual knowledge via immediate access of the 
conceptually structured actuality. In other words, instead of experience standing in 
a causal relation to our beliefs and affecting conceptually articulated responses in 
us, it has to serve as a rational constraint, since only the latter can ground the 
normative role that experience plays for the objective purport of out believes. The 
rational “friction” with the world, which allows McDowell to walk the fine line 
between Scylla of the myth of the given and Charybdis of the Davidsonian spinning 
in the void, is provided by the direct perception of the conceptually structured 
world. Hence, perceived individuals, instead of effecting conceptually structured 
observational beliefs in us, already “contain” conceptual content. This distinction 
between the perceptual and observational knowledge allows McDowell to maintain 
that the former (the perceptual knowledge) affords us a direct access to the world.  
Clearly, in this picture the key element is the differentiation between the 
perceptual vs. mere observational judgment. It is what allows McDowell to set his 
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position apart from that of Davidson. But it is not clear that McDowell’s stance is 
free of problems, as Robert Brandom points out McDowell has difficulties with 
maintaining a clear distinction between the perceptual and observational 
judgments.  
What sort of a fact is it that in some cases where we 
non-inferentially acquire a true belief by exercising a 
reliable disposition non-inferentially to respond to the 
fact in question by acquiring the belief there is a 
perceptual experience present, while in others there is 
not? How would we go about settling the question of 
whether the physicist has genuine perceptual 
experiences of mu mesons? Is there any way in 
principle to tell other than asking? And if we do ask, is 
there any chance that the physicist is wrong, because 
the physicist has been taught a bad theory? Could I 
think I was having perceptual experiences of mu 
mesons or the maleness of chickens when I was not, or 
vice versa? Do we know just by having a perceptual 
experience what sensory modality it corresponds to (so 
that the—supposed—fact that the chicken sexers get 
this wrong is decisive evidence that they do not have 
genuine perceptual experiences)? The answers to 
questions such as these determine just how classically 
Cartesian McDowell’s notion of perceptual experience 
is—and so, from my point of view, just how suspicious 
we should be of it. (Brandom 2002, Reading McDowell, 
100)   
The difficulty in McDowell’s position that Brandom is pointing out here is of exactly 
the same nature as the one we are dealing with in the ontological model of the 
Categorical Syllogism. The system of determinate conceptual content is asserted as 
the ground of actuality by being presented as the middle term of the syllogism, but 
its relation to perceptual experiences of individuals is merely postulated, not well 
justified. While McDowell maintains that the conceptually structured world is 
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directly perceived by us, it is not clear on what grounds he can argue that any 
specific non-inferentially acquired conceptual content does better justice to the 
world than any other, granted that we have no other source of objective purport 
than perceptual experience itself.  
As with McDowell’s position, just like with the ontological model Hegel 
considers in the Categorical Syllogism, the relation between the particular and the 
individual moments of the concept lacks justification—this is the meaning in the 
Hegelian technical vocabulary of the critical point raised by Brandom against 
McDowell in the above-cited passage. Brandom, however, does not merely place his 
finger on the problematic aspect of the ontological model under consideration, he 
also points out a way toward a solution. What appears to be the ultimate ground of 
objective purport of the given beliefs is not finding oneself in a state of being in 
possession of some conceptually articulated beliefs, but through drawing inferences 
from the given conceptually structured perceptual episodes, deciding how well it 
squares with other beliefs we hold, and in general engaging in the social practice of 
giving and asking for reasons.  
Thus, with the ontological model of the categorical syllogism, just like with 
the McDowellian version of it, the lack of mediation or mere postulation of the unity 
of the moments constitutes the key problem that needs to be addressed. Hence, 
what remains to be done is to transform the immediateness of the relation between 
the middle term and the extremes to mediated unity. This would mean reworking of 
the present conceptions of the individual and the universal moments and putting 
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forth a relational structure in which all three moments are fully mediated with one 
another. This would mean, in the McDowellian version of the model, not a mere 
postulation of the rational constraint via perceptual experience but offering a well-
grounded account of how the individuated entities are related to the conceptual 
framework on the one hand and how both of these are related to the process of 
generation of determinations on the other. This will be accomplished through the 
development that takes place in the remaining part of the Syllogism of Necessity; the 
very same posited totality found at the present stage only in the middle term will be 
developed in the extremes as well.  
 
4.2) The Hypothetical Syllogism 
The theme of the relationship between the individual and the particular 
moments of the concept comes to the center of attention in the Hypothetical 
Syllogism in the form of the relation between the diversity of individuals and the 
inner substantial identity that underlies them. The syllogistically expressed 
ontological model has the following form: “If A is, then B is / But A is / Therefore B 
is.” The major premise of the syllogism is the hypothetical judgment described by 
Hegel in the following words: “The relation of the hypothetical judgment is necessity 
or inner substantial identity associated with external diversity of existence, or 
mutual indifference of being in the sphere of Appearance—an identical content 
which forms the internal basis” (WL 699). It is natural to think of the two sides of 
the relationship as the former standing for the conditioned and the latter for the 
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condition. But Hegel’s picture is more complex; he wants to sublate the rigid 
division between the essential, the more important moment on the one hand and its 
manifestation on the other. In the hypothetical judgment (the major premise of the 
present syllogism), either side can be taken both as the condition and the 
conditioned (WL 699).  
Clearly, here the central difficulty of the previous model—the relation 
between the particular and the individual moments of the concept—is being re-
examined by Hegel from a different angle. On the one hand, “the inner, abstract” side 
can be seen as the conditioning that stands behind its manifestation in the 
multiplicity of individuals. On the other hand, though, the separate, scattered 
appearances of individuals can be described as the conditions for the manifestation 
of the genuine reality that is revealed through them. One way to think of this 
relation is to compare it with the way physicists typically conceive of a force (for 
example, electromagnetic or gravitational force). We can think of the force as the 
underlying essential reality that manifests itself through a series of appearances, 
which is the effect it has on the observable object. In this sense, the interior, the 
invisible is the essential, while the exterior and the observable the unessential. On 
the other hand, however, we can also think of the series of appearances as the 
essential aspect of reality and reduce existence to what manifests itself to us; in this 
case, the postulated force is a mere theoretical hypothesis and the only reason that 
we come to posit its existence is the series of appearances observed. Hence, in the 
hypothetical syllogism through its major premise, the hypothetical judgment, the 
theme of the relation between the individuals and the particularity as determinate 
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“content which forms the internal basis” is introduced and their mutual 
“indifference” is put in question. In other words, Hegel is focusing on the crucial flaw 
of the previous model, the theme of the relation between the particularity and the 
individuality, and is clearly paving his way toward overcoming the insufficient 
degree of mediatedness between them.   
The relation between the condition and the conditioned and complexities 
involved with this is a prominent theme for the Hegelian system in general. In 
gaining a better understanding of it, it might be helpful to look at one example of 
how the condition vs. conditioned interrelatedness is played out, namely the 
relationship between the theoretical vs. practical stance. “In the theoretical attitude, 
we attempt to ‘make’ the objective subjective; and in the practical attitude, we 
attempt to make subjective objective” (Pippin 1989, 134). While the practical 
philosophy can be seen as a translation of the inner, the subjective into the outer, 
the objective; thus, the inner is the condition and the outer the conditioned. Within 
the theoretical stance, the objective reality presents the conditions that are being 
internalized. Hegel’s overall position is that the very same schema is in operation in 
two different guises in these stances, “The distinction between thought and will is 
simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes, but they are not two 
separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is particular way of thinking” (PR, par4 
35). This positing of the identical schema in operation in both of these stances 
undermines the traditional rigid distinction between them and is clearly related to 
the sublation of the distinction between the condition and the conditioned that is 
taking place in the Hypothetical Syllogism. The re-description of the relation 
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between the theoretical and practical attitudes as a manifestation of the very same 
schema operating in two different modalities is related to the overcoming of the 
schism between the individual and particular moments of the concept—in the 
Categorical Syllogism, the particular moment occupied the pride of place of the 
ontological ground, hence the condition, while the individuality was the conditioned. 
In the present model, the distinction between the two is problematized, and 
individuality—just as much as the particular moment of the concept—is at the 
ground of the model under consideration. Just like with the theoretical vs. practical 
stances with the particular and individual moments of the concept, we also reach 
the realization of their identity, their mutual mediatedness.  
The crucial difference between the Hypothetical Judgment and the 
Hypothetical Syllogism is that the nexus of relations between the conditions and the 
conditioned as presented in the former (which also is the major premise of the 
latter) is a mere potentiality still lacking actualization—the feature that is 
introduced in the latter. The schematic content of the nexus is a mere potentiality 
standing beyond the immediate being still requiring an additional element for 
actualization. This element is supplanted by the minor premise “A is” of the 
hypothetical syllogism, “The conditions are a scattered material that waits and 
demands to be used; this negativity is the mediating element; the free unity of the 
Concept. It determines itself as activity… This middle term is therefore no longer 
merely an inner necessity, but necessity that is; the objective universality contains 
self-relation as simple immediacy, as being” (WL 700). Hence, to the inner necessity 
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of the major premise, the minor one adds the missing element for its actualization—
immediate existence.  
Here Hegel is using an important element of his system without explicitly 
naming it—the notion of true infinity. Unlike the spurious infinity, which for Hegel is 
a mere endless reiteration of the finite, the true infinity is not extraneous to the 
finitude. Infinity is a process of self-relation that is immanent and in fact constitutive 
of any concrete finitude. Hegel describes the middle term of the preset syllogism, “A” 
as an “individuality as self-related negative unity,” but clearly it is not mere 
individuality as the middle term is already mediated with the particular moment 
and this is what renders it into a self-related unity. Thus, with the middle term and 
its “simple immediacy,” the true infinity enters the picture as the driving force of the 
actualization or the concretion of the nexus of necessity. The whole syllogism thus is 
acquiring the quality of self-related objective universality—the feature that will be 
further developed in the following model—the Syllogism of Disjunction.   
Now, how does this move map onto the contemporary renditions of the 
ontological and epistemological models we have looked at above? As has been 
argued, some interesting aspects of the problems of the previous stage of mediation 
of the Syllogism of Necessity—the Categorical Syllogism—could be brought forth 
through the examination of Robert Brandom’s criticism of John McDowell’s position. 
In a similar vein, the development that has taken place in the present stage of 
mediation—the hypothetical syllogism—can be clarified by attending to some 
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important features of Brandom’s own position, specifically those features that set 
him apart from McDowell.  
One of the most fundamental disagreements between them, as Brandom sees 
it, is McDowell’s insufficient appreciation of the role that our conceptual content 
generating activity plays in the individuation of the entities that figure in our 
perception experiences. McDowell’s emphasis on the direct access of the 
conceptually structured reality, according to Brandom, ultimately commits him to 
positing the conception of the world populated by entities individuated prior to any 
conceptualizing activity on our part. Brandom is skeptical of this commitment of 
McDowell and wants to reverse the relation—it is not that our cognition grasps the 
conceptually structured worlds, but our conceptual content generating and applying 
activity is the condition of the possibility of both individualization of the entities 
that makes up the world, as well as the specific conceptual determinations (the fact 
that entities appear of being this and such kinds, having this and such properties, 
etc.) that structure the world that manifest itself to us.  
This is exactly the move that is made in the Hypothetical Syllogism in relation 
to the Categorical Syllogism. The actualization of the relation between the individual 
and the particular moment is carried out through the universal moment of the 
concept. That is to say, the individuation of entities as instances of a given 
constellation of determinate conceptual content is conditioned on the conceptual 
content generating activity—the process of formation of determinations through 
which concepts are applied in judgments, inferences are drawn from doxastic 
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commitments, as well as the conceptual content of determinations used in 
judgments, the revisions are made to them in case incompatibility between two or 
more commitments arise, etc. In other words, if in the previous model the particular 
moment of the concept—a system of determinate conceptual content structuring 
reality—was granted the fundamental ontological role, now the move is made 
toward emphasizing the centrality of the conceptual content generating activity—
the universal moment of the concept. It is only through the latter that the former is 
actualized and manifests itself as the immanent structure of reality.   
This development clearly maps on the move Brandom makes in relation to 
McDowell, echoing the critical point cited earlier as captured by these words: 
What sort of a fact is it that in some cases where we 
non-inferentially acquire a true belief by exercising a 
reliable disposition non-inferentially to respond to the 
fact in question by acquiring the belief there is a 
perceptual experience present, while in others there is 
not? How would we go about settling the question of 
whether the physicist has genuine perceptual 
experiences of mu mesons? Is there any way in 
principle to tell other than asking? And if we do ask, is 
there any chance that the physicist is wrong, because 
the physicist has been taught a bad theory? (Brandom 
2002) 
Brandom’s distancing of himself from McDowell’s position that mirrors the 
differences between the last two syllogisms can be described as a rejection of the 
Aristotelian stance regarding the primary locus of conceptual content and its 
replacement with a form of conceptual pragmatism. Instead of postulation of the 
conceptually structured world as the ultimate source of intentional content that is 
actualized in us as we come into “rational friction” with the world, the sources of 
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conceptual determination are to be sought in the practical activity of application of 
concepts in judgments, drawing inferences from them, and in general from the 
functional role of semantic content generating activities that are carried out in “the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” 
The conclusion of the hypothetical syllogism is “therefore B is.” Hegel 
explains that this is a manifestation of the B as having “its being through an other.” 
Here the central theme of the Hegelian transcendental ontology, self-relation, is 
brought to the fore one more time. B’s existence is grounded on the existence of A. 
But at the same time, the inner substantial identity that binds the two makes this 
relation to the other into a self-relation. The identity of the individual and the 
particular moments of the concept, “the absolute content of A and B are the same,” is 
not an immediate but a mediated identity, a unity that has been posited through 
“form’s activity”: “the difference of A and B is an empty name. Thus it is a unity 
reflected into itself—hence and identical content; and it is so not merely implicitly 
but it is also posited as such through this syllogism” (WL 701). As it has been argued 
in the previous chapter, Hegel is using the Kantian notion of the universality as the 
form of concepts. Here in the Hypothetical Syllogism, as we have seen above, the 
mediation between the individual and the particular moments has been 
accomplished via the universal moment. Hence, in the passage just quoted, Hegel is 
tying the self-relation that obtains between the moments of the concept with 
universality or “form’s activity.” This is an important thesis that will be further 
elaborated in the subsequent syllogistic model—the universal moment as the 
ground of the self-relational structure of the concept. I will present a more detailed 
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analysis of this crucial feature of the Hegelian transcendental ontology in the 
following section, where a more comprehensive account of the self-relational 
structure of the concept will be laid out. At this point, it is important to note a 
significant step taken in the present form of syllogism that sets the stage for the next 
and the final model of mediation—the overcoming of the clear-cut distinction 
between the contents of the three moments.  
In the beginning of the Syllogisms of Necessity, all three terms were 
described by Hegel as “pervaded” by the same essential nature; the content of the 
moments, however, were not developed to the same degree. Now, not only is the 
clear-cut distinction between the two sides of the major premise (individuality and 
particularity) problematized in regard to the issue of which is the condition and 
which the conditioned, or cause vs. effect, ground and consequence, but also the 
middle term—A is declared to have the same absolute content as B (WL 700). In 
other words, the content given in individuals has no element that is not reducible to 
the system of empirical conceptual determinations that make up the particular 
moment of the concept. Moreover, the universal moment that is the conceptual 
content generating and applying process guided by the determinations of reflection 
plays the mediating role between the individual and the particular moments. That is, 
instead of the mind passively acquire the specific content caused by the perceived 
individual, it is actively engaged in determination of its conceptual content. The 
mediation goes the opposite direction as well—the universal moment is not only 
engaged in determining the individual by means of the constellation of the concepts 
available to it, but it also is the process through which conceptual determinations 
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are generated and revisions made based on the individuals entities encountered in 
experience and the doxastic endorsements and inferential commitments they result 
in.  
This mutual dependence of the individual and the particular moments of the 
concept, and the function that the universality plays in it, have clear resemblance 
with the Kantian determinative and the reflective judgment. In the former case, it is 
the concept that is at hand and the individual is to be subsumed under it; in the 
latter, individual intuitions are presented to the mind, which searches for the 
concept through which they can be determined. Kant’s and Hegel’s positions are 
closer here than is often taken to be. Some commentators have read Kant as 
discriminating between two types of judgments, determinative and reflective, as two 
different modalities of operation of the mind. But as Longuenesse has convincingly 
shown, these are not two different, but instead the very same, activity of the mind—
although with two different outcomes. In the former, the individual is subsumed 
under a concept, while in the latter the very same process of searching for a concept 
fails: “They [reflective judgments] differ in this regard from other judgments related 
to the sensible given, which are not merely reflective, but determinative as well. 
What makes judgments merely reflective is that in them the effort of the activity of 
judgment to form concepts fails” (Longuenesse 1998, 164). Hence, the Kantian 
picture of the process of reflection that related concepts and intuitions has much in 
common with the Hegelian model of the universal moment as the actualization of 




4.3) The Disjunctive Syllogism 
The Kantian norm Hegel uses to evaluate the ontological models in the 
Syllogism chapter states that the moments of the concept ought to be not merely 
related to one another, but their relation should also have the nature of self-relation. 
This norm, as we have seen, has not been met by any of the alternative models 
discussed so far. Only the last model considered by Hegel, the Disjunctive Syllogism, 
does justice to this criterion. As Hegel puts it, in the Disjunctive Syllogism the three 
moments of the concept—universality, particularity, and individuality—attain the 
state in which “the distinction of mediating and mediated [as well as form and 
content, … ] has disappeared” (WL 703). Hence, the Disjunctive Syllogism, the last 
ontological model presented in the Syllogism chapter, lays out Hegel’s vision of the 
basic structure of actuality. It is the culminating point of the development taking 
place in the Syllogism chapter that can be best described as the epigenesis of the 
logical structure of the concept—the development through which the concept 
attains “its positedness“ (WL704).  
One of the most distinctive features that set the disjunctive syllogism apart 
from all others is that it has the middle term in both premises and conclusion. The 
syllogism is presented in two different versions: “A is either B or C or D / But A is B / 
Therefore A is neither B nor C” and “A is either B or C or D / But A is neither C nor D 
/ Therefore A is B.” Either one of these versions presents the middle term, A, as the 
subject in both the major and the minor premises, as well as in the conclusion. 
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Overall, the middle term comes to the fore as embodying the totality of the concept, 
representing all three of its moments. In the major premise, the middle term is 
universality, in the minor one it is particularity, and in the conclusion it is presented 
as individuality (WL 702). Each one of these components has significant 
implications and warrants a close examination.  
The first premise, “A is either B or C or D,” presents “a universal, and in its 
predicate, the universal sphere particularized in the totality of its species” (WL 702). 
Thus, we have on the one hand the universal moment as the determinate content-
generating process through which the particular ground-level empirical concepts 
are furnished and their content is revised. Once more, the major premise of the 
syllogism draws on the result of the previous form of mediation—the universality as 
grounding the particular moment of the concept. The middle term of the Disjunctive 
Syllogism carves out the logical—or, rather, the ontological—space within which the 
systematically related constellation of empirical concepts is generated: “As 
universality it is first the substantial identity of the genus; but secondly an identity 
that embraces within itself particularity.” Hegel uses the term substance and 
Substantial identity in a peculiar sense here, reflecting his ontological vision; it is 
declared to be “activity-of-form” of the possibility passing into actuality (par150, EL 
225). Hence, the universality is the substance in the sense of the underlying ground 
or the condition from the activity of which its potentialities are materialized. What 
Hegel has in mind here is clearly the generation of empirical determinate content 
through the universal moment of the concept as the “creative power” (WL 556).  
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At the same time, as we already know from the development that has taken 
place in the Syllogisms of Necessity, the schism between the moments of the concept 
is overcome; therefore, the products of the universal moment of the concept cannot 
be different from it. This is what Hegel wants to bring home in the passages like the 
following: “When substance, as self-identical being-in-and for-self, is distinguished 
from itself as totality of accidents, that which mediates is substance as power” (WL 
557). If “the substance” stands for the underlying creating power, the determinate 
content generating activity, “the totality of accidents” that it furnishes is the 
determinations posited by the power. But as Hegel makes clear in this passage, the 
universal moment needs to distinguish from itself in order to be considered as 
merely the empirical concept generating activity, because at this stage in the 
development of the syllogistic mediational structure, the state of complete unity 
between the moments is attained. Hence, for Hegel, the totality of the constellation 
of the empirical concepts is identical to the process through which they are 
generated and revised. This thesis is deeply rooted in the Kantian heritage of Hegel’s 
transcendental ontology. Recall Kant’s dual notion of the concept as the unity of the 
act of synthesis, as well as the universal and reflected representation. The activity of 
the combination of the manifold on the one hand, and the determinate universal on 
the other in the Kantian account correspond to the empirical content generating 
process (the universal moment) and the totality of the determinations furnished 
through them (the particular moment) in the Hegelian account. 
The identity of the two moments within the Hegelian account means the 
ultimate reducibility of the content of each one of the moments to the other. There 
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are no particular determinations of the systematically related constellation of 
empirical concepts that is not produced by and therefore also revisable via the 
determination furnishing activity. In other words, the totality of the content of the 
particular moment is posited through the universal one, which incorporates the 
immediacy of experience into the mediate system of empirical concept that it 
continuously forms, alters, revises, clarifies, etc. On the other hand, the universal 
moment, the activity of the empirical determinations generating process, is none 
other than the application of the very same empirical concepts that make up the 
particular moment. The universal moment of the concept is not some transcendent 
ground from which the content of empirical concepts is formed and altered. Instead, 
it is the process of application of these concepts itself, through which the inferential 
relations between different determinations are drawn through discerning the 
consequences and incompatibilities that a given doxastic commitment or conceptual 
content requires. Through experience, the systematically related empirical concepts 
are being applied, but every new episode of experience that adds bits of doxastic 
and inferential commitments implies transformation of the whole spectrum of 
interrelated empirical determination through an inferential chain of 
interdependencies. Hence, the universal moment is the continuously evolving 
process of application of the empirical concepts through which shaping and 
transformation of the content of these systematically interrelated determinations is 
taking place. Thus, the mutual dependency of the universal and the particular 
moments of the basic ontological structure that Hegel calls the concept is how we 




4.3.1) Contrast with Bowman’s Interpretation of Unity 
When introducing the universal moment of the concept, Hegel described it 
not merely as a creative power, but as a free creative power. Freedom, however, for 
Hegel means “being with self in its other.” Hence, we can see that up to this point in 
the process of mediation between the three moments of the concept, universality has 
been free merely potentially. It is only in the Disjunctive Syllogism that it fully 
actualizes its freedom—as the rupture between the form and content, mediated and 
mediating aspects of the immanent structure of the concept, is overcome, and 
universality comprehends the totality of the particularization as identical to it. 
Universality, as the creative power, “is therefore the universal sphere that contains 
its total particularization” (WL 701). The unity between the dynamic and the static 
aspects of the Hegelian ontology is one of the central claims of Bowman’s recent 
interpretation of the dualistic aspect of the Hegelian notion of the concept. The basic 
account of the static ontological structure is borrowed by Bowman from Rolf 
Horstmann’s influential work on Hegel’s ontology Ontologie und Relationen, which 
he synthesizes with the dynamic account of the very same structure as the source of 
all finite determination as presented in Dieter Henrich’s works.  
As my reading of the unity between the universal and the particular 
moments of the concept has demonstrated, the basic idea behind Bowman’s project 
is indeed correct, as the moments of the concept are two sides of the same coin (one 
static, the other dynamic) and only with keeping this dual aspect of the Hegelian 
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concept can we gain proper understanding of him. But just as the overall thrust of 
his position is right, the specific account of the self-relational structure Bowman 
offers is mistaken. The determinations of reflection—identity, difference, ground—
that Bowman describes as the “single complex rational structure” of the concept, in 
reality are the determinations of reflection or the basic functions guiding the 
conceptual content generating activity. This is the reason that Hegel presents them 
not in the Doctrine of the Concept but in the Doctrine of Essence. The dynamic part 
that Bowman discusses, on the other hand, relying on Henrich’s account, also 
belongs to the Doctrine of Essence and in fact is nothing but a close investigation 
into the structural elements of the determinate content generating process, which 
he earlier misidentified as the basic features of the Hegelian notion of the concept. 
Hence, his conclusion, “the Concept and absolute negativity are two sides of a single 
‘speculative’ coin, one structural, one dynamic” is fundamentally misleading as what 
he has described as the immanent structure of the concept in reality is the set of the 
functions guiding “the dynamic” moment of the dualistic picture.  
The unity of the dynamic and the static aspects, as my reading has 
demonstrated, is indeed fundamental to Hegel’s transcendental ontology, but it is 
not the identity of the concept on the one hand and dynamic process on the other as 
Bowman would have it. Rather, it is the self-relational structure of the concept itself 
and the unity between its moments. Indeed, if the self-relational unity is the 
fundamental feature of the Hegelian ontology, as Bowman claims, it ought to be 
located on the bottom floor of the ontological theory under consideration—it has to 
be discerned on the level of the concept (i.e., not the essence as Bowman would have 
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it). As my analysis in the last three chapters has shown, Hegel does indeed present 
such self-relational structure in the concept; moreover, this self-mediation is the 
defining characteristic of the concept unifying the dynamic element (the universal 
moment as the process of generation and revision of the systematically related 
empirical concepts that proceeds through incorporating experience within the web 
of these inferential interdependencies) with the static one (the particular moment 
as the constellation of inferentially interrelated empirical concepts generated 
through the dynamic moment) and the individual (the unity of the other two 
moments). As we have seen, the attainment of the complete mediation between 
these three moments of the concept has been the normative force behind the 
development that we have traced in the present chapter. Each new syllogistic model 
took us one step closer to the fulfillment of this criterion, which is fully met only in 
the Disjunctive Syllogism.  
Having looked at the major premise of the Disjunctive Syllogism and the 
ontological commitment implied in it, I shall briefly outline the key aspects of the 
remaining parts of the mediational model under consideration. If in the major 
premise, the term “A” is subject, which is universal that in its predicate 
particularizes itself (WL 702.2), in the minor premise the same term appears as 
“determinate or as a species” (WL 702.2), which Hegel also describes as “the 
reciprocal exclusion of the terms” (WL 701.3). Here the very same term that was 
exhibited as universality in the major premise is particularized into determinations 
related by the inferential pathways. The totality of this conceptual content is making 
up the particular moment of the concept. If the focus of the major premise was the 
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self-differentiation of the universal moment as the creative power positing 
determinations, the minor premise offers a look at the nature of interrelatedness of 
the empirical concepts and role that this interrelatedness place in determining their 
content. The point is that the determinate boundaries of how things are is possible 
only through the inferential web of interrelations between the concepts that spell 
out the relations of necessary implication and incompatibility. The specific meaning 
of a given determination is constituted by the totality of the inferential relations it 
has with other determinations through which the necessary implications and 
incompatibilities are articulated.   
Here Hegel is again tying the particularization with the third moment, the 
individuality. This particularly vividly comes to the fore in the conclusion of the 
Disjunctive Syllogism: “Further, this exclusion is not merely a reciprocal exclusion, 
or the determination merely a relative one, but it is just as essentially a self-related 
determination, the particular as the individuality to the exclusion of the others” 
(701.3). The already familiar theme of the individuation of entities via particular 
determination is brought to the fore again. One more time we are dealing with the 
Kantian insight (integrated within the complex architectonics of the Hegelian 
concept) that objects, instead of being given to the mind as already individuated, 
existing out there in the world as objects of this and such nature making up 
determinate furniture of the world, are conditioned by the conceptual content 
through which the mind relates to the world. Hence, both extreme terms of the 
Disjunctive Syllogism, particularity and individuality, are grounded on the universal 
moment that makes up the middle term of the final ontological model presented by 
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Hegel in the Syllogism chapter. The central thesis of the Hegelian transcendental 
ontology is that the conceptual content generating process is what grounds the 
particular determination and their meanings, as well as the entities individuated 
through them: “The extremes, in distinction from this middle term, appear only as 
positedness which no longer possesses any determinateness peculiar to itself as 
against the middle term” (WL  702).  
 
4.3.2) Ontology of Formal Logic  
With positing the universal moment as the middle term of the last 
mediational model, the dynamic nature of the Hegelian vision of the world came to 
the fore with its full force for the first time. Not only the complex empirical concepts 
through which we relate to the world, but even the most basic determinations, from 
which they are made up and which tie the empirical concepts and their content into 
a system of interrelated elements, are the products of the determinate content 
generating activity, a process that is neither merely mental, nor merely discursive 
justificatory or explanatory, nor merely practical and action guiding—rather, it is 
one that underlies and conditions all these. It is interesting to note in this respect 
the change that has taken place in the last three syllogistic models regarding the 
different implications they have on the laws of logic (in the traditional, not the 
Hegelian sense of the term).  
Within the ontological vision that was expressed in the Categorical Syllogism, 
where the particular moment was given the central role, the validity of the laws of 
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logic was ultimately rooted in the structure of the world. By maintaining that the 
systematically related determinations that make up the particular moment of the 
concept constitute the basic structure of actuality, we were also implicitly granting 
the same status to the formal relation between these determinations. Hence, 
according to the model expressed in the Categorical Syllogism, our thought is bound 
by the laws of logic because they structure and describe the relations within the 
world; actuality is the source of normativity of the rules of inference. In the 
Hypothetical, and especially the Disjunctive Syllogism on the other hand, the center 
of gravity is shifting from the particular to the universal moment of the concept. 
What this means is that the laws of logic, instead of being anchored in the 
conceptually structured world that we somehow directly intuit, are an abstract and 
formalized version of the rules in place in the social practices of applying empirical 
concepts through which the process of generation and revision of their content is 
taking place. The laws of correct inference are the implicit rules guiding everyday 
social practices and made explicit in what Brandom has called “the language game of 
giving and asking for reasons.”  
Paul Redding, in his article entitled “Brandom, Sellars and the myth of the 
logical given,” contrasts Robert Brandom’s Hegel-inspired stance with that of early 
Bertrand Russell regarding their respective position on the question of the origins of 
the laws of logic. Russell had put forth a position that Redding describes as the myth 
of the logical given, echoing that “What we believe, when we believe the law of [non-
]contradiction, is not that the mind is so made that it must believe the law of [non-
]con-tradiction. This belief is a subsequent result of psychological reflection, which 
270 
 
presupposes the belief in the law of [non-]contradiction. The belief in the law of 
[non-]contradiction is a belief about things, not only about thoughts” (Redding 2007, 
60-61; Russell 1912, 88-89).  
When it comes to the question of the ontological status of the laws of logic, 
Russell’s position has much in common with the model put forth in the Categorical 
Syllogism. While Brandom’s alternative is inspired by Hegel and shares the basic 
approach on the issue presented in the Hypothetical and more explicitly in the 
Disjunctive Syllogism, for both Hegel and Brandom the basic laws of inference, 
rather than being given to us as some form of transcendent metaphysical 
substructure of being, are the immanent element in the patterns of social practices 
from which emerge the determinate conceptual content and the normative force of 
the formal relations between its elements. This shift from the objective to the 
subjective side as the fundamental locus of the laws of logic reminds us one more 
time of the Kantian origin of Hegel’s position, as Paul Redding puts it in his 
comparison of Hegel’s Kantian stance with Russell’s Aristotelian one:  
With this, then, Russell, following Moore, had reverted 
to a position closer to Aristotle’s representationalist 
interpretation of the logical categories than to Kant’s. 
For Aristotle, it would seem, the categories reflected in 
the logical behaviour of our words reflect structures 
properly belonging to being, while for Kant the worldly 
structures – in the sense of the way that they are for us 
– reflect the logical structures of our judgements. 
(Redding 2007, 61) 
At the end of the Syllogism chapter we are presented with the Hegelian vision of 
these “worldly structures,” which Kant had traced to the logical forms of our 
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judgment. But in Hegel’s hands, they are no longer anchored within the Kantian 
psychologism. While the Syllogism chapter of the Logic is the culmination of the 
project announced by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason—replacing metaphysics 
with logic, that is, tracing the basic determinations of reality to the unified self-
relational structure of thought, the nature of this self-relational structure has 
undergone radical reinterpretation as I have demonstrated. Hegel sees the relation 
between empirical multiplicities of the phenomena we find in the world, the 
determinate conceptual content on which our cognitive and practical relation to it 
stands, and the continuous process of application and revision of this content to the 
empirically experiences reality (the process guided by the determinations or 
reflection presented in the logic of essence) as the three moments of the holistic 
self-relational onto-logical structure that constitutes the most basic schema of 
Hegel’s transcendental ontology. 
The process of fundamental reformulation of the traditional metaphysics into 
the transcendental ontology driven by the Kantian principle of self-relational unity 
that I have retraced here culminates in the ontological outlook that is far from its 
widespread misinterpretation. The thesis that Hegel’s system integrates within itself 
the totality of the world from the ordinary mundane object to the abstract logical 
forms of inference, from the religious practices of Hindus to Kant’s categorical 
imperative, etc., ought not to be understood as a claim to present an exhaustive list 
of the totality of phenomena, an encyclopedia of every single entity making up the 
furniture of the world. Instead, Hegel presents the schema of the interrelation of the 
activity (in both theoretical and practical senses of the term, or thought and deed), 
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the determinations furnished through it, alongside the logic structure of 
individuated entities that rests on these. Hence, the concept and its self-relational 
schema presented in the Syllogism section instead of mirroring the world 
immanently constitutes it; or, the order that we find in the world instead of being 
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